THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

COLLEGE OF NAVAL COMMAND AND STAFF

NAVAL STAFF COLLEGE

SYLLABUS
STRATEGY AND WAR
OCTOBER 2006 – JANUARY 2007

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, Rhode Island

FOREWORD

This pamphlet contains the syllabus for the Strategy and War Course for the College of Naval Command and Staff and Naval Staff College, October 2006 – January 2007.

SUBMITTED

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STRATEGY AND WAR
COURSE DESCRIPTION

Course Objectives and Content

The Strategy and War Course is designed to teach students to think strategically. Strategy is the relationship between war's purpose, objective, and means. The aim of the course is to sharpen the student's ability to assess how alternative operational courses of action best serve to achieve overall strategic and national objectives. Students will be asked to think in a disciplined, critical, and original manner about the international strategic environment, about a range of potential strategies, and about the strategic effects of joint and interagency operations.

The task for strategists and planners in translating operational outcomes into enduring strategic results is never easy or straightforward. The Strategy and War Course examines how the overall strategic environment shapes operational choices and outcomes. In turn, the course also examines the strategic effects of operations, exploring how battlefield outcomes change the strategic environment. Operational success in war, for example, might open up new strategic opportunities. Meanwhile, operational failures might close off promising strategic courses of action. This interaction between the operational use of military force and strategic outcomes can lead to unanticipated results. The history of warfare provides many examples of lopsided military victories that were largely unforeseen by planners. In addition, the commitment of large numbers of forces and huge resources sometimes produce meager strategic results. Unanticipated second- and third-order effects time and again frustrate planners, who seek to dominate the battlefield and the course of operations.

Of course, in war, the enemy always seeks to frustrate the best-laid plans and impose high risks and costs on operations. The Strategy and War Course emphasizes that a war's outcome is contingent upon the actions taken by those engaged in the fighting. A skillful adversary seeks to exploit strategic vulnerabilities and operational missteps. Further, an enemy's capabilities might prove difficult to overcome. Asymmetric strategies and capabilities can create an operational environment that frustrates decisive outcomes. The skilled strategist and war planner thus understand that the enemy has a vote in determining the war's outcome. The Strategy and War Course gives critical attention to how an enemy's actions form part of the dynamic violent interaction that is the test of war.

The Strategy and War Course adopts a unique interdisciplinary approach to strategy. The course integrates the disciplines of history, political science, and international relations, along with military factors from the profession of arms—such as, doctrine, weaponry, training, technology, and logistics—into a coherent approach that provides students with a conceptual frame of reference to analyze complex strategic problems and formulate military strategies to address them.

The curriculum consists of two core components: a study of foundational theories of war and analysis of key case studies. The works of prominent strategic thinkers—such as Carl von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao Tse-tung, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Sir Julian Corbett—provide a foundation on which the course builds an analytical framework that students can use to understand the interrelationship between the realms of strategy and operations. The case studies provide a means to evaluate and discuss the ways in which strategic planners and military leaders in the real world have successfully (or unsuccessfully) addressed the problems associated with the use of force to attain national objectives. The case studies highlight many different types of war and cover a wide range of strategies and operations. This in-depth analysis of a wide range of case studies involving the use of force prepares students to think not only about current strategic and operational problems but also about those that might emerge in the future.

The Strategy and War Course addresses Intermediate Level Learning Areas for professional military education established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, additional areas of emphasis put forward in the United States Navy's guidance on professional military education, the intent articulated by the President of the Naval War College, and strategic challenges highlighted by the Department of Defense. The Strategy and War Course also reflects the experience and judgment of the Naval War College faculty.

At a time when the country and global community face daunting security challenges, the need for levelheaded strategic analysis and clear guidance is of the utmost importance. The Honorable Ike Skelton, U.S. House of Representatives, one of the country's leading authorities on professional military education, has put it well: "*This Nation does not have enough strategists.*"[1] The goal of the Strategy and War Course is to educate joint warfighters, who are strategically minded and skilled at critical analysis.

Course Themes

The Strategy Department has developed nine interrelated themes for use in the Strategy and War Course. These themes are neither a checklist of prescriptions nor a set of "school solutions," for the conduct of war can never be reduced to a formula. Rather, they are sets of questions designed to provoke thought and discussion. They will be used throughout the course, because they can be of great importance in understanding the reasons for military effectiveness and ineffectiveness in contemporary war. The themes cannot provide the answers. Nonetheless, they are of critical importance both in themselves and as points of departure for analysis and discussion. These themes are a starting point for undertaking critical strategic thinking.

We have divided these themes into two broad categories: those dealing with the process of matching strategy and operations; and those concerning the environment in which that process takes place.

[1] The Honorable Ike Skelton, U.S. House of Representatives, "Family and Future: Five Assignments for Future Leaders," *Military Review* (July-August 2006), p. 3. Emphasis in the original.

STRATEGY AND WAR COURSE THEMES

MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS
THE PROCESS

1. **THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF POLICY, STRATEGY, AND OPERATIONS**
2. **INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSMENT, AND PLANS**
3. **THE INSTRUMENTS OF WAR**
4. **THE DESIGN, EXECUTION, AND EFFECTS OF OPERATIONS**
5. **INTERACTION, ADAPTATION, AND REASSESSMENT**
6. **WAR TERMINATION**

MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS
THE ENVIRONMENT

7. **MULTINATIONAL ARENA**
8. **INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT**
9. **CULTURES AND SOCIETY**

MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS
THE PROCESS

1. THE INTERRELATION OF POLICY, STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS

What were the political objectives of the belligerents? Were these objectives clearly articulated and understood? Did the political aim call for the removal from power of an enemy regime or a more limited objective? What value did each participant in the conflict place on its political objectives? Were the costs and risks of the war anticipated? How did political and military leaders propose to manage these risks? Were the risks commensurate with the benefits and rewards to be achieved?

What strategic guidance did the political leadership provide to the military? What was the quality of that guidance? Did the guidance place restraints on how force could be

used? Were these restraints so stringent as to reduce the chance of success? What military strategies did the belligerents adopt? To what extent did these strategies support their respective policies? What was the relationship between the political objectives and the military objectives of each of the belligerents? What assumptions did statesmen and military leaders make about the linkage between the achievement of military objectives and the achievement of political objectives?

What were the principal campaigns and major operations contemplated by each belligerent? In what way did each belligerent think that these would support its strategy and its policy? Did the political and military leaders think carefully in advance about how the other side would respond militarily and politically? To what extent did the campaigns and major operations actually support the strategies of the belligerents?

2. INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSMENT AND PLANS

How reliable and complete was the intelligence collected before the war? How accurately was it interpreted, and how well were its limits understood? Was a serious effort made to analyze the "lessons" of previous wars, and if so how did it affect planning for the war both at the strategic and operational levels? How successful were each belligerent's efforts to deny the enemy information about his own capabilities and intentions?

How well did each belligerent know both himself and his enemy? Were plans for the war based on an objective net assessment of friendly and enemy strengths and weaknesses? How well did each belligerent understand the culture, values, political system and military traditions of its enemy? How was that understanding reflected in the plans for the war? Was account taken of the possibility of non-rational or unpredictable behavior on the part of the enemy? Was there consideration of the enemy's potential employment of asymmetric warfare or, if they existed, weapons of mass destruction? To what extent did civilian and military leaders correctly predict the nature of the war upon which they were embarking?

Did each belligerent have a formal operational planning process, and, if so, was it both flexible and thorough? Were allies included in that process and, if so, with what results? Did the plans correctly identify the enemy's center or centers of gravity? His critical vulnerabilities? Were the strategic and operational plans informed by a sound grasp of the relationship between political ends and military means? To what extent did the plans rely upon deception, surprise, and/or psychological operations? Did planning make adequate allowances for the fog, friction, uncertainty and chance of war? What assumptions, if any, did plans make about the contribution that other instruments of power—diplomatic, informational, and economic—would or could make to the achievement of the overall political objectives? Did the initial plans consider how and when the war would be terminated, and what the requirements of the anticipated postwar settlement would be?

3. THE INSTRUMENTS OF WAR

Did political and military leaders understand the strategic and operational capabilities, effects, and limitations of the different forms of military power at their disposal? Did military leaders properly take into account operational, logistical, or other physical constraints on the deployment and employment of the available instruments of war? How well were diplomacy, economic initiatives and information policy coordinated with combat operations?

Did the military leadership understand how to integrate the different forms of military power for the maximal operational and strategic effectiveness? Did those in command of the different instruments of war share a common set of assumptions about how the use of force would translate into the realization of the political objective? What limitations prevented one side or the other from achieving an optimal integration of the different forms of military power?

Did operational art and strategy exploit opportunities created by technological innovation? Did any military or political disadvantages result from technological innovation? Did any belligerent successfully translate asymmetries in technology into a strategic advantage? Was there a revolution in military affairs (RMA) prior to or during the war, and if so, did its tactical and operational consequences produce lasting strategic results?

4. THE DESIGN, EXECUTION AND EFFECTS OF OPERATIONS

Was the design of operations informed by a lucid and coherent vision of the desired end state? Was the operational design based upon an accurate estimate of the situation in theater as well as a sound appreciation of the enemy's critical strengths and weaknesses? Did the design of operations provide for a main focus of effort against an enemy's center or centers of gravity? If a center of gravity was attacked, was the attack direct or indirect? If a belligerent attacked an enemy target other than a center of gravity or attacked an enemy who lacked such a center, what operational concept guided such an attack? Did operational design provide for synchronized, sequenced, and phased operations for maximum advantage? Did operational plans seek deception and/or surprise? Did they aim at producing chiefly kinetic or chiefly psychological effects? Did the design of operations take into account a wide range of possible enemy responses and countermeasures? What precautions did the belligerents take to protect their own centers of gravity? What steps did the belligerents contemplate to manage political and military risks?

To what extent were operations joint and/or combined in their execution? Was unity of effort achieved? Were the operations conducted with their ultimate strategic and political purposes continually and clearly in view? To what extent did the execution of the operation or operations reflect the commander's intent? Were promising opportunities exploited? Were unexpected enemy operations effectively parried or countered? How and timely and accurate was the information available to a belligerent

about the changing dispositions and actions of the enemy? How coherent, agile and effective was each belligerent's system of command and control? Was either side able to use its operations to control the tempo of the war? Did operations receive the logistical support necessary for success? Was an operational pause necessary to avoid exceeding the culminating point of victory? Did one side trade space to gain time? Did one side pursue a "Fabian" strategy to delay a decision? Was there a transition from offense to defense on one side and/or from defense to offense on the other side? Did the execution of the operation or operations conform to the accepted principles of war? What was the overall quality of the operational leadership of the belligerents?

What effects did key campaigns and operations have on the enemy's material capabilities, command structure, morale, and will to fight? What synergistic and/or cumulative effects did the synchronizing, sequencing, and phasing of operations produce? Were these effects accurately foreseen and intended? Did the mix of operations maximize the strategic effects of the campaign? If one side was conspicuously more "joint" than the other, how important was this "jointness" for the outcome of the campaign? If a belligerent was combating an insurgency, did it understand the dangers of an excessive reliance on military force?

5. INTERACTION, ADAPTATION AND REASSESSMENT

How accurately were the consequences of interaction with the enemy predicted and anticipated by the belligerents? Was the initial strategy implemented as planned, or were the prewar strategic plans disrupted by unexpected enemy action? What effects did interaction with the enemy have on the nature (and perceived nature) of the war? Was the interaction among the belligerents asymmetric, and if so, in what sense and with what consequences? Was one side able to make its adversary fight on its own preferred terms? If not, how well did strategists and commanders adapt to enemy actions? How skillfully did a belligerent reapportion his forces in reaction to enemy operations or as an adjustment to the fog and friction of war?

If a belligerent chose to open a new theater of war, did this signify a new policy objective, a new strategy, or merely an extension of previous operations? Was it a response to failure or stalemate in the original theater? Alternatively, was it an effort to seize a previously unanticipated opportunity created by the evolution of the war? What role did maritime power play in opening the theater and supporting operations there? Did it make operational and strategic sense to open the new theater? Was the new theater opened at the correct time? Was the environment of the new theater favorable to operational success, and if so, did that success have strategic spillover effects in the larger war?

Did the success or failure of key operations produce adjustments or radical changes in strategy and/or policy? If an additional state or other third parties intervened on behalf of one side in the conflict, did this force the other side to reshape its policy and/or strategy, and if so, how? If there were changes in policy and/or strategy, were

these based on a rational and timely reassessment of the relationship between the political objective and the available military means?

6. WAR TERMINATION

Were realistic opportunities for a successful or partially successful end to the war squandered? If a belligerent was committed to removing an enemy's political leadership from power, did that commitment result in a longer war and heavier casualties? If negotiations began before the end of formal hostilities, how well did each side's operations support its diplomacy?

Did the winning side carefully consider how far to go militarily at the end of the war? In an attempt to maintain military pressure on its adversary, did it overstep the culminating point of victory? Alternatively, did the winning side not go far enough militarily to give the political result of the war a good chance to endure? Did the winning side carefully consider what specific demands to make on the enemy in fulfillment of its general political objectives? How and why did the losing side stop fighting? Was there a truce, and if so, did the terms of the truce crucially shape the postwar settlement? Did the post-war settlement meet the political objectives of the winning state or states? Did the concluding operations of the war leave the victor in a strong position to enforce the peace?

To what extent did the stability or instability of the settlement stem from the nature of the settlement itself? To what extent did the pattern of civil-military relations on the victorious side contribute to the stability or instability of the settlement? What were the implications, if any, of the nature of the war for the durability of the settlement? Did the winning side maintain the strength and will to enforce the peace? Did the victor make appropriate postwar deployments for stability operations if necessary?

MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS
THE ENVIRONMENT

7. THE MULTINATIONAL ARENA

Did political and military leaders seize opportunities to isolate their adversaries from potential allies? If so, how successful were these efforts and why? Did the belligerents seize opportunities to create coalitions? If so, what common interests and/or policies unified the coalition partners? Was there effective strategic and operational coordination and burden sharing within a coalition, and what were the consequences if not? How freely did information, intelligence, and material resources pass among the members of a coalition?

Did the strategies and operations of the coalition have the effect of solidifying it or splitting it apart? Did the strategies and operations have the effect of strengthening an opposing coalition or weakening it? To what extent did allies act to support, restrain, or control one another within the same coalition? If a coalition disintegrated, was this chiefly the result of internal stress, external pressure or a combination of both? Did coalition dynamics promote or hinder efforts to match operations to strategy, and strategy to policy? How did the action or inaction of allies contribute to operational success or failure? What impact did coalition dynamics have on the process of war termination? Did the winning coalition fall apart at the end of the war?

8. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

How were the military forces of each belligerent organized? How well did that system of organization facilitate planning, executing and training for joint and combined operations? Did a regular process exist to coordinate the employment of military power with the use of the other instruments of national power in pursuit of a belligerent's political objectives? If so, how effective was that process? How might that process have been improved? How well was information shared among military and civil agencies?

If there was rivalry among the military services, how did this affect the design and execution of operations and strategy? Were the relations among military and political leaders functional or dysfunctional? If dysfunctional, why was this so and what were the consequences? How did any lack of clarity or constancy in the political aims affect the wartime civil-military relationship? If the political leaders demanded of the military instrument something that it could not effectively deliver, or if they imposed overly stringent political restraints on the use of force, how did the military leadership respond? If political leaders insisted on operations that promised to be politically useful but militarily costly, how did the military leaders respond? If military leaders proposed operations that promised to be militarily effective but entailed significant political risk, what was the reaction of the civilian leadership? How attuned were military leaders to the need to manage risk?

9. CULTURES AND SOCIETIES

How did the culture, ideologies, values, social arrangements and political systems of the belligerents influence the design and execution of operations and strategies? Did a belligerent possess a discernable strategic culture or way of war, and if so, did this allow its adversary to predict and exploit its behavior? If the war was an ideological struggle either in whole or in part, how did the character of military action affect its course and its outcome? If the war involved a struggle for mass political allegiance, did culture or values give either belligerent a clear advantage?

Was the embodiment of Clausewitz's trinity—the relationship among government, people and the military—able to withstand the shock of battlefield reverses or the strain of protracted war? If not, why not? If the war was protracted, how successful was the victorious side in weakening its adversary from within? Did the

victorious side conduct information operations, and were they founded on a solid grasp of the psychology and culture of the enemy and of its own side? Did the belligerent's military strategy deliver sufficient incremental dividends—periodic successes or tokens of success—to maintain support for the war? Alternatively, did the strategy and operations have the effect of diminishing domestic support for the war? Did belligerents attempt to mobilize and manage public opinion, and if so, with what success? Did the passions of the people make it difficult for political and military leaders to maintain the proper relationship between policy and strategy and to conduct operations necessary for victory?

Course Process and Standards

1. Methodology. Each case study will be examined in-depth through a combination of presentations, readings, tutorials, student essays, and seminars.

2. Seminar Assignments. Each student has been assigned to a seminar for the duration of the course. Each of these seminars will be led by a faculty team composed of a military officer and a civilian academic. Seminar discussion is crucial to understanding the issues of the individual case studies. It is thus essential that students prepare for seminar. Each member of the seminar is expected to contribute to the discussion and to help the group as a whole understand the issues examined by the case study, as well as course themes and objectives.

3. Presentations. Students will attend four presentations each week. At the conclusion of each presentation, the speaker will field questions about the presentation topic from the audience. This question and answer period is considered an integral part of the presentation. Students are encouraged to avail themselves of that opportunity to ask their questions so that others in the audience may benefit from the answer.

4. Required Readings. Before seminar, students are expected to have read the required books and articles assigned for that week's topic, as well as the student essays prepared for that week (which will be distributed in advance). These "required" readings are the only assigned texts for the course. They are all the readings that are required for seminar preparation, for the essays, and the final examination. In addition, the Department has provided on its website an "additional subject bibliography" for students who may care to pursue their interest in a case. Additional subject bibliography readings are not in any way required for success in this course. At the conclusion of the course, books must be returned to the Publication Issue Room within four weeks.

5. Pretutorials and Tutorials. The faculty moderators will hold tutorials during regularly scheduled office hours. These conferences will normally be with the students who are preparing essays, but may be used for any other consultation desired by either the students or the moderators. A pretutorial is required for every essay. It is meant to assure that the student understands the essay question. Once on track, a regular tutorial session will follow, in which the thesis of the essay will be discussed. Students who are

writing essays should schedule a tutorial session with their moderators no earlier than one week before the date on which the essay is due. All students are encouraged to take advantage of these individual tutorials with their moderators as an aid in the preparation of their seminar essays.

6. Seminar Essays. Each student will submit two essays of no more than ten double-spaced typewritten pages (12-pitch font), on questions listed in the syllabus. The seminar moderators will assign students their two essay questions at the beginning of the term.

The essay offers an opportunity to undertake a strategic analysis on issues where the information available is substantial. A good essay is an analytical "think piece" in which the author presents a thesis supported by arguments based on the information available in the required reading. For this reason, students **should not consult past student papers on their assigned topics**; doing so would contradict department policy, negate the whole purpose of this exercise in independent analysis, and deprive the student of a valuable opportunity to exercise original strategic thought.

A good essay will demonstrate five elements: it answers the question asked; it has a thesis; it marshals evidence to support that thesis; it considers, explicitly or implicitly, counterarguments to or weaknesses in the thesis and supporting evidence; and it does the above in a clear and well-organized fashion.

Students will submit a copy of the completed essay to each moderator no later than 0830 of the day before the seminar meets. In addition, the student will distribute a copy of the essay to each member of the seminar, as the papers are a part of the required readings for the week. Students must read the essays prepared by their seminar colleagues before the seminar meets.

7. Seminar Preparation and Contribution. Student contribution to seminar discussion is an important part of this course. Seminar moderators evaluate the contribution made by each student, assessing the quality of the student's input. The goal in assigning a classroom contribution grade is not to measure the number of times students have spoken, but how well they have understood the subject matter, enriched discussion, and contributed to their seminar colleagues' learning. This caliber of commitment entails that each student come prepared to take part in discussion by absorbing the readings, listening attentively to presentations, and thinking about both. Students are expected to prepare for and be thoughtfully engaged in each seminar. Not to contribute or to say very little in seminar undercuts the learning experience of everyone in the seminar and hurts a student's classroom contribution grade.

8. Examination. Students will be given a final examination at the end of the term. The exam is expected to be an analytical synthesis that covers the work of the entire course.

9. Academic Honor Code. Plagiarism, cheating, and misrepresentation of work are prohibited at the Naval War College. Definition of these acts and their consequences are discussed in detail in Naval War College Standard Organization & Regulations Manual

(SORM). To access the SORM, go to Internet Explorer, and underneath "Organization" click on SORM/Instructions/SAP. Once in this site, click on "SORM Instructions and Annexes" and proceed to Annex A, Section 8: pg. A-8-A-1 to A-8-A-3). **Students are encouraged to read this section of the SORM in detail before writing their first paper.**

In general plagiarism is:

- "Duplication of an author's words without both quotation marks and accurate references or footnotes." (NWC SORM)

- "The use of an author's ideas in paraphrase without accurate references or footnotes." (NWC SORM)

Points to keep in mind:

- Facts are facts and need not be referenced or footnoted. For example:

"The Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941."

- Another author's ideas, style, analysis, or insight are his or her own and must be referenced. If using his or her words, quote directly (either a formal footnote or the shortened version below is required along with quotation marks):

"It was an asymmetry between the crisp running analysis being performed in Berlin, and not one but a whole series of analytic failures in Vienna that was perhaps the decisive factor in establishing the initial war context the Prussians needed." (Smoke, p.93)

- Changing a few words here or there does not alter the need for direct credit (i.e., citation).

- If using ideas, analysis, or insight in a general context, give general credit:

One of the central reasons Vienna was unprepared at the beginning of the war was lack of intelligence and good analysis. This contrasted sharply with the situation in Berlin where intelligence was constantly updated and evaluated. (Smoke, p.93)

- If in doubt:

    - Consult your moderator.

    - Give credit—always use quotation marks and proper citation for direct (or nearly so) quotes.

10. Grades and Grade Appeals. Grading will be in accordance with the current Naval War College Instruction 1520.2 series. A final course grade of B- or above is required for an award of a Master's degree. In computing the final grade, the following percentages will be used:

Essays—25 percent for the first essay; 30 percent for the second essay
Final Examination—25 percent
Seminar Preparation and Contribution—20 percent

All written work in the Strategy and War Course will be graded according to the following standards:

A+ (98): Offers a genuinely new understanding of the topic. Indicates brilliance.

A (95): Work of superior quality that is, at least in part, original.

A- (92): Above the average expected of graduate work. An insightful essay.

B+ (88): A well-executed paper that meets all five standards of an essay listed above.

B (85): Average graduate performance. An essay that is on the whole a successful consideration of the topic.

B- (82): An essay that addresses the question, has a thesis clearly stated but not fully supported, and that either does not treat counterarguments thoroughly or has structural flaws.

C+ (78): Sufficiently analytical to distinguish it from a C, but still lacks the support, structure, or clarity to merit graduate credit.

C (75): Indicates that the work is marginal and fails to meet the standards of graduate work. While it might express an opinion, it makes inadequate use of evidence, has little coherent structure, is critically unclear, or lacks the quality of insight deemed sufficient to explore the issue at hand adequately.

C- (72): Attempts to address the question, approaches a responsible opinion, but is conspicuously below average in one or more of the elements listed above.

F (65 or lower): Indicates that the essay has failed to address the question or has resulted from plagiarism.

The Naval War College SORM Annex A, Section 2 on Examination and Grading, sets forth the following procedures for appealing grades assigned in the Strategy Department. A request for a review of a grade on written work (weekly essays or final

examination) may be made to the Department Executive Assistant no later than one week after the grade has been received. The Executive Assistant will then appoint two faculty members other than the original graders for an independent review. Anonymity will be maintained throughout. The second team of graders will not know the student's identity, the seminar from which the essay came, or its original grade. They will both grade the paper independently as though it were submitted for the first time, providing full comments, criticisms, and a new grade. The new grade will replace the old one. The student may request an additional review of the work in question, whereupon the Department Chairman will review the appeal and either affirm the grade assigned on appeal or assign another grade (higher or lower), which then replaces any previous grade assigned. In exceptional circumstances, the student may make a further appeal to the Dean of Academics, whose decision in the matter will normally be final.

11. Seminar Preparation and Contribution Grading. Seminar preparation and contribution will be graded at end of term according to the following standards:

> **A+ (98):** Strikes an outstanding balance of 'listening' and 'contributing.' Demonstrates complete preparation for each session as reflected in the quality of contributions to discussions. Contributions indicate brilliance through a wholly new understanding of the topic.
>
> **A (95):** Contribution is always of superior quality. Unfailingly thinks through the issue at hand before comment. Can be relied upon to be prepared for every seminar. Contributions highlighted by insightful thought, understanding, and in part original interpretation of complex concepts.
>
> **A- (92):** Above the average expected of a graduate student. By the insightful quality of contributions commands the respect of colleagues. Fully engaged in seminar discussions.
>
> **B+ (88):** A positive contributor to seminar meetings. Joins in most discussions. Contributions reflect understanding of the material.
>
> **B (85):** Average graduate level contribution. Involvement in discussions reflects adequate preparation for seminar.
>
> **B- (82):** Contributes. Sometimes speaks out without having thought through the issue well enough to marshal logical supporting evidence, address counter-arguments, or present a structurally sound position.
>
> **C+ (78):** Sometimes contributes voluntarily; more frequently needs to be encouraged. Content to allow others to take the lead. Minimal preparation for seminar reflected in arguments lacking the support, structure or clarity to merit graduate credit.

C (75): Contribution is marginal. Attempts to put forward a plausible opinion through inadequate use of evidence, incoherent logical structure, and a critically unclear quality of insight that is insufficient to adequately examine the issue at hand. Usually content to let others form the seminar discussions.

C- (72): Lack of contribution to seminar discussions reflects substandard preparation for sessions. Unable to articulate a responsible opinion. Sometimes displays a negative attitude.

F (65): Student fails to contribute in any substantive manner. Extremely disruptive or uncooperative. Completely unprepared for class.

12. Course Critique. Student input is vital to the future development of this course. The critique is available from a link on the Strategy Department website or at the following URL https://nwcportal.nwc.navy.mil/surveys/sp_eoc_cncs_200611.htm. **Strategy faculty will not have access to your critique until after course grades have been recorded at the end of the term.** Each student will be provided with a password that will provide access to the critique and permit work on it at any time during the semester. DO NOT SHARE THIS PASSWORD WITH ANYONE. Student seminar leaders will be provided with a list of passwords for use in the event that a student forgets theirs.

Students do NOT have to complete the entire critique in one sitting. The critique can be completed one page at a time and then saved. Annex C is a paper copy of the critique that can be annotated as the course progresses, if desired, to assist in making the required entries in the electronic critique. Note that the hard copy is provided as a convenience and will not be accepted in lieu of the electronic critique at course completion. Seminar leaders will ensure that all students have completed their course critiques prior to the final exam and will provide this information to the seminar moderators so that individual student grades can be promptly released upon course completion.

13. Web Page. Access to the Strategy Department web page can be gained through the Naval War College web site. Currently all elements of the College of Naval Command and Staff course syllabus are contained on the web page. To gain access to the Department web page, either click on Strategy and Policy under "Academics/Students" on the NWC Intranet page and go the College of Naval Command and Staff under "Courses" or log on to the Internet and go to http://www.nwc.navy.mil, then make the following selections:

"Academics"
"Strategy & Policy" (under Courses)
"College of Naval Command and Staff" (under Courses)

Along the left side of the screen, click on the various sections to the syllabus (i.e. Critique, Foreword, Course Objectives and Content, etc.). Information regarding specific presentations can be found at "Presentations." The User Name is "strategycncs" and the password is "cncs2006". Please refer any questions to Carol Keelty (Strategy and Policy Department Academic Coordinator): E-mail: carol.keelty@nwc.navy.mil; Phone (401) 841-2188; Rm. C-214.

THE STRATEGY AND POLICY DEPARTMENT FACULTY 2006-2007

Professor John H. Maurer, the Chairman of the Strategy and Policy Department, is a graduate of Yale University and holds a M.A.L.D. and Ph.D. in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Before joining the faculty of the Naval War College, he was executive editor of *Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs*, and held the position of senior research fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. In addition, he served on the Secretary of the Navy's advisory committee on naval history. He is the author or editor of books examining the outbreak of the First World War, military interventions in the developing world, naval arms control between the two world wars, and a recently published study about Winston Churchill's views on British foreign policy and strategy. At present, he is working on several research projects: a study on the transformation of naval warfare that occurred during the era of the two world wars; and, a book about Winston Churchill and Great Britain's decline as a world power. In June 2001, he received the U.S. Navy's Meritorious Civilian Service Award.

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Colonel David A. Brown, U.S. Army, is a designated Army Strategist who holds a BA in Philosophy from Carson Newman College, a diploma from the Defense Language Institute for studies in the Greek language, a diploma from the Army's Command and General Staff College, a MS from Long Island University in Counseling and Leader Development, and a Masters of Military Arts and Sciences from the Army's School of Advanced Military Studies Program. COL Brown's career spans over 22 years in Field Artillery units and a variety of command and staff positions in the US and overseas. His operational experience includes nuclear weapons programs, combat experience in Desert Storm, frequent visits to Bosnia and Kosovo and operational planning experience at Battalion, Brigade, Division and Theater levels, where he served as 1st Armored Division Chief of Plans and Chief of Contingency Plans for United States Army Europe. COL Brown also served as a Tactical Officer at the US Military Academy, West Point and most recently commanded the United States Army Garrison, Fort Wainwright, Alaska. He is a recipient of the James D. Forrestal Award for excellence in Strategy and Force Planning and a recent graduate of the Institute of Counter-Terrorism's Executive Studies Program at Herzliya, Israel. He has lectured extensively on ethics, theology and history and is the author of Intifada & The Blood of Abraham, Lessons in Asymmetrical Warfare - Written in Stone, published by the Association of the United States Army's Institute of Land Warfare.

Professor Jon F. Danilowicz, is a Department of State Faculty Advisor on detail to the Naval War College. He holds a BSFS degree from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service as well as an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College, where he graduated with highest distinction in 2003. Since joining the U.S. Foreign Service in 1989, he has served in U.S. Embassies in Dhaka, Bangladesh; Harare, Zimbabwe; Maputo, Mozambique; and Islamabad, Pakistan. His most recent assignment was as Director of the Narcotics Affairs Section at the U.S. Embassy in Panama City, Panama. He has also served in the Bureau of South Asian Affairs, and the Department of State's Operations Center in Washington.

Colonel Kevin S.C. Darnell, USAF, is the Senior Air Force Advisor to the President, U.S. Naval War College. He is a Master Navigator with over 3,900 flight hours and holds degrees in Psychology (B.A. Maine), Systems Management (M.S. Southern California), and National Security Studies (M.A. NWC). He is a distinguished graduate of USAF Undergraduate Navigator Training School, Instructor Training School, Squadron Officer School, and the Naval War College. From 2000 to 2003 Colonel Darnell taught in the S&P Department and lectured on airpower theory and the Gulf War. He returns to Newport following 19 months as the Air Attaché to Saudi Arabia and 12 months in Iraq. While assigned to Multi-National Force-Iraq, U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, Colonel Darnell served as the NATO-EU-Coalition branch chief and, later, as the Policy Division chief of the DCS for Strategic Effects. His division analyzed policy options and formulated strategies to achieve them for the CG, MNF-I. Major efforts under his tenure included dialogue with the Kurdish Regional Government leadership on Iraqi stability, support to the ratification of the Iraqi constitution, Sunni engagement, risk mitigation during the December 2005 national elections, political responses to the

Samarra Golden Mosque bombing, improving Iraqi ministerial capacity, and the disarmament and reintegration of unlawful armed groups.

Professor Frank "Scott" Douglas performed his doctoral work with Columbia University's Political Science department, focusing on the use of air power for compellence in Bosnia and Kosovo and on developing strategies to coerce authoritarian regimes. He also holds an MA from Johns Hopkins University, SAIS, where he concentrated in Strategic Studies, and a BSFS degree from Georgetown's School of Foreign Service. Prof. Douglas holds an area studies certificate in East /Central Europe from Columbia's Harriman Institute and received a Foreign Language Area Studies Fellowship for Serbo-Croatian. In addition to his scholarly work, he has served as an election observer in Bosnia and as the director of a volunteer English teaching program in the Czech Republic. He is currently working on a manuscript entitled *Hitting Home: Coercive Theory, Air Power, and Authoritarian Targets*, as well as a new project analyzing the United States' and Al-Qaeda's struggle to best one another's strategic information operations and define the nature of the war to their advantage.

Captain Stephen G. Gabriele, U.S. Navy, is a distinguished graduate of both the U.S. Naval Academy (1979) and the Naval War College (2003). A submarine officer, he had command of USS ALBUQUERQUE (SSN 706) and was most recently Commander Undersea Surveillance with worldwide oversight of the navy's Integrated Undersea Surveillance System. Other assignments include operational tours on several submarines and staffs, Executive Assistant to the navy's Chief of Legislative Affairs, and several training commands. Captain Gabriel served as Director of the Combined Forces Maritime Component Commander (CFMCC) Central Command Friendly Forces Coordination Center (F2C2) in Bahrain during a 6-month sabbatical from the War College in 2006.

Captain Paul Gallagher, U.S. Navy, is a 1978 Graduate of Marquette University and holds a Masters degree in Strategic Studies from the Army War College. A career Naval Flight Officer, he flew the E-2C Hawkeye. In addition to time spent in the VAW community CAPT Gallagher was the Assistant Navigator on the USS INDEPENDENCE, and he Commanded Tactical Air Control Squadron Twenty Two. Some other assignments include Commander Carrier Group Eight, and Commander Striking and Support Forces South, in Naples Italy.

Professor Marc A. Genest earned his Ph.D. from Georgetown University in International Relations. He has taught at Georgetown University, the University of Rhode Island and the US Air Force War College. He also serves as a political commentator for local radio and news stations as well as for RI and national print media. In addition, Dr Genest worked on Capitol Hill for Senator John Chafee and Representative Claudine Schneider. Dr. Genest has received fellowships, grants and awards from numerous organizations including the United States Institute of Peace, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Harry S. Truman Foundation and the Foundation for the Defense of Democracy. Professor Genest was also the recipient of the University of Rhode Island's Teaching Excellence Award. Professor Genest's

books include, *Negotiating in the Public Eye: The Impact of the Press on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations*, *Conflict and Cooperation: Evolving Theories of International Relations* and *Stand! Contending Issues in World Politics*. He has also written articles dealing with international relations theory, terrorism, American foreign policy and public opinion. His current work is entitled, "Winning the War of Ideas in the Age of Global Terrorism."

Professor Timothy D. Hoyt received his undergraduate degrees from Swarthmore College, and his Ph.D. in International Relations and Strategic Studies from The Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies in 1997. At Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, 1998-2002, he taught graduate courses on security in the developing world, South Asian security, technology and international security, and military strategy. In October 2003, he testified before two subcommittees of the House Committee on International Relations regarding terrorism in South and Southwest Asia. Dr. Hoyt's recent publications include chapters and articles on the war on terrorism in South Asia, the limits of military force in the global war on terrorism, the impact of culture on military doctrine and strategy, military innovation in the developing world, and the impact of nuclear weapons on recent crises in South Asia. He is the author of *Military Industries and Regional Defense Policy: India, Iraq and Israel.* He is currently working on a book on American military strategy in the 21st century, and also on a study of the strategy of the Irish Republican Army from 1913-2005.

Professor Colin F. Jackson is a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School (MBA, Finance), Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies (MA, International Economics and Strategic Studies), and Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School (BA, Public and International Affairs). He did his doctoral work in Political Science (Security Studies) at MIT. Professor Jackson's current research includes work on counter-insurgency, military operations in urban terrain, public and private sector risk management, organizational learning, and intelligence operations. Prior to entering academia, Professor Jackson worked for several years in the corporate sector in financial trading, telecommunications, transportation markets, and power development. Previously, he had served four years on active duty with the United States Army in Germany as a tank and cavalry officer. Professor Jackson continues to serve as a military intelligence officer in the U.S. Army Reserve.

Lieutenant Colonel R. Scott Jarvis, U.S. Air Force, joined the Strategy & Policy faculty in June 2005 after graduating from the Naval War College (CNW). He is a 1984 graduate of Iowa State University and holds an M.S. in International Relations from Troy State University, an M.S. in Military Operational Art and Science from the Air Command and Staff College, and an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. A career civil engineer officer, he has held a wide variety of assignments from the wing to HQ Air Force-level throughout Europe, the Pacific, and CONUS. Prior to arriving in Newport, Lt Col Jarvis commanded the 366th Civil Engineer Squadron at Mountain Home AFB, Idaho from 2002-4.

Professor David E. Kaiser holds a Ph.D. from Harvard and has taught at Harvard and at Carnegie Mellon University. He is the author of *Economic Diplomacy and the Origins of the Second World War*; a bold and wide-ranging book analyzing five centuries of conflict entitled *Politics and War: European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler*; books on baseball and the case of Sacco and Vanzetti; and, most recently, *American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War*, as well as numerous articles.

Professor Heidi E. Lane earned her Ph.D. at the University of California, Los Angeles. She has conducted extensive field research in the Middle East and was a research affiliate with the Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. As a former U.S. Fulbright scholar, she spent two years conducting research and studying Arabic in Damascus, Syria. Her sub-areas of specialization are ethnic-conflict and religious nationalism, insurgency and terrorism, and political liberalization in the Middle East. She is currently completing a book manuscript, entitled "Orders from God? Ethno-Religious Discourse and the Implications of Transnational Networks on Group Mobilization and Violent Conflict," which focuses on the increased importance of transnational networks among ethnic and religious opposition movements in the Middle East. Prof. Lane received her B.A. from the University of Chicago and her M.A. at UCLA. She has previously taught as a visiting instructor in the Department of Government at Claremont McKenna College.

Commander Thomas Lang, U.S. Navy, holds a B.S. from Central Michigan University and an M.A. from the Naval War College, where he graduated with distinction. During assignments in operational and training squadrons as a Radar Intercept Officer, he flew the F-14 Tomcat over 4200 hours and made over 1000 carrier arrested landings. He has also completed staff assignments with a Carrier Battle Group, the Navy Staff in the Pentagon and, prior to joining the Strategy and Policy faculty, the European Staff Element of NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation, in Mons, Belgium.

Professor Bradford A. Lee earned his Ph.D. from Cambridge University and was a member of the Society of Fellows at Harvard University, where he taught for eight years before coming to the Naval War College in 1987. At Harvard, Professor Lee was awarded the Levenson Memorial Teaching Prize as the best teacher among the assistant and associate professors. He has written extensively on strategy, diplomacy, politics, and economics in the affairs of modern states. He recently co-edited, and contributed a chapter on war termination to, *Strategic Logic and Political Rationality*, a volume in honor of the late Michael Handel. He is now at work on a book, entitled "Theories of Victory," an analysis of how military operations translate into political results.

Commander Daniel J. Lynch, U.S. Navy, holds a B.A. from the University of Rochester, an M.S. from Troy State University, and an M.A. from the Naval War College. A career naval aviator, he has served in a number of operational, staff and instructional tours in the SH-3H, HH-1N, and TH-57. Before joining the Strategy and Policy faculty, he served as Executive Officer of the Naval ROTC Unit at Purdue University.

Commander J. Scott McPherson, U.S. Navy, is a distinguished graduate of the Naval War College and one of the first officers selected for the NWC's Permanent Military Professor Program. He has served as a Naval Flight Officer and instructor in several carrier aircraft including the E-2C, A-6E, and EA-6B. From 2000-2003, he served in the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Directorate of Operations (J-3) as Executive Flag Assistant to the Director for Information Operations, Psychological Operations Officer, and Branch Chief of the Special Activities Division in support of world-wide operations including ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. He is currently working towards his PhD in the ethical aspects of space weaponization.

Professor Thomas M. Nichols holds the Forrest Sherman Chair of Public Diplomacy. A former Chairman of the Strategy and Policy Department, he holds a Ph.D. from Georgetown University and the Certificate of the Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union at Columbia University. He previously taught international relations and government at Georgetown University and Dartmouth College. He has served as a legislative aide in the United States Senate, a consultant to the Central Intelligence Agency, and was a Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He was previously a Secretary of the Navy Fellow at the Naval War College and served on the National Security Decision Making Department faculty. He is currently also a Senior Associate of the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs in New York City. He is the author of *The Sacred Cause: Civil-Military Conflict over Soviet National Security, 1917-1992*; *The Russian Presidency: Society and Politics in the Second Russian Republic*; and *Winning the World: Lessons for America's Future from the Cold War*. He is currently completing a book about international norms regarding preventive war.

Commander Ronald J. Oard II, U.S. Navy, is a graduate of Purdue University and holds master's degrees from the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA as well as the Naval War College. A Surface Warfare Officer, upon completing nuclear power training he served as a Repair Division Officer in USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CNV 69) and later as Electrical Officer in USS LONG BEACH (CGN 9). He also served as Navigator in USS CLAUDE V. RICKETTS (DDG 5) and Operations Officer in USS FORT MCHENRY (LSD 43). Commander Oard most recently served at sea as Executive Officer in USS GUNSTON HALL (LSD 44). His shore assignments include Steam Propulsion Instructor at Senior Officer Ship Material Readiness Course. Before joining the Strategy and Policy faculty, he was assigned for three years to the Headquarters Staff, U.S. Transportation Command.

Professor Sarah C. M. Paine earned a B.A. in Latin American Studies at Harvard, an MIA at Columbia's School for International and Public Affairs, an MA in Russian at Middlebury, and a Ph.D. in history at Columbia. She studied in year-long language programs twice in Taiwan and once in Japan, and wrote the prize-winning book, *Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and Their Disputed Frontier* (M. E. Sharpe, 1996), and *The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895* (Cambridge, 2003), and co-edited with Bruce A. Elleman *Naval Blockades and Seapower: Strategies and Counter-strategies, 1805-2005* (Routledge, 2006). She has received year-long grants twice from the Fulbright Program

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Professor Michael F. Pavković received his B.A. in History and Classics from the Pennsylvania State University and his Ph.D. in history from the University of Hawaii at Mānoa. Before joining the Naval War College he served as an associate professor of history at Hawaii Pacific University where he also coordinated the programs in Diplomacy and Military Studies. He has presented papers at national and international conferences and has also published a number of articles, book chapters, and reviews on topics relating to ancient, early modern, and Napoleonic military history. He is currently completing a book, entitled "War in World History: Society, Technology, and War," for McGraw Hill's College Division. He has held summer fellowships at West Point in Military History and at Harvard University's Dumbarton Oaks Center for Byzantine Studies.

Commander Thomas P. Rosdahl, U.S. Navy, is a 1987 graduate of Villanova University and holds a Master's degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. A career naval aviator, he has had a number of operational, staff and instructional tours in the UH-1N, EP-3E and T-34C. Before joining the Strategy and Policy Department, he served on the staff of Commander, Patrol Reconnaissance Wing TWO, Kaneohe Bay, HI.

Professor Steven T. Ross holds a Ph.D. from Princeton University. He has taught at the NWC since 1973, and has served as a political-military analyst for the DIA and the CIA. He has published many books including *European Diplomatic History 1789-1815*; *Quest for Victory: French Military Strategy 1792-1799*; *From Flintlock to Rifle: Infantry Tactics, 1740-1866*; *American War Plans 1919-1941*; *American War Plans, 1941-1945*; *American War Plans, 1945-1950*; *Historical Dictionary of the Wars of the French Revolution*; *American War Plans 1939-1945*; *US War Plans 1941-1945*; and *US War Plans 1890-1939.* Among his more than 40 scholarly presentations have been the Harmon Memorial Lecture at the Air Force Academy and the Biggs Lecture at Virginia Military Institute.

Professor Joyce E. Sampson is a veteran of the United States Air Force. Dr. Sampson earned her Ph.D. in political and military history from The Florida State University in April 2001. Specializing in Early Modern British History, her doctoral dissertation was a biography of Major-General Thomas Harrison, one of Oliver Cromwell's regimental commanders during the English Civil Wars, 1640-1660. As a doctoral candidate, Professor Sampson received the J. Leitch-Wright Research Award (1998) and a Florida State University Fellowship (1998-1999). Now Director of the Web-Based course for Strategy and Policy, Dr. Sampson has four years experience teaching and managing virtual classrooms, and fifteen years' teaching experience in "real" classrooms, including a semester at Florida State's London Study Program in the United Kingdom. More

recently, she has developed a minor in Middle Eastern Studies, and is teaching electives courses on Islam and the Middle East, Modern Iran, and Modern Iraq at the U.S. Naval War College, and for the School of Continuing Education at Providence College. She has presented aspects of her research in 17th-century English History at the late Lord Conrad Russell's Stuart Seminar at the prestigious Institute for Historical Research, University of London, the North American Conference for British Studies, and at the Midwestern, Pacific Coast, and Southern Conferences of British History. She has also contributed articles to the *New Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford University Press, 2004), the *Dictionary of Irish Biography* (Cambridge University Press, 2003), *The Readers' Guide to British History* (London: Fitzroy Dearborn, 2002), *The Historical Dictionary of Late Medieval England* (Greenwood, 2001), and *History: Review of New Books* (1997 and 2002).

Professor John R. Schindler received his B.A. and M.A. in history from the University of Massachusetts, and his Ph.D. in history (European/military) from McMaster University in 1995. Prior to joining Strategy and Policy, he served with the National Security Agency for nearly a decade as an intelligence analyst and counterintelligence officer, work which took him to more than a dozen countries. He previously served on the faculty of the Joint Military Intelligence College and the National Cryptologic School. He has published widely on military history, intelligence and strategy, terrorism and insurgency, and Balkan/East European affairs. He is the author of *Isonzo: The Forgotten Sacrifice of the Great War*, and recently completed *Unholy Terror: Bosnia and the Global Jihad*. His next book is a study of the Austro-Hungarian military and total war, 1914-1918.

Colonel Peter T. Underwood, U.S. Marine Corps, holds a B.A. from the Virginia Military Institute, an M.A. in History from Duke University and an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. He is also a graduate of the Air Command and Staff College and the Armed Forces Staff College. His career has included multiple assignments in the Far East and Europe. Staff assignments have been at the Battalion, Regimental, Air Group, Division, MARFOR, and Unified Command level. He has served as a history instructor at the US Naval Academy and holds the designations of Joint Service Officer and Western European Regional Specialist. He commanded MEU Service Support Group-31, 31st MEU and has most recently served as Chief of Staff Marine Corps Logistics Command and Commander, Multi-Commodity Maintenance Center Albany Georgia.

Professor Karl F. Walling received a joint Ph.D. from the Department of Political Science and the Committee on Social Thought of the University of Chicago. He is the author of *Republican Empire: Alexander Hamilton on War and Free Government*, and many studies of American and European political thought and action. He has taught at the U.S. Air Force Academy, Carleton College, Ashland University, and Colorado College, and was a Fellow at the Liberty Fund before coming to Naval War College. At present he is writing on Thucydides, as well as strategy and policy in American political thought.

Professor Andrew R. Wilson is a graduate of the University of California, Santa Barbara and received his Ph.D. in History and East Asian Languages from Harvard University. Before joining the Naval War College faculty, Dr. Wilson taught Chinese History at both Wellesley College and at Harvard, where he received several awards for teaching excellence. He is the author of numerous articles on Chinese military history, Chinese sea power, *Sun Tzu's Art of War*, as well as the Chinese diaspora. He is also the author or editor of two books on the Chinese overseas, *Ambition and Identity: Chinese Merchant-Elites in Colonial Manila, 1885-1916* and *The Chinese in the Caribbean*. Recently he has been involved in editing a multi-volume history of the China War, 1937-1945; a conference volume entitled *War and Virtual War*; and is completing a new translation of *Sun Tzu's Art of War*. Among his other duties at the Naval War College, Professor Wilson is a founding member of the Asia-Pacific Studies Group.

Captain Robert S. Winneg, U.S. Navy, holds a B.A. from the University of Rochester and an M.A. from the Naval War College. A career Naval Flight Officer in the P-3C Orion, he had command of Patrol Squadron One. He has served in a variety of operational and staff assignments, including duty in the Pentagon and as Chief of Staff to the Commander, Maritime Surveillance and Reconnaissance Forces, U.S. Sixth Fleet. He most recently served as the Commanding Officer of NAS Brunswick, Maine.

Professor Toshi Yoshihara is a graduate of the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, holds a M.A. from the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University, and received a Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He has taught in the Department of Strategy at the U.S. Air War College. In addition, he has served at the American Enterprise Institute, the RAND Corporation, and the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. He is the author of over twenty books and articles on the international strategic environment in Asia, maritime strategy and sea power, strategic culture, information warfare doctrine, military space programs, and the theory and practice of counterinsurgency operations.

I. MASTERS OF WAR: CLAUSEWITZ, SUN TZU, AND MAO

A. General: Although modern military technology has revolutionized most of the material dimensions of war since the pre-modern era, the logic of war remains unchanged. This explains in part why Clausewitz's *On War* and *Sun Tzu's The Art of War* remain relevant conceptual frameworks for the study of strategy and war. Both of these foundational texts show how theory and principles of war pertain to the operational level of war. *On War*, the more systematic and detailed of the two classics, breaks down wars into several different categories, ranging from "wars of armed observation" through wars of limited objectives to wars aiming at the total defeat of the enemy. Clausewitz also deals specifically, if briefly, with "national uprisings," similar to modern insurgencies. In this way, he introduces us to the different kinds of wars we will study, and discusses the relationships among the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war. Clausewitz remains essential reading for understanding strategy and war. In the words of one distinguished expert on professional military education, the Honorable Ike Skelton, U.S. House of Representatives: "as time passes, I appreciate the timelessness of Clausewitz's thoughts on the art of war and strategy more and more. These ideas, distilled from history, his extensive and broad wartime experience, and his powerful intellect, will continue to be relevant in the future."[1] The *Sun Tzu*, too, looks at the entire range of the use of military force from what we would call deterrence and military operations other than war at one end of the spectrum to the extermination of the adversary's state at the other.

The authors of these texts also agree that political authorities must determine the political objectives in any war. They discuss at length the relationships among national objectives and the military objectives that will secure them. At the same time, the authors recognize that the pressures faced by political leaders and military commanders invariably give rise to civil-military tensions regarding the best means to be employed. They consider the nature of war to be a reflection of the dynamic relationship among the political authorities, the people, the military and the physical environment within which the conflict is taking place.

While each book presents approaches to the operational planning of wars, they have different emphases. For example, intelligence and deception at all levels of war are of central importance in the *Sun Tzu*. Clausewitz, however, is pessimistic about the accuracy of intelligence and utility of deception at the operational and tactical levels. In general, the author of the *Sun Tzu* advocates more reliance upon information operations and maneuver warfare, including speed, surprise, and deception, while Clausewitz puts his trust in the application of concentrated force at a decisive point. The Strategy and War course includes many examples of the successful application of both of these principles, allowing students continually to assess the relevance of these two theories.

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[1] The Honorable Ike Skelton, U.S. Representative, "Family and Future: Five Assignments for Future Leaders," *Military Review* (July-August 2006), p. 3.

Although both theories recognize the inevitable influence of chance and irrationality upon warfare, they nevertheless see war as an essentially rational political activity. Clausewitz in particular tries to define war as a rational act by stressing the identification of the national interest, the correlation of ends and means, cost-benefit calculations, careful planning, and the assessment of the opponent's objective, military potential and probable behavior as well as one's own. A central tenet of the *Sun Tzu* is that the sole purpose of the military is first to secure and ultimately to enhance the wealth and power of the state. Both authors also understand that war requires the coordination of diplomatic, informational and economic power, and stress the critical role of multinational coordination, or, as they would put it, alliances.

Joint and Service doctrine in the U.S. armed forces rely on Clausewitzian and Sun Tzuian concepts and definitions. Current official documents, such as the *National Security Strategy of the United States* and *National Military Strategy of the United States*, support the Clausewitzian concept of the policy-strategy match. Meanwhile, other sources of strategic guidance, such as those dealing with information warfare and transformation, have a distinctly Sun Tzuian flavor. Still, while both texts give considerable emphasis to analyzing the relationship between policy and strategy in war, they also provide the analytical tools that apply to the operational levels of warfare. Both authors were primarily concerned with the intellectual development of professional military officers whom they identified as essential to the security of the state. The expectations that they had for their students to engage in rigorous critical analysis of theory and military history are the same as those of the Naval War College. They are the natural place for us to begin our study of Strategy and War.

Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong) is the third major strategic theorist whom we examine at the beginning of the Strategy and War Course. Mao was a towering figure in the history of the twentieth century. He led the Chinese communists to victory in a protracted civil war against the Nationalist government of China and then ruled over the world's most populous country for more than a generation. Mao developed his theories on strategy and war during the struggle to defeat the Nationalist government, as well as fighting against the Japanese during the Second World War. Mao is the preeminent theorist of strategies of non-state actors. His strategic writings drew upon other great works on strategy and politics, including Clausewitz and the *Sun Tzu*. Indeed, Mao's work represents an important synthesis of Clausewitz and the *Sun Tzu* with the tenets of communist ideology. In *On Protracted War*, Mao elaborates a strategy for how a non-state actor, motivated by an extreme set of revolutionary goals, calling for regime change and global ideological struggle, could grow in strength to defeat more powerful state adversaries. Asymmetric strategies employing irregular warfare—such as terrorism, insurgency, and information operations—loom large in Mao's writings about strategy and war. The stunning success of the communists in the Chinese Civil War has inspired leaders of other extremist movements, including Al Qaeda, to look for inspiration and guidance in Mao's writings and life. The study of Mao's writings thus has great relevance for understanding contemporary long wars involving extremist groups who employ subversion, propaganda, political agitation, popular mobilization, terrorism, and insurgency to defeat their enemies.

B. Topics for Discussion:

1. Clausewitz emphasizes the primacy of politics in waging war. "Policy," he states, "will permeate all military operations." At the same time, he notes "the political aim is not a tyrant," that political considerations do not determine "the posting of guards," and that "policy will not extend its influence to operational details." How can we reconcile the first statement with the others? Does Clausewitz's view of the proper relationship between war and politics differ from that of the *Sun Tzu*?

2. Clausewitz and the author of the *Sun Tzu* agree that although war can be studied systematically, it is an art, not a science. What are the implications of this assumption for the study of strategy and war?

3. Among Clausewitz's most important concepts are "the culminating point of victory," "the center of gravity," and "the need to be strong at the decisive point." How useful are such concepts for strategic and operational leaders?

4. The *Sun Tzu* places great emphasis on the role of intelligence in warfare. Clausewitz states: "The only situation a commander can know fully is his own: his opponents he can only know from unreliable intelligence." He contends that this "can lead him to suppose that the initiative lies with the enemy when in fact it remains with him." Considering these two views, what is the proper role of intelligence in determining a course of action?

5. Clausewitz emphasized the need to understand the importance of three interrelated aspects of war: reason, passion, and the play of chance and creativity. What is the role of each in war, and do they interact differently at the operational level of war as opposed to the strategic or tactical?

6. The author of the *Sun Tzu* argues that "to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill"; meanwhile, Clausewitz stated that "since in war too small an effort can result not just in failure but in positive harm, each side is driven to outdo the other, which sets up an interaction." Are these two statements contradictory or complementary? What are the dangers of adhering to only one of these statements?

7. In Chapter 2 of Book 1 of *On War*, Clausewitz refers to "operations that have direct political repercussions that are designed in the first place to disrupt the opposing alliance, or to paralyze it, that gain us new allies, favorably affect the political scene, etc." At the operational level, does this contradict his guidance in the chapter's introduction that "the fighting forces must be destroyed"?

8. Clausewitz (*On War*, page 69) recognized two kinds of war, involving a limited or unlimited objective. How do they differ from each other? Is one type of war more political than the other?

9. Some proponents of "transformation" and network-centric warfare have suggested that technological innovation might soon lift the "fog of war" completely, thus invalidating certain of Clausewitz's most important insights. Do you agree?

10. Which do you regard as more relevant to the current U.S. global war on terrorism, *On War*, *The Art of War*, or the writings of Mao?

11. How might Book 5, Chapter 4 of *On War* be rewritten to reflect modern warfare, either within one service or in the context of joint warfare?

12. Did Mao radically modify Clausewitz and the *Sun Tzu*, or is he merely adapting them?

13. The author of *The Art of War* puts a premium on acquiring a decisive superiority in the information domain for obtaining victory in war. How realistic is it to expect that one side can gain such a decisive edge against a competent adversary?

14. What are the principal strategic and operational tenets of Mao's writings on how a non-state actor can defeat more powerful adversaries?

15. What role did Mao assign to intelligence, military deception, psychological operations, and information security in his writings on strategy and war?

C. Required Readings:

1. Handel, Michael I. "Who Is Afraid of Carl von Clausewitz? A Guide to the Perplexed." Naval War College, 1999. (NWC Reprint)

[Michael Handel, a noted scholar of strategic affairs who served on the faculty of the Naval War College, prepared this guide for reading *On War*.]

2. Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989. Author's Preface, Comment and Notes; Book 1; Book 2, Chaps. 2-3, 5-6; Book 3; Book 4, Chap. 11; Book 5, Chaps. 3-4; Book 6, Chaps. 1, 5, 6, 26, 27; Book 7, Chaps. 2-5, 22; Book 8.

3. Sun Tzu. *The Art of War*. Samuel B. Griffith, trans. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980. Pages 63-149.

[Griffith's experience in the USMC and his familiarity with Asian languages and cultures make his translation both scholarly and approachable for the professional soldier.]

4. *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung*. Peking, 1967. Pages 187-263, 345-352. (NWC Reprint)

[These selections include some of Mao's most important writings on strategy and war. Mao offers strategic guidance for how a non-state actor, initially weak in strength, can seize power by mobilizing support in the countryside, using irregular warfare and information operations, and building up the military capability to undertake a defense-to-offense transition.]

5. Handel, Michael I. *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*. London: Cass, 2001. Pages 1-39, 53-63, 77-117, 135-154, 165-193 (including the map), 215-253, 299-302.

[*Masters of War* argues that, despite some important differences in emphasis and substance, there is a universal or unified strategic logic, which transcends the wide gaps in time, culture, and historical experience of various nations. The other chapters, appendices and charts in this book are relevant to subsequent case studies and make this book an invaluable reference for the study of Strategy and War.]

6. Van Riper, Paul K. "The Relevance of History to the Military Profession: An American Marine's View," in Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich, eds. *The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pages 34-54. (Selected Readings)

[Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper provides an assessment of the value of history for the study of strategy and reflects on the value of his education at the Naval War College for his professional development.]

I. GRAND STRATEGY, STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP AND THEORIES OF WAR

Bassford, Christopher. "John Keegan and the General Tradition of Trashing Clausewitz: A Polemic." *War in History* (November 1994), pages 319-336.

_____, and Edward Villacres. "Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity." *Parameters* (Autumn 1995), pages 9-20.

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Handel, Michael I., ed. *Clausewitz and Modern Strategy*. London: Cass, 1986. Pages 1-10, 35-92.

Howard, Michael. *Clausewitz*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.

Jomini, Baron de. *The Art of War*. Capt G. H. Mendell and Lt W. P. Craighill, 1862. Chap. 2, pages 34, 46-54; Chap. 3, pages 59-64; Chap. 6, pages 245-253; Conclusions, pages 293-297.

Meyer, Andrew and Wilson, Andrew. "Sunzi Bingfa as History and Theory." Bradford A. Lee and Karl F. Walling, eds., *Strategic Logic and Political Rationality: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel*. London: Frank Cass, 2003. Pages 99-118.

Shy, John. "Jomini," pages 143-185 and Paret, Peter. "Clausewitz," pages 186-213. In Paret, Peter, ed. *Makers of Modern Strategy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.

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Other Studies of War:

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Fuller, Jr., William C. "What is a Military Lesson?" Bradford A. Lee and Karl F. Walling, eds., *Strategic Logic and Political Rationality: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel*. London: Frank Cass, 2003. Pages. 38-59.

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Sun Pin. *Military Methods*. Translated with an Introduction by Ralph D. Sawyer. Boulder: Westview Press, 1995.

Walling, Karl F. "Thucydides on Democratic Politics and Civil-Military Relations." Bradford A. Lee and Karl F. Walling, eds., *Strategic Logic and Political Rationality: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel*. London: Frank Cass, 2003, pages 139-163.

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MASTERS OF WAR

aggression An attack or act of hostility, often the first act leading to a war.

alliance A formal agreement, especially between sovereign states, to combine efforts toward common objectives, interests, a united offense and/or defense. The common usage implies that an "alliance" is a more formal combination than a coalition and more apt to apply between states rather than in domestic politics.

Bologna flask An unannealed bottle susceptible to shattering with the slightest disturbance. (See "On War," p.572)

casus belli Event leading to or justifying war.

coalition Cooperation for combined action of distinct parties, persons or states without incorporation into one formal body. The common usage implies less formality in international affairs than "alliance." "Coalition" is frequently used to describe cooperation within a state, i.e. "coalition government."

concert of powers An agreement between two or more states on preserving or sustaining a certain status quo. In international politics, it also means the coordinated action by two or more states against one or more states. See "concert system" Napoleonic Case study.

coup d'oeil The rapid action or capability of taking a general view of a position and estimating its advantages or disadvantages. The ability to assess a combat situation rapidly, correctly, and act decisively. In today's jargon, the ability to quickly get the big picture." Intuition.

dialectic The art of critical examination into the truth of an argument or opinion; the investigation of truth by discussion. A testing of truth by contrasting opposites.

guerrilla (guerrilla warfare) An irregular war carried on by small bodies of men acting independent of central authority. First appeared in the English language about 1810 in the correspondence of Wellington from Spain.

hegemony Leadership, predominance, preponderance, especially of one state, of a confederacy, or of a union over others.

interceptive war A state about to be attacked has reliable intelligence on the impending attack, is ready to retaliate, but waits for the attacker to make the first move.

jihad In Arabic, Farsi, Afghan, and other Eastern languages of the Islamic people, "holy war."

Machiavellian Of, or pertaining to, or characteristic of Machiavelli, or his alleged principles; following the methods recommended by Machiavelli in preferring expediency to morality; practicing duplicity in statecraft or in general conduct; astute, cunning, intriguing.

Manichean Usual usage is to indicate a black or white view, either/or, no gray area, i.e. communism is pure evil. One with a "Manichean view" takes absolutist positions and does not permit compromise.

milieu A medium, environment, surroundings.

neutrality A neutral attitude between contending parties or powers; abstention from taking any part in a war between other states. If a state wishes to adopt a position of neutrality between two or more states, it has an obligation under international law to refrain from aiding any war-making party, or from allowing belligerents to use its territory for any warlike purpose.

paradigm A case or example to be regarded as representative or typical. Dominant view/method/outlook, usually one accepted without question at any particular time.

preemptive war A preemptive war is one in which the country initiating hostilities does so not for an inherently aggressive motive, but because it is certain that it is about to be attacked.

preventive war Deliberate decision to initiate military violence because the initiator perceives that he has a preponderance of power in his favor, but this advantage is perceived to be transitory and his potential adversary may overtake him in the future.

raison d'état In French, "reason of the state." Also, a political concept emphasizing the existence of the state as an end in itself, which, in the final analysis, has the right to employ any means it chooses for the protection of its continued existence.

Realpolilik Practical politics; policy determined by practical, rather than moral or ideological, considerations. It has been most often used to describe Bismarck's policies and indicates attention to detail, and a willingness to use force if necessary.

rebellion Organized armed resistance to the ruler of one's country, insurrection, revolt. Whether it's a "rebellion" or a "war of liberation" depends upon your point of view.

reprisal A retaliatory act by one state against another in response to some injury. Strictly speaking, a form of retaliation short of war. Fear of reprisals is an important sanction underlying the effectiveness of international norms of behavior. In a more practical sense, the infliction of similar or more severe punishment on the enemy in response to some act committed, e.g. an execution of prisoners of war in response to some act by the enemy.

retaliation The return of like for like punishment or penalty similar to injury done.

sovereignty Total and unreserved independence of a state, or a state able to make decisions without outside influence.

stratagem An operation or act of generalship; usually, an artifice, deception, or trick designed to outwit or surprise the enemy.

war of annihilation To decimate an enemy, to put an enemy in utter rout.

war of attrition Usually armed conflict of prolonged duration, which is characterized by the wearing down of the enemy's strength and morale by military operations.

II. SEA POWER, JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS, AND IRREGULAR WARFARE: THE AMERICAN WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE

A. General: At dawn on 29 June, 1776, five days before the Continental Congress signed the Declaration of Independence, the largest European maritime expedition in history thus far arrived outside of New York City to enable the British Empire to regain control of its rebellious colonies in North America. As the sun rose, citizens of New York gaped in awe as one ship after another appeared over the horizon. The greatest military power of the age had sent 10 ships of the line, 20 frigates, 40 other fighting vessels, 100 troop transports, 10,000 seamen, 23,000 British soldiers, and 10,000 Hessians to crush organized resistance in New York in a massive joint operation. Another 500 auxiliary ships were strung out across the Atlantic behind the armada to tend to every logistical need. Within a month, much of New York would be burned to the ground, with thousands of refugees from the British fleeing Manhattan and Long Island for the interior. The recently constituted Continental Army under General George Washington, with only 10,000 Continental soldiers and 9,000 militia, was outflanked and forced into hasty retreat. The new general was able to avoid complete envelopment and total destruction of his army only by slipping across the Hudson into New Jersey in an emergency evacuation that, ironically, anticipated the later British evacuation of Dunkirk in 1940. Suffering from massive desertions, worn out by forced marches, and often without food, shoes, or shelter, Washington's fleeing army was reduced to no more than 3000 men by December, 1776, with many of the remaining soldiers' enlistments due to expire at the end of the month. All hope seemed lost as organized resistance in the Middle States was about to collapse. British victory appeared complete and decisive. The British "shock and awe" campaign, led by two brothers, Admiral Lord Richard and General Sir William Howe, had spectacular operational success initially, but surprisingly failed to achieve the British political objective of restoring obedience to the Crown. This case explores why the British failed and the Americans, the weaker power by any conventional standard, achieved their independence in a protracted revolutionary war that foreshadows many of the insurgencies against occupation forces of the modern era.

The American Revolution is of historical interest to American military officers because the war of 1775-1783 brought their country and its military into being. It is of strategic interest because it provides an opportunity to study three different types of war at once. It was a war within a war within a war: an irregular or partisan war for the allegiance of the American people; a conventional war between the Continental Army under George Washington and a British army exploiting its advantages in joint operations whenever possible; and a global maritime conflict among great powers that was fought in the English Channel, the Mediterranean, the West Indies, the South Atlantic, the Indian Ocean, and off the coast of North America. The War for Independence is of operational interest because its decisive battle, the joint and combined operation of French and American forces at Yorktown, compels us to investigate the circumstances and conditions under which such campaigns are most likely to yield their desired strategic results.

A revolutionary war involves a struggle for the political allegiance of a group of people. That defining characteristic links the American Revolution of the eighteenth

century to more recent insurgencies, some of which we shall study later in this course. Nonetheless, the "liberal-republican" political ideology of the Patriots fighting for independence was quite different from that of more recent revolutions. It proved a major cultural obstacle to British efforts to understand the motivations of their enemy and a significant asset for revolutionary leaders seeking to sustain and expand their political base. The mix of conventional and unconventional military tactics employed by General George Washington's forces differed from that of more recent revolutionaries as well, although Rhode Island General Nathanael Greene's Southern Campaign supplies a classic example of strategically effective operations mixing regular and irregular forces. Nonetheless, the imperative to win popular political support and the desire to make a military transition over time from the strategic defensive to the strategic offensive were very much the same as in more recent revolutionary conflicts. So too was the triangular nature of the struggle. Students are often surprised that American support for the Revolution was not unanimous, especially at the beginning of the conflict. Insurgents had to earn such support and deny it to their enemy, which sought to do the same to them. Hence, the conflict requires us to examine how insurgents and counter-insurgents fight to sustain the loyalty of their followers, win the support of neutrals and the undecided, and marginalize the influence of their adversaries.

This case also invites an effort to understand the impact of foreign intervention in an ongoing war. When France and Spain intervened against Britain, the coalition against the British gave a major material and moral boost to the Americans and threatened Britain's global empire. The British had to reassess their strategic priorities, as the French and the Spanish sought to seize British colonies in the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, and India. The global naval conflict that ensued provides us with an opportunity to consider the strategic uses of sea power in light of the theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan. As a member of the faculty and President of the Naval War College, Mahan wrote his most famous book on *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*. By examining Mahan's critique of British naval strategy during the war, we confront enduring strategic issues: geopolitics, commerce and the material foundations of strategy, naval preparedness, land versus sea power, naval concentration, when to risk a fleet, decisive battle, and the uses and limits of blockades.

Most importantly, this case is an ideal laboratory for exploring the strategic effects of joint and combined operations. Whereas successful British operations using land and naval forces together in New York and the South failed to yield their desired strategic results, the only significant French and American joint and combined operation of the war, the siege of Yorktown by both land and sea, broke the will of the British government to continue the war. Jointness is not an end in itself, but a means among many to strategic success. Understanding why the British failed, but the French and Americans succeeded may enable us to discriminate between the kinds of joint operations that win wars and those that do not. Discerning when to open a theater in an ongoing war, and how to use naval forces to support it, is surely part of the strategic problem. Yet many other factors also deserve attention, such as the nature of the war, the availability of local support and intelligence, control of sea lines of communications, the willingness of allies to cooperate, civil-military and intra-military relations, coherent command

structures, coalition leadership, and keeping pressure on the enemy without passing the culminating point.

This case might be subtitled: the education of George Washington as an operational and strategic leader. It explores the evolution of his thought and practice as commander of the Continental Army from the darkest days of the War for Independence, when humiliating defeat seemed all but inevitable for the Americans, to his greatest triumph at Yorktown. Washington's partisans ascribe much of the credit for American victory to his strategic and operational leadership. After numerous mistakes, he adapted and matured enough to deny the British early victory, protract the war, and seek decisive battles, when opportunity allowed. As much by necessity as by choice, he employed a Fabian strategy to wear out the British. Although this approach required staying on the strategic defensive for most of the war, it enabled the Continental Army to survive. Tactical offensives supplied "incremental dividends" to keep hope alive until Washington could seize the initiative and transition to the strategic offensive. Even during the war, some questioned Washington's skill both as a strategic planner and as an adaptive operator, however. Perhaps a purely guerilla strategy would have been better. Moreover, often lacking effective command and control to coordinate their far-flung forces, British political and military leaders made significant strategic and operational mistakes that sometimes prevented them from cashing in military victories for political results. Absent many British blunders waging a counter-insurgency campaign, fighting Washington's conventional army, and employing England's navy for optimal effect, perhaps Washington's army would not have survived. Perhaps American resistance would have collapsed. A critical analysis of Washington's leadership and the failures of the British may thus help us come to terms with the nature of strategic and operational leadership itself.

Washington did not bear the responsibility of leadership alone. Having served in the Second Continental Congress himself, he knew most of the political leaders of the Revolution well, many of whom were well versed in the strategic uses of information, diplomacy, intelligence, and foreign aid. The committee that drafted the Declaration of Independence, for example, had clear strategic purposes in mind: to mobilize domestic support for independence and war against the British; to persuade foreign powers to intervene; and to appeal to British public opinion to oppose the war. Reading the Declaration of Independence as a strategic document highlights the uses of strategic communications and public diplomacy in the first, most famous, and perhaps most effective information operation in American history. Nonetheless, the political organization of the Americans complicated winning the war enormously. Congress was a coalition of independent states jealous of any central authority that might become dangerous to liberty. Without the authority to raise troops and revenue on its own, Congress often found it difficult to support Washington's rag-tag army in the field, with many wondering whether inflation, bankruptcy, desertion, and even mutinies in the army were a greater danger to American independence than the British themselves. In this way, the American War for Independence is paradigmatic of virtually all other major wars in American history, with some sacrifice of liberty often being necessary for security, but great fears about sacrificing too much, lest liberty never recover. That

Congress and Washington managed to win the war without losing the liberty for which it was fought was perhaps their greatest accomplishment.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. When the United States declared its independence in July 1776, what was the likelihood that the Americans could win their struggle with Great Britain?

2. How well did George Washington and the Continental Congress use information operations, deception, and intelligence during the American War for Independence?

3. Was the British decision to pacify American resistance by force of arms counterproductive to Great Britain's overall objectives?

4. Assuming that the American Revolution was a struggle for the allegiance of the American people, compare how well the strategies and operations of American and British commanders were suited to the nature of the war.

5. Was American success in achieving independence due more to the strategic skill of George Washington or to the operational and strategic mistakes of the British?

6. Who would rate George Washington better as a general, Clausewitz or the author of the *Sun Tzu*?

7. Why did British joint operations in the South fail to win the war for Britain from 1778-1781?

8. Why was the joint and combined French and American operation at Yorktown strategically successful when earlier British joint operations in New York and the South proved to be strategic failures?

9. In *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*, Mahan was harshly critical of British naval strategy during the War for American independence. Do you agree with his critique? Why or why not?

10. What strategic and operational lessons did George Washington learn from his successes and failures in 1776?

11. Given the overwhelming British victories in New York and New Jersey in 1776, how was General Washington able to avoid catastrophic defeat and eventually win the war?

12. The United States fought the War for Independence as a coalition of thirteen separate states in alliance with France. How well did George Washington and the Congress manage these different coalitions?

13. In 1778, after France entered the war, what strategic course of action should the British have followed?

14. Could the United States have won its independence in 1783 without the French? If so, how? If not, why not?

15. Why did British leaders find it so difficult to reassess and to adapt their strategy during this conflict?

16. What was more important in accounting for Great Britain's defeat in the War for American Independence, failures in intelligence or inadequate troop strength?

17. Why was Great Britain not able to translate its naval strength into decisive strategic effects during the war for American Independence?

C. Required Readings:

1. Morison, Samuel Eliot. *The Oxford History of the American People*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. Pages 234-297, 323-342, 348-353.

[The famous historian Samuel Eliot Morison examines the British imperial system and provides a balanced overview of the political, diplomatic, economic, social, and military dimensions of the struggle for American independence.]

2. Fischer, David Hackett. *Washington's Crossing*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. Pages 7-205, 346-379.

[Using all of our course themes, the preeminent historian of the American War for Independence supplies a detailed account of British and American strategic and operational planning and campaigns in 1776. Fischer highlights the initial success of British joint operations in New York and George Washington's ability to learn from his mistakes in order to deny the British an early and decisive victory.]

3. Kurland, Philip B. and Ralph Lerner, editors. "Fundamental Documents of the American Revolution," from *The Founders' Constitution*. Vol. 1. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, and University of Chicago, 1987; and Syrett, Harold G., editor. *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961. (Selected Readings)

[These readings are essential for comprehending Washington's Fabian strategy against Britain. In addition, these readings will prove useful for understanding the cultural, social, material, institutional, and international dimensions of strategy during this war.]

4. Weigley, Russell F. *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977. Chapters 1-2.

[One of the country's leading military historians, in what is widely considered a classic study, considers American strategy from both conventional and partisan warfare perspectives, suggesting a symbiotic relationship between the two.]

5. Shy, John. *A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990. Chapters 6-10.

[This study supplies a framework for understanding the insurgency that confronted the British and the strategic problem they faced in fighting militias and armed groups during this war.]

6. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1957. Introductory, Chapters 1, 9-11, and 13-14.

[Mahan's famous study examines the elements of sea power and analyzes where Britain went wrong with its naval strategy, all the while advancing a 'blue water' theory of war at sea.]

7. Selby, John. *The Road to Yorktown*. New York: St. Martin's, 1976. Pages 167-198. (Selected Readings)

[This reading provides a clear account of the decisions and events in the South that led to the Franco-American victory at sea and on land at Yorktown.]

II. SEA POWER, JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS, AND IRREGULAR WARFARE: THE AMERICAN WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE

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Cohen, Sheldon S. *British Supporters of the American Revolution, 1775-1783: The Role of the 'Middling-level' Activists*. Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press, 2004.

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Davis, Burke. *The Campaign That Won America: The Story of Yorktown*. New York: The Dial Press, 1970.

Draper, Theodore. *A Struggle for Power: The American Revolution*. New York: Random House, 1996.

Dull, Jonathan R. *The French Navy and American Independence: A Study of Arms and Diplomacy, 1774-1787*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.

_____. *A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985.

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THE AMERICAN WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE

blockade A belligerent act to isolate an enemy from access to resources or supplies. Formal blockades are recognized under international law, which also provides guidelines for their implementation. A blockade involves the use of military force and has standing under international law. See "paper blockade."

"crossing the T" A naval maneuver from the days of sailing ships in which a fleet sailing in line ahead (single file) crossed at a right angle in front of another fleet. The fleet executing the maneuver could bring the full broadside fire of all its ships to bear on the enemy, whereas the other fleet could fire only the bow guns of his lead ships effectively. It was a difficult maneuver to accomplish because the fleet under attack could turn away before the attacking fleet "crossed the T." The tactic survived the demise of sail and was attempted in modern times at Tsushima (1905), Jutland (1916), and in the Sarigato Straight during the Battle for Leyte Gulf (1944).

embargo A self-imposed government order which prohibits certain types of trade through its ports.

Fabian Strategy A strategy where decisive battle is avoided with a more powerful or skillful enemy. While avoiding decisive battle, the side employing this strategy harasses its enemy to cause attrition and loss of morale. Employment of this strategy implies that the weaker side believes time is on its side, but it may also be adopted when no feasible alternative strategy can be devised. This strategy derives its name from Quintus Fabius Maximus, who defended Rome against Hannibal in the Second Punic War (218-201 B.C.). Due to Hannibal's skill as a general, he repeatedly inflicted devastating losses on the Romans despite his numerical inferiority. Fabius advocated a strategy of avoiding battle with Hannibal, while attacking his allies and his communications. Fabian strategy is usually associated with conventional warfare, as differentiated from guerrilla tactics in unconventional warfare.

frigate A three-masted square rigged ship, usually 36 to 44 guns, one or two decks.

grenadier Originally a soldier whose primary function was to throw grenades. Although the use of grenades declined during the 18th century, the elite units of grenadiers remained in many armies, and often became elite attack troops.

guerre de course The interruption of an enemy's seaborne commerce by the destruction of its merchant shipping. Such naval warfare is usually carried on by fast cruisers, capable of fighting small enemy warships, but able to avoid enemy capital ships by speed, maneuver, or stealth. The opposite of a fleet-on-fleet engagement.

in the van In the line; in front of.

leeward Downwind. The ship to leeward was at a disadvantage if desiring to engage in combat, since it was forced to close the enemy against the wind. See windward.

letter of marque and reprisal A commission issued to the owner of a private vessel, authorizing its captain to operate against enemy ships as a privateer.

man of war A warship.

mêlée A mixed or irregular fight between combatants. In the case of naval warfare, the loss of orderly formation in battle.

monarchy The rule by a king, queen, Caesar, Kaiser, tsar/tsarina, regent (one who is ruling in the name of a monarch who has not yet reached the necessary age), emperor, or in tribal societies, a chief. Monarchs were, as a rule, laws upon themselves, responsible for their acts and actions only before God and history. They ruled by the Divine Right of Kings, which helps explain why European wars prior to the French Revolution were limited in objective. To depose a rival king would bring the whole concept of "divine right" into question.

ochlocracy Government by the mob or lowest of the people; mob rule.

paper blockade Blockade that is declared by a belligerent to exist, but is not effective.

partisan A member of an irregular or guerrilla group operating within occupied territory to harass and inflict damage on the occupying forces. These guerrilla forces operate as an auxiliary to the regular military forces. Partisans require external support while insurgents operate as armed dissidents within a society seeking revolutionary, social and political change. (Larry Cable, "Conflicts of Myths")

pilot A person duly qualified to steer ships into or out of harbor, or wherever the navigation requires local knowledge.

privateer A privately owned vessel usually commissioned by a nation at war to attack and seize enemy vessels, as a means of destroying enemy commerce.

quarantine A coercive act to isolate an adversary from access to resources or supplies. Quarantine is different from a blockade in that it has no standing under international law.

Quai d'Orsay The official seat of the French Foreign Office, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

revolutionary war A war unleashed by a revolutionary group to overthrow the existing social or political order. Revolutionaries often begin their struggle by using unconventional methods of warfare.

ship of the line An armed vessel capable of taking a position in the first line of offense or defense. They were two-decked vessels carrying 74 or 86 guns. If of three decks, they sometimes carried up to 120 guns, but never less than sixty.

sine qua non Latin, indispensable, absolutely necessary.

sloop of war A small warship of the 17th, 18th, and early 19th centuries. Smaller than a frigate, it could have one, two, or three masts, one deck and usually 18 to 32 guns.

THE AMERICAN WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE
CHRONOLOGY

King George becomes King of England	1760
Treaty of Paris ends French & Indian/Seven Years War	1763
Stamp Act is passed by Parliament to pay for British troops stationed in the Americas	1765
Stamp Act is repealed after violent protests by colonists	Mar 1766
British troops arrive in Boston to enforce custom laws	1768
Five killed in "Boston Massacre"	Mar 1770
Massachusetts colonists dressed as Indians protest the Tea Act by throwing tea from British ships into Boston Harbor	Dec 1773
First Continental Congress convenes in Philadelphia.	Jan 1774
Shots fired at Lexington and Concord. "Minute Men" force British troops back to Boston under siege--Washington takes command of Continental Army.	Apr 1775
King George declares colonies to be in rebellion.	Apr 23, 1775
Americans capture Fort Ticonderoga.	Jul 5, 1775
Americans unsuccessfully attack Quebec.	Dec 1775
Thomas Paine publishes "Common Sense"--pushes colonies toward independence.	Jan 1776
British evacuate Boston.	Mar 1776
Declaration of Independence signed.	Jul 4, 1776
British land large force in New York bent on crushing the rebellion.	Jul 1776
British chase Continental Army off Long Island.	Aug 1776
Washington crosses Delaware and defeats a Hessian force an Trenton.	Dec 26, 1776
Continental Congress dispatches John Paul Jones and the Ranger to raid the English coast.	Jun 14, 1777
Congress names 19-year-old French aristocrat Marquis de Lafayette a major general.	Dec 26, 1776
British under Burgoyne retake Fort Ticonderoga—begins move down Hudson River to link up with forces from New York to cut off New England from the rest of the colonies.	Jul 1777
Continental Army defeated at Brandywine and Germantown—British under Howe occupy Philadelphia.	Sep-Oct 1777
Americans defeat Burgoyne at Saratoga.	Oct 17, 1777
Continental Army winters in Valley Forge	1777-78
Prussian Baron von Steuben arrives at Valley Forge	Feb 23 1778
France signs treaty of alliance with the Americans	Feb 1778
British Parliament creates a Peace Commission to negotiate with the Colonies, offers to meet all demands short of independence—Congress declines.	Mar 1778
Clinton replaces Howe in Philadelphia-withdraws British forces in Pennsylvania to New York	Jun 1778
France declares war on Great Britain	Jul 10, 1778
French fleet under D'Estaing with an American land force attempts unsuccessful siege of Newport, RI—Gale drives French out of Narragansett into aborted encounter with British fleet under Howe—D'Estaing departs for the West Indies.	Aug 1778
British take Savannah, GA	Dec 1778
Spain declares war on Great Britain but does not ally with the Americans	Jun 16, 1779
D'Estaing fleet and American troops conduct unsuccessful attack on Savannah—D'Estaing returns to France (guillotined 1794)	Sep-Oct 1779
British evacuate Newport, RI.	Oct 1779
British take Charleston, SC, in worst American defeat of war.	May 1780
Count Rochambeau arrives in Newport with 6,000 French soldiers—blockaded there by British. Rochambeau carries orders rendering Washington a Marshal of France, making him the senior officer of French forces in the theater.	Jul 11, 1780
Battle of King's Mountain—British commander, Cornwallis abandons operations in North Carolina.	Oct 7, 1780
Battles of Cowpens and Guilford Courthouse force Cornwallis to abandon southern operation and head for Virginia.	Jan-Mar 1781
Washington convinces Rochambeau to join in a combined naval and land attack on New York.	May 21, 1781
Cornwallis arrives in Yorktown.	
Washington abandons plan to attack New York after learning Comte de Grasse with 29 ships of the line and 3,000 troops are headed for the Chesapeake. Washington and Rochambeau move their forces to Philadelphia.	Aug 1781
Comte De Grasse's fleet arrives off Yorktown, joins with Lafayette's American troops to cut off Cornwallis from land and sea.	Aug 31, 1781
Battle of the Chesapeake, de Grasse defeats British fleet under Graves who withdraws to New York abandoning Cornwallis.	Sep 5-8, 1781
De Grasse moves Washington and Rochambeau's army from Philadelphia to Yorktown.	Sep 14-24, 1781
Washington's 17,000-man army (nearly 8,000 French) begins siege of Cornwallis' nearly 8,000 men in Yorktown.	Sep 28, 1781
Cornwallis surrenders.	Oct 19, 1781
Clinton arrives in the Chesapeake with 7,000 reinforcements—returns to New York after learning of Cornwallis' fate.	Oct 24, 1781

THE AMERICAN WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE CHRONOLOGY (cont.)

British withdraw from North Carolina.	Jan 1782
House of Commons votes to end war.	Feb 27, 1782
British Prime Minister Lord North resigns—is replaced by Lord Rockingham who seeks immediate negotiations with the Americans.	Mar 20, 1782
Carleton replaces Clinton to implement new British policy—withdrawal of troops from America.	Apr 4, 1782
Battle of the Saintes--De Grasse's fleet is defeated in the West Indies by Admiral Rodney—Peace talks begin in Paris.	Apr 12, 1782
British withdraw from Georgia.	Jun 11, 1782
Fighting between British and American troops continues in South Carolina and Kentucky.	Aug 1782
Preliminary peace treaty is signed recognizing American independence.	Nov 30, 1782
British troops withdraw from South Carolina.	Dec 14, 1782
French object to the Americans signing peace treaty without consulting them.	Dec 15, 1782
French and Spanish sign preliminary peace treaty with Britain.	Jan 20, 1783
Britain declares an end to hostilities in America.	Feb 4, 1783
Washington convinces the officers of the Continental Army not to overthrow Congress (Newburgh Conspiracy).	Mar 15, 1783
Congress declares an end to the war.	Apr 11, 1783
Bulk of Continental Army disbands.	Jun 23, 1783
Total of Loyalists fleeing to Canada reaches 100,000 as 7,000 leave New York.	Apr 26, 1783
Treaty of Paris signed--officially ends war.	Sep 3, 1783
Washington disbands remainder of Continental Army .	Nov 3, 1783
Last British troops in America leave New York.	Nov 25, 1783
Washington resigns.	Dec 23, 1783

III. CLASH OF CULTURES: MARITIME STRATEGY, JOINT OPERATIONS, AND WAR TERMINATION IN A LIMITED REGIONAL CONFLICT— THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

A. General: This segment of the course examines the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5), a regional conflict between an established great power and a rising challenger seeking to overturn the existing balance of power. Whereas Russia had been the dominant Eurasian land power throughout the nineteenth century, Japan had been modernizing for little more than one generation. Japan's remarkably successful strategy contains the key elements necessary to prosecute a regional war: a well thought-out coordination of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements of national power; equally well coordinated land and sea operations; and a thorough preparation for war termination. In contrast, Russian strategy illustrates the dangers of failing to understand the culture and military potential of the adversary. Despite Japan's success, this limited war did not resolve the underlying problem of regional instability caused by failing regimes in Korea and China, where the fighting on the ground took place. Indeed instability in Northeast Asia has remained a dangerous international problem ever since.

The conflict examines fundamental geostrategic problems, highlighting the interrelationship between land and sea operations. Russia, despite major advantages in resources, men under arms, naval vessels, interior lines, and strategic depth, lost the war to a rising power whose military transformation Russian policy makers had grossly underestimated. The limited carrying capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Chinese Eastern Railway (the Manchurian link to Vladivostok and Port Arthur) precluded a rapid Russian troop buildup. This would allow the Japanese to achieve numerical superiority in the first half of the war. Therefore, before the completion of the Russian Far Eastern railway network, Japan seized the strategic initiative to launch a surprise attack on the Russian naval base at Port Arthur in Manchuria and landed armies on the Asian mainland in both Korea and China. The Russo-Japanese War demonstrates how the weaker side can win limited regional wars.

Yet, Japan's initial gains did not produce a rapid conclusion to the conflict, which lasted for almost nineteen months. The fighting on land revolved around the desperate siege of Port Arthur (May 1904-January 1905) and huge battles fought in Manchuria—Liaoyang (August-September 1904), Shaho (October 1904), and Mukden (February-March 1905). Neither side proved able to deliver a knockout blow; rather, Russian forces retreated into the interior of Manchuria, lengthening Japan's supply lines. This war thus illustrates the relationship between operations and war termination. By the spring of 1905, Japan was physically exhausted and Russia was politically unstable. Although Russia had overcome transportation bottlenecks to reverse Japan's numerical superiority in theater, the defeats suffered by the Russian armed forces provoked outbreaks of revolutionary violence throughout the empire. Just as Russia had marshaled its capacity to defeat Japan, its will to fight evaporated. Meanwhile, Japan had used up its financial and manpower reserves. War weariness led both sides to accept the offer to open negotiations made by President Theodore Roosevelt, who won the Nobel Peace Prize for his diplomatic efforts.

Naval operations loomed large in determining the outcome of this conflict. Russian naval forces coordinated neither with each other nor with Russian land forces. The Vladivostok Squadron caused consternation among the Japanese when it disrupted commercial traffic, but for only a very short period, while the Japanese kept the Port Arthur Squadron in port for most of the war. For a brief period, under the leadership of VADM Stepan O. Makarov, the Port Arthur Squadron threatened Japan's vital sea lines of communication and mines destroyed two of Japan's six battleships. After Makarov's death, however, the Port Arthur Squadron reverted to inactivity. The Imperial Japanese Army would destroy the squadron at anchor during the reduction of Port Arthur.

In contrast, Japanese naval forces under the leadership of ADM Heihachirō Tōgō focused on neutralizing Russian naval forces so that the Imperial Japanese Army could land men and supplies unimpeded on the Asian mainland. Meanwhile, the Imperial Japanese Army jeopardized its primary mission of annihilating the Russian army in order to prosecute a joint operation with the navy to reduce Port Arthur. This division of forces deprived the army of the numerical superiority necessary to envelop Russian land forces. At sea, the Japanese achieved a series of notable successes. The Battle of Tsushima—in which a Russian fleet was annihilated after steaming 18,000 miles from the Baltic Sea to Northeast Asia—is often considered a classic example of a decisive fleet engagement.

An in-depth examination of the Russo-Japanese War highlights several enduring problems in strategy and war. First, the conflict was fought in Northeast Asia, which has been and remains a focus of regional conflict and instability. The Russo-Japanese rivalry to dominate the Korean Peninsula precipitated the Russo-Japanese War, while a Soviet-Japanese rivalry would be central to the conduct of much of the Chinese Civil War (1927-1945) and a Soviet-U.S. rivalry would lie at the heart of the Korean War (1950-1953). Examining the Russo-Japanese War thus provides a useful starting point for understanding the geopolitics, geostrategy, societies, and cultures of Northeast Asia.

Second, the Russo-Japanese War was Japan's second successful limited war fought both to promote its own regional influence and to contain Russian East Asian expansion. Japan fought the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) to expel China from the Korean Peninsula in anticipation of a Russian advance in tandem with the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway. In the Russo-Japanese War, Japan attempted to limit this Russian expansion before the completion of the railway system. These two successive wars illustrate an effective strategy of using limited regional wars to achieve national objectives.

Third, the case shows the difficulty of developing appropriate doctrine to guide operations in a period marked by rapid technological change. Before the war, although many naval experts had believed that modern torpedoes would revolutionize the nature of war at sea, during the conflict the erratic performance of these weapons punctured such expectations. Conversely, naval mines, quick-firing artillery, and machine guns yielded surprisingly important operational results. At the same time, the scale of the Manchurian conflict, as well as the carnage of the siege of Port Arthur and the battle of Mukden,

foreshadowed the horrors of trench warfare a decade later in World War I. Yet, neither the belligerents nor the majority of foreign observers completely understood these phenomena or divined their implications.

Fourth, the engagements on land and sea raise important questions about the interconnection between land and sea power, and the possibilities for combining different kinds of military power to produce desired strategic outcomes. Joint operations made possible the reduction of Port Arthur. Before this happened, the Japanese army faced hostile forces at the front and rear, while the Japanese navy could not leave Port Arthur to refit and prepare for the arrival of the Baltic Fleet lest the Port Arthur Squadron escape and jeopardize Japan's vital sea lines of communication. Russia, in contrast, suffered endemic problems with coordination. The war demonstrates the consequences of a lack of jointness for Russia and the corresponding benefits for Japan.

Fifth, the war affords an opportunity to examine the influential sea power theorists Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett. Both closely studied the conflict, which influenced the evolution of their thinking about the theory and principles of maritime war. They analyzed the strategic effects of Japan's use of sea power and joint operations. The Russo-Japanese War can be used to compare and test their ideas about sea power, naval strategy, and the proper relationship between armies and fleets. While Russia could reach the front both by land and sea, its SLOCs and LOCs were long. Japan, in contrast, had much shorter lines of communication, but it depended on its navy to deploy troops on the Asian mainland. While Russia could have prosecuted the war without a navy, Japan could not. In addition, Russia could rebuild its navy internally, while Japan could not construct state-of-the-art battleships. These differences raise interesting strategic questions: When should Russia or Japan have risked its fleet? Should Russia or Japan have focused on prosecuting the war at sea or on land, and if on land, how far inland?

Finally, the termination of the war sheds light on the translation of military achievements into the attainment of national political objectives. Japan went to war only after intensive diplomacy to shape the international arena so that it could end the conflict on desirable terms. Japan set the stage for strategic success by the diplomatic isolation of Russia with the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 and by pre-war preparation to end the war through U.S. mediation. The Japanese carefully integrated all the elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) into their planning, prosecution, and termination of the war. During the hostilities, Japanese military leaders determined the culminating point of victory, took Sakhalin Island at the very end to use as a bargaining chip at the peace negotiations, and coordinated with their civil counterparts to end the conflict before the balance of power on the battlefield had shifted to Russian advantage. In contrast, Russia provides a negative case for dysfunctional civil-military relations, the failure to integrate the elements of national power, and war termination.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. Was Japan's success in this war due more to the strategic and operational skills of Japanese leaders or to Russian blunders?

2. Could Russia have defeated Japan in this war? If not, why not? If so, how?

3. How well did Japanese operations cope with Russian strengths and exploit Russian weaknesses?

4. When and under what strategic circumstances should Russian and Japanese commanders have accepted greater risk in the operations of their fleets?

5. What were the most important operational mistakes made by the Japanese and how might the Russians have exploited them?

6. How did the land and sea operations that took place around Port Arthur affect the conflict's outcome?

7. What enduring lessons about war termination in a conflict fought for limited aims can be learned from studying the Russo-Japanese War?

8. Did the Japanese army's leadership, in pursuit of a decisive victory, push their offensive ground operations too far when they advanced to fight the Battle of Mukden? Instead of fighting the Battle of Mukden, should the Japanese have made an earlier transition to the defense rather than continue on the offensive?

9. Many contemporaries were struck by leniency of the Peace of Portsmouth to Russia, given its poor military performance. Could Japan have secured a more advantageous peace?

10. Both Mahan and Corbett found evidence in the Russo-Japanese War to support their strategic theories. Evaluate their theories against the backdrop of this war.

11. How did the operations of the Imperial Japanese Navy contribute to the war's outcome?

12. Washington successfully executed a Fabian strategy during the War for American Independence. Why did a Fabian strategy work in Washington's case but not for Russia in the war against Japan?

13. Based on an assessment of the rewards, feasibility, and risks of the principal alternative courses of action open to Russia for the employment of its naval forces, which option would you recommend to Russian strategic decision makers?

14. Was Tsushima a "decisive" victory?

15. "The paramount concern . . . of maritime strategy is to determine the mutual relations of your army and navy in a plan of war." (Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, p. 14) How well did Japanese and Russian commanders plan their operations so that their ground and naval forces mutually supported each other to achieve overall strategic objectives?

16. Evaluate the strategic and operational leadership of ADM Heihachirō Tōgō.

17. At the war's outset, how would you assess Japan's chances of success in the coming struggle against Russia?

18. Why did Russian leaders find it difficult to adapt effectively to the wartime realities that confronted them in the fighting against Japan?

19. How well did Japanese and Russian military leaders understand the lethality of modern weaponry and exploit the transformation taking place in warfare on land and sea?

C. Required Readings:

1. Koda, Yoji. "The Russo-Japanese War: Primary Causes of Japanese Success." *Naval War College Review*, vol. 58 no. 2 (Spring 2005), pages 11-44. (Selected Readings)

[Koda, a serving Japanese vice-admiral, summarizes Japan's pre-war strategic situation, its wartime policy and strategy, and the lessons the Japanese drew from the war.]

2. Elleman, Bruce A. *Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989*. London: Routledge, 2001. Chapter 7. (Selected Readings)

[Professor Bruce Elleman, a member of the Naval War College faculty, provides a short account of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5), examining Japanese policy and strategy.]

3. Paine, S. C. M. *The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pages 3-11, 367-70. (Selected Readings)

[Professor Paine of the Strategy Department describes the impact of this war on the balance of power in the Far East and of Japan's new policy of imperialism on its relationship with Russia.]

4. Warner, Denis and Peggy. *The Tide at Sunrise: A History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905*. New York: Charterhouse, 1974. Pages 3-20, 154-286, 299-416, 427-80, 498-538.

[The Warners provide a detailed description of the war on the operational and strategic levels.]

5. Fuller, William C., Jr. *Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600-1914*. New York: Free Press, 1992. Pages 361-407.

[Fuller describes the Russian diplomatic situation and state of the empire on the eve of the war and the evolution of Russian strategy during the hostilities.]

6. Andidora, Ronald. "Admiral Togo: An Adaptable Strategist." *Naval War College Review*, vol. 44, no. 2 (Spring 1991), pages 52-61. (Selected Readings)

[Andidora focuses on the Japanese strategic dilemmas concerning when to risk the fleet.]

7. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. "Retrospect upon the War between Japan and Russia," in *Naval Administration and Warfare*. Boston: Little Brown, 1918. Pages 133-173. (Selected Readings)

[Mahan presents his assessment of the naval strategies of Russia and Japan.]

8. Corbett, Julian S. *Maritime Operations in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905*. Vol. 2. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press and Newport: Naval War College Press, 1994. Pages 382-411. (Selected Readings)

[Corbett outlines Japanese strategy and sketches a Russian alternative strategy, while the Appendix discusses the strategy that the Russians employed.]

9. Corbett, Julian S. *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. London: Longman, Green, 1911. Pages 1-104.

[Corbett shows how a sea power can deploy its navy to achieve strategic objectives against a land power. He emphasizes the utility of joint and peripheral operations. He also provides his analysis of the naval and land strategies of Russia and Japan.]

10. Evans, David C. and Mark R. Peattie. *Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Chapters 3-4.

[This important study of the Imperial Japanese Navy examines Japan's prewar preparation for a conflict with Russia and the wartime realities.]

III. CLASH OF CULTURES: MARITIME STRATEGY AND JOINT OPERATIONS IN A LIMITED REGIONAL WAR—THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

Cecil, Lamar J.R. "Coal for the Fleet that Had to Die." *The American Historical Review* 64, no. 4 (July 1964): 990-1005.

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Esthus, Raymond A. *Double Eagle and Rising Sun: The Russians and Japanese at Portsmouth in 1905*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1988.

Hamilton, Sir Ian Standish Monteith. *A Staff Officer's Scrap-Book During the Russo-Japanese War*. 2 vols. London: E. Arnold, 1912.

Harries, Meirion and Susie. *Soldiers of the Sun: The Rise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Army*. New York: Random House, 1991.

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Okamoto, Shumpei. *The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970.

Pleshakov, Constantine. *The Tsar's Last Armada: The Epic Voyage to the Battle of Tsushima*. New York: Basic Books, 2002.

Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, David. *Toward the Rising Sun: Russian Ideologies of Empire and the Path to War with Japan*. DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2001.

Schurman, D.M. *The Education of a Navy: The Development of British Naval Strategic Thought, 1867-1914*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965.

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THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

Black Dragon Society A political group which argued unsuccessfully in January 1904 for the unification of Japanese political and military strategies.

bushido "The way of the samurai [warrior]." Characterized traditional ideals of conduct that controlled all Japanese society: justice, courage, sincerity, loyalty, and obligation to emperor, parents, country, ancestors and family. Death in battle was not sought. The warrior knew when to die, and if dishonorable capture or defeat was imminent he resorted to the sword, the soul of the samurai. At the time of the Russo-Japanese War, bushido became the privilege not only of officers but also of the ordinary conscript.

Cabinet System Came into being in Japan after the restoration of supreme imperial power (the 1885 Meiji Restoration) when samurai families (clans) pledged their allegiance to the emperor instead of the shogun. The cabinet consisted of a Prime Minister and nine department ministers. In 1900 the cabinet ruled that only military flag or general officers of three or four star rank, no civilians, could be a military minister. Since cabinet decisions were required to be unanimous the Prime Minister and the cabinet were at the mercy of the military ministers who could bring down the government by resigning or refusing to make a decision unanimous.

Choshu clan A samurai clan from the Choshu province of Kyushu, this clan was anti-shogun, anti-foreign involvement and pro-emperor. Many important members of this clan were senior, influential army officers. In the 1850's-60's, the Choshu clan provoked a series of reprisals against western naval forces, which broke the back of anti-foreign resistance, but not the pro-imperial movement to which it was linked. After the Meiji Restoration, Japan saw rapid adaptation of western methods in government, commerce, industry and military organization.

Constitutional Military Party After the 1885 Meiji Restoration this party rejected European influence and considered expansion to the Asian continent more urgent that social and economic reforms.

Diet Nominally equal to the cabinet, it had indirect and political vice legal responsibilities. Members were appointed and removed by the emperor. The Diet could put questions to ministers and send opinions to the emperor, but had little power.

Genro "Council of elder statesmen," the invisible power behind the throne whose contribution was envisioned to lend careful preparation and balance to decision making. They were an informal, extra-constitutional group who had the most influence with the emperor. Numbering five in 1904, they advised on internal and external issues, selected the Prime Minister, made decisions for war, and coordinated the decision making structure. The Genro all traveled abroad and understood the West.

Kunsoku "Evil advisors" around the emperor who either denied information or supplied the wrong information to the emperor.

Liaotung Peninsula Located between China and the Korean Peninsula, the key to Manchuria. Location of Port Arthur, a warm-water port with access to the Yellow Sea. These qualities made the Liaotung Peninsula geopolitically important when western powers competed for spheres of influence in this area.

Privy Council An advisory group to the emperor, having no responsibility to the Diet. Members were appointed for life by the emperor. Ratified international treaties before forwarding to the emperor for final approval.

Progressive Party (Kaishinto) During the Meiji reforms, pursued a policy of expanding the economic area, but wanted to effect western reforms first.

Radical Party (Siyute) During the Meiji reforms, wanted a parliamentary system which was not directed against the Genro or against divine absolutism.

Satsuma clan A samurai clan from the southern tip of Kyushu, this clan (like the Choshu clan) was anti-shogun, anti-foreign involvement and pro-emperor. The Satsuma had a tradition of being the greatest warrior-scholars and the second wealthiest of the samurai clans. Many important members of this clan were senior, influential navy officers. With their frontier enemies, the Choshu clan, led Japan from feudalism under the shoguns to eventual war with Russia.

verst A unit of linear/distance measurement, one verst = 0.66 mile.

Viceroy A position established by the Tsar in East Asian Russia in August 1903. Admiral Alexieff, as Viceroy, was given charge of all matters, diplomatic as well as military and economic, concerning Russia's possessions and spheres of influence in the territories east of Lake Baikal. Served notice on Japan and China of Russia's determination to consolidate her strong position in East Asia.

Russo-Japanese War Chronology

Boxer Rebellion ends with weakened Chinese government and massive Russian occupation of Manchuria	Jun-Aug 1900
Russian forces fail to withdraw from Manchuria in violation of treaty with China	Oct 1903
Anglo-Japanese Alliance signed.	Jan 30, 1902
Japanese Imperial Council decides for war.	Feb 4, 1904
Japanese damage Russian gunboat at Chemulpa--Japanese naval attack on Port Arthur.	Feb 8, 1904
Japanese defeat Russian ships in clash at Chemulpa, Russian vessels in harbor are scuttled.	Feb 9, 1904
Russian Adm Makarov arrives at Port Arthur to revitalize Russian fleet.	Mar 7, 1904
Treaty between Japan and Korea makes Korea a Japanese 'protectorate'.	Feb 23, 1904
After a series of aggressive naval actions at Port Arthur, Makarov is killed when a mine destroys his flagship.	Apr 13, 1904
Russians defeated at the Yalu River.	May 1, 1904
Japanese land on Liaotung Peninsula and begin siege of Port Arthur.	May 5, 1904
Japanese lose two of their six battleships to mines off Port Arthur.	May 16,1904
Japanese defeat Russians in Battle of Nanshan--forces loss of Dalny.	May 25, 1904
Russian Vladivostok fleet raids Japanese coast and sinks several cargo ships/transports killing thousands of Japanese troops and destroying siege artillery bound for Port Arthur.	Jun 1904
Russian Port Arthur fleet conducts an abortive sortie	Jun 23, 1904
With Gen Nogi expecting an easy victory, Japanese ground (frontal) assault on Port Arthur fails.	Aug 7-8, 1904
Russian Vladivostok fleet is defeated and bottled up in harbor.	Aug 14, 1904
Russian fleet sorties from Port Arthur--Defeated in Battle of the Yellow Sea and returns to Port Arthur.	Aug 10-11, 1904
Second Japanese ground assault on Port Arthur, including a night attack, also fails.	Aug 19-24, 1904
After defeat at Liaoyang, Russians withdraw to Mukden	Sep 4, 1904
Third Japanese ground assault on Port Arthur fails.	Sep 15-30, 1904
Russians complete rail link between European Russia and Manchuria	Sep 18, 1904
Japanese siege artillery (190 to 280 mm) arrives in Port Arthur.	Oct 1, 1904
Russian Baltic Fleet departs for the Pacific.	Oct 15, 1904
Alexeiev resigns--Kuropatkin becomes commander in chief	Oct 25, 1904
Fourth Japanese ground assault on Port Arthur fails.	Oct 30-Nov 1, 1904
Fifth Japanese ground assault on Port Arthur fails.	Nov 26, 1904
Supported by the new siege artillery, Japanese assault on 203 Meter Hill succeeds--14,000 Japanese killed in taking hill.	Nov 27-Dec 5, 1904
Using 203 Meter Hill as an observation post, Japanese siege guns destroy all but one of Russian ships in Port Arthur.	Dec 6-7, 1904
Port Arthur surrenders with over 49,000 Russian troops--Japanese suffer nearly 92,000 casualties taking the port.	Jan 2, 1905
Following a series of paralyzing strikes, 200,000 protesters are fired on by Russian troops in St. Petersburg during “Bloody Sunday”.	Jan 22, 1905
Russians defeated at Mukden.	Mar 9, 1905
Linievitch replaces Kuropatkin as commander in chief	Mar 1905
Battle of Tsushima destroys Russian Baltic Fleet.	May 27-29, 1905
Japanese ask America to mediate.	Jun 1, 1905
Japanese land on Sakhalin Islands.	Jul 7, 1905
Formal negotiations to end the war begin at Portsmouth Navy Yard, New Hampshire	Aug 6, 1905
Treaty of Portsmouth signed--Russians cede northern Sakhalin and Liaotung Peninsula to Japan, recognize Japan's dominance over Korea.	Sep 5, 1905

IV. WAGING TOTAL WAR: INTERDEPENDENCE OF SEA, AIR, AND GROUND OPERATIONS—THE UNITED STATES IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

A. General: On June 6, 1944 the Allies invaded France and opened up the long awaited second front against Nazi Germany. With more than ten thousand aircraft and two hundred major warships in support, over fifty-seven thousand Americans landed at Utah and Omaha beaches, while seventy-five thousand British and Canadians waded ashore at beaches code named Gold, Sword, and Juno. Within a week of D-Day the Allies would control a lodgment area fifty miles wide and eight to twelve miles deep. At the end of two weeks there would be approximately two million U.S. and Commonwealth troops in France.

D-Day was the most complex and intricate joint and combined amphibious operation in the history of warfare. The success of the landings of June 6 and the success of the breakout in Normandy ten weeks later have been described as the climactic battle of World War II. In December 1943, Hitler had observed that if the allies "attack in the west that attack will decide the war." In key respects he was correct, for the battle of Normandy determined the character of the war's termination in Europe. First, the Allied triumph in the battle of Normandy deprived Germany of any realistic prospect of even a limited victory in the Second World War. Hitler had been anticipating an Anglo-American assault on Fortress Europe for some time and had reinforced his armies of occupation in France and Norway in preparation. It had been Hitler's expectation that if he could drive the invaders back into the sea, he could then transfer fifty-nine divisions to the eastern front and regain the military initiative against the Soviet Union. But Operation OVERLORD and its sequels entirely confounded that expectation. Second, if Normandy precluded German victory, it also virtually guaranteed Germany's eventual total defeat. Because of Normandy, there was no longer any chance that the war would end in a negotiated settlement, rather than in the unconditional surrender of the Nazi regime. And Normandy also meant that the political interests of Washington and London, not only those of Moscow, would have great weight in the reconstruction of post-war Europe. In this week's case study we will analyze the operations prior to OVERLORD that made it possible, the battle of Normandy itself, and the operations that stemmed from it that led to the utter destruction of the Third Reich in May, 1945.

How and when to open a second front in Europe was a matter of great controversy and tension within the Grand Alliance. While the Americans had originally advocated staging a massive invasion of the continent as early as possible, and certainly no later than 1943, Churchill's government favored an entire series of peripheral operations in North Africa, the Mediterranean, and the Balkans that were supposed to so diminish Germany's power that when it eventually occurred a cross-channel attack would entail much less risk. At the same time, the Soviet Union, which was bearing the largest burden and paying the heaviest price in the struggle against Hitler's armies, insisted that its allies open a second European front at the earliest opportunity—even prematurely. The contradictory strategic preferences of London and Moscow thus confronted Roosevelt with two unpalatable choices. If he acquiesced to Churchill's strategic vision, there was

the danger of antagonizing the Soviets, who might then be tempted to pursue a separate peace with Germany. But if he tried to push Churchill into attacking occupied France in either 1942 or 1943, as both Stalin and his own military advisors wished, there was the possibility that the attack might fail. And if an Anglo-American invasion of France failed, the political fallout would probably be devastating: Britain would in all likelihood never again be able to marshal the forces necessary for a repeat effort; and the American public might insist that Washington cut back on its own commitment to the war in Europe and concentrate on the Pacific instead. Determined to get the U.S. Army into action against Germany somewhere in 1942, FDR eventually agreed to collaborate with Churchill in Operation TORCH, the invasion of French North Africa. TORCH was followed by Eisenhower's campaign in Tunisia, and then by several Mediterranean operations, including the invasion of Sicily and the Italian mainland. These campaigns, as well as the outflow of men and materiel to the Pacific, meant that OVERLORD only became possible in 1944. To this day there are those who argue that, if the United States had made different choices about both strategy and resource allocation, an invasion of France in 1943 could have been undertaken successfully. If so, the war in Europe might have ended months, or even a year, earlier than it did. But others have emphasized that even in 1944, the battle of Normandy was still a close-run thing, and have described the North African, Mediterranean and Italian operations of 1942-44 as providing indispensable preparation and training for D-Day.

OVERLORD must be seen as the culmination of an entire sequence of earlier, foundational operations. The precondition for any invasion of France in the first place would be a vast build-up of American troops and materiel in Great Britain. But this buildup (code named BOLERO) would be jeopardized if the Allies could not guarantee the security of the transatlantic shipping lanes. And this, in turn, required the Allies to defeat Admiral Karl Dönitz's U-Boat fleet in the Battle of the Atlantic. The Trident Conference of May 1943 concluded: "until the U-boat menace was subdued, a European invasion was at risk due to the vulnerability of essential supply convoys." In the first forty months of the Second World War, German submarines sank 2,177 merchant vessels—208 of them in the first three months of 1943 alone. By the end of that year, however, the Allies were clearly winning their struggle against the German navy. In August, Allied losses to U-Boat attacks fell to twenty five, and by early 1944 twenty per cent of Dönitz's operational submarine fleet was being destroyed or put out of commission each month.

Another prerequisite for the Normandy landings was Allied air supremacy in Northwest Europe. Air supremacy was essential to prevent the Luftwaffe from bombing and strafing the Allied forces into oblivion during the first days of the invasion. It was no less critical to the isolation of the Normandy battlefields by aerial attacks on the French transportation net and the German military units that tried to use it in the daytime. Operation POINTBLANK—the Allies' strategic bombing of German industry in 1943 and 1944—finally resulted in air supremacy, but not in the manner originally anticipated. By the early spring of 1944 the British and American air forces had achieved such dominance in the skies over France that the following specimen of gallows humor became popular in the German army: "If you see white planes overhead that's the

Americans. If you see black planes, that's the RAF. But if you see no planes of any kind, THAT'S the Luftwaffe." On D-Day the Germans had only 80 operational fighters on the French coast, and flew a total of only 250 combat sorties. By contrast, the USAAF alone flew 8,722 sorties on that day.

Deception was yet another vital ingredient in the plan for OVERLORD. One of Eisenhower's greatest fears was that the Germans would be able to reinforce their troops in the immediate invasion zone more quickly than the Allies could. After all, Germany's OB West (Commander-in-Chief West) had approximately sixty divisions under his control by the spring of 1944.[1] It was therefore a matter of the highest importance to disinform Berlin about the precise location of the invasion. By planting a grossly inflated Allied order of battle on German intelligence and by "creating" a fictitious Army Group under George S. Patton in southeast England, among other measures, Operation FORTITUDE persuaded Hitler that the main Allied attack would come at the Pas de Calais, not in Normandy. Even after D-Day, for several weeks Hitler was convinced that Normandy had been merely a diversion and that the real Allied invasion would take place north of the Seine. The bulk of the German Fifteenth Army was consequently immobilized between Le Havre and Calais until late July. By that point, the Allies had already broken through the German lines east of Caen.

Then there is the question of Eisenhower's leadership. Eisenhower enjoyed a meteoric rise in rank as the U. S. Army expanded to fight World War II, and had advanced from Lieutenant Colonel to full General in scarcely two years. In December 1943, Franklin Roosevelt chose Eisenhower to be OVERLORD's supreme commander, since he decided he could not do without George Marshall in Washington and since he regarded Ike as "the best politician among the military men." Eisenhower has received praise for presiding over the intricate planning process for the invasion of France, for refereeing disputes among the separate military services, for wisely insisting on the invasion of Southern France (DRAGOON) after Normandy, and for the skillful diplomacy with which he handled relations with America's British allies. But he has also been the target of criticism. Field Marshal Montgomery, for example, complained that Eisenhower's cautious "broad front strategy" after the breakout from Normandy needlessly lengthened the war in Europe, which might have been brought to a victorious conclusion earlier if the Allies had gambled on a "single thrust" against the Third Reich. However, other writers have censured Eisenhower for what they regard as an excessive deference to British operational preferences in general, and those of Montgomery in particular. For example, it was Eisenhower who signed off on Montgomery's Operation MARKET GARDEN, an effort to flank the German West Wall by driving through Holland and on into northern Germany. But MARKET GARDEN proved to be a sanguinary failure that most likely produced more Allied casualties in the Battle of Arnhem than had been incurred on D-Day.

In the end the Allies prevailed in the Battle of Normandy, and their victory was greatly facilitated by a series of German operational and strategic errors in the summer of

[1] Twenty-three of these were admittedly so-called "static" divisions.

1944. First, there was the failure of the German army to adopt a single coherent concept for the defense of the French coastline. Gerd von Rundstedt, who served as OB West, envisioned a defense-in-depth, with powerful armored forces held deep in the rear as an operational reserve. By contrast, Erwin Rommel, whose Army Group B was responsible for what turned out to be the actual invasion zone, wanted to position the Panzer divisions close to the Normandy coast so as to crush the Allied invasion force at the water's edge. Rommel, although technically Rundstedt's subordinate, enjoyed extraordinary prestige in German military circles as well as direct access to Hitler. The upshot was a lame compromise that satisfied neither man: while some armored formations, such as the Panzer Lehr and the 12th SS Panzer divisions were deployed in the rear, others, including the 2nd, 21st, and 116th divisions, were deployed closer to the coast of Normandy, although not as close as Rommel would have liked. Then, too, Hitler's personal interventions in military decision-making crippled the German war effort in France that spring and summer. On the eve of the invasion he rejected Rommel's suggestion that army, air and naval assets be placed under a single commander, while after D-Day his order to hold "present lines" at all costs deprived his commanders of tactical flexibility and eventually ruled out that fighting retreat to the Seine that was probably the German military's best option.

But the Allies made plenty of mistakes, too. Despite the material and intellectual resources lavished on the planning of OVERLORD, the runaway success of FORTITUDE, as well as the benefits conferred by access to ULTRA decrypts, the assault on Omaha Beach came close to failing. The preliminary air and naval bombardment, which lasted scarcely more than forty minutes, did little damage to the concrete pillboxes and other fortifications that dominated the beach. The majority of the swimming DD tanks that were supposed to cover the infantry landing were launched into the water prematurely—in some cases 6,000 yards or more from the beach—and consequently sank in the rough seas. Of the 32 tanks of the 741st Tank Battalion, only five managed to reach the shore. Then, too, Allied operational commanders were evidently not informed that the German 352nd Infantry Division had been deployed north of Bayeux since March, which meant that Omaha Beach was held by eight battalions of German defenders, not four as had been assumed. As a result of these errors and failures, and others besides, casualties were severe, with the U. S. 1st Infantry Division alone losing 2,000 men killed, wounded or missing on June 6. It has been estimated that at least 2,500 U.S. personnel died on Omaha Beach on D-Day.

Allied operations after D-Day continued to be plagued by poor assumptions, missed opportunities and command errors. Neither Caen nor Cherbourg fell as quickly as the Allies had supposed they would. The Germans took advantage of the hedgerows of Normandy to mount an unexpectedly vigorous defense against the Allied advance inland. At the very end of the battle of Normandy in August, the Allies managed to permit some 20,000 German troops to escape from the Falaise pocket and retire to the Siegfried Line. In September, the Allies squandered their chance to trap and destroy the entire German Fifteenth Army in the Low Countries. Operation MARKET GARDEN failed dismally. Progress towards the German frontier that fall was slow and costly, with the United States suffering over 60,000 combat casualties in November alone. In mid-December,

the Allies appear to have been caught completely by surprise when Hitler counterattacked in the Ardennes sector. The Battle of the Bulge proved to be another expensive American victory, but it did both exhaust Germany's strategic reserves and open the road to the Rhine, which the Allies crossed in March 1945. While some have attributed these problems to poor leadership, others have viewed at least some of them as the product of a probably unavoidable friction in the Anglo-American military relationship. Yet still others, including Allan Millett and Williamson Murray, have instead criticized the Allies for a systemic lack of adequate intellectual preparation for war on the operational level.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. What were the most important strategic and operational factors behind the Allied victory in the Battle of the Atlantic?

2. Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War there were many who predicted that air power would play a decisive part in the next general European war. To what extent did the performance of allied air forces in the European Theater of Operations from 1943 to 1945 conform to those predictions? If those predictions were wrong, then why?

3. Operation FORTITUDE was one of the most successful deception operations staged in world military history. Did its success stem chiefly from an exploitation of the unique political and military institutions of the Nazi regime or for some other reason or set of reasons?

4. What were the chief differences of opinion between Washington and London concerning strategy? Did the resolution of those differences help or hinder the planning and execution of the invasion of France?

5. Evaluate the potential risks and rewards of a cross-Channel invasion in 1943 as opposed to 1944.

6. One factor that compromised both Germany's plans for and conduct of the battle of Normandy was the irreconcilability of Rundstedt's and Rommel's concepts for defense against an Allied invasion. In the end, the German High Command adopted neither approach in its entirety. Given the geographical, political and military conditions that existed in June 1944, which of these two operational concepts offered the German army the greatest chance of success?

7. To what extent was faulty doctrine to blame for the excessively large casualties suffered by U.S. forces on Omaha Beach on D-Day?

8. Why was the Grand Alliance superior in strategic coordination to the alliance of Germany and Italy?

9. "The most consistent mistake made by the Allied commanders in Northwest Europe was a failure to realize . . . the will and tenacity of the German Army to resist against overwhelming odds and in the most appalling conditions." Do you agree?

10. Evaluate Eisenhower's leadership of the Allied campaign in Western Europe from D-Day to VE Day. In what ways did he excel? What were his principal failings?

11. Some have argued that the Allied insistence on the unconditional surrender of Germany resulted in an unnecessary protraction of the Second World War in Europe. Do you agree or disagree?

12. Which contributed most to the Anglo-American victory over the German armed forces in 1944 and 1945—the Allies' material and technological superiority, their superior "jointness," or their superior strategy?

13. Some strategic analysts question whether the strategic air offensive against Germany was an effective use of resources and manpower and if the results achieved were worth the costs paid. Evaluate the contribution of strategic air power to the victory over Germany.

14. Evaluate the war-termination strategy of the United States in the European theater of war.

15. Compare and evaluate how effectively Germany, Great Britain, and the United States integrated different instruments of military power.

16. A respected analyst of the role played by information in the Second World War writes: "[I]nformation cannot win wars by itself. Information helps commanders make their operations more effective and efficient. It magnifies physical resources by enabling troops and guns to be better used in combat. It improves will and morale by reducing anxiety and steadying command. But ultimately its effect is secondary: it works only as a multiplier and guider of force and determination. If the Axis had possessed the best intelligence and the Allies the worst, the Allies still would have won." Do you agree with this assessment?

17. Which contributed most to the defeat of Nazi Germany—the Allies' material superiority or German strategic and operational errors?

C. Required Readings:

1. Murray, Williamson and Millett, Alan R. *A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000. Pages 1-142, 234-335, 374-383.

[Murray and Millet's very readable narrative history of World War II focuses on the operational level of war. The selections assigned cover the entire war in Europe from its inception in September 1939 until the surrender of Germany in May 1945.]

2. Larrabee, Eric. *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants and Their War.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987. Pages 412-508.

[Larrabee provides an appreciation of Eisenhower's leadership during the Second World War. He also deals with the major operational controversies of the Normandy campaign, many centering on the relationship between Eisenhower and Montgomery.]

3. Stoler, Mark A. "The 'Second Front' and American Fear of Soviet Expansionism, 1941-43," *Military Affairs*, vol. 39, no. 3 (October, 1975), pages 136-141. (Selected Readings)

[Stoler's short article sets the decision to open a second front in Normandy in the context of the politics of the Grand Alliance. As he shows, the invasion of France was designed *both* to assist the Soviet Union *and* to prevent the Soviet domination of all of Europe once Nazi Germany had been defeated.]

4. Kahn, David. "Codebreaking and the Battle of the Atlantic," *USAFA Harmon Memorial Lecture no. 36.* Colorado Springs, Colorado: USAFA, 1994. Pages 1-14. (Selected Readings)

[Kahn demonstrates the importance of ULTRA intelligence to Allied victory in the Battle of the Atlantic. Intelligence was used both defensively (to route convoys away from U-Boat patrol lanes) and offensively (to destroy the submarine tankers or "*Milchkühe*" that were essential for long-range German submarine operations.)]

5. Emerson, William. "Operation Pointblank: A Tale of Bombers and Fighters," *USAFA Harmon Memorial Lecture no. 4.* Colorado Springs, Colorado: USAFA, 1962. (Selected Readings)

[Operation Pointblank, major air operations against Germany's industrial potential and against the German air force, was part of the Combined Bomber Offensive. As Emerson shows, the course of the campaign did not validate pre-war air doctrine; considerable ingenuity and adaptation were necessary to the campaign's eventual success. The upshot was the destruction of the Luftwaffe and the achievement of the Allied air supremacy that made the Normandy landings possible.]

6. Cubbage, T. L. "German Misapprehensions Regarding Overlord: Understanding Failure in the Estimative Process," in Michael I. Handel, ed., *Strategic and Operational Deception in the Second World War.* London: Frank Cass, 1987. Pages 114-174. (Selected Readings)

[Cubbage offers a comprehensive explanation of the reasons that Overlord took the Germans by surprise, and highlights the contribution made by Allied deception operations. His essay also addresses the general problem of accurately forecasting enemy behavior in any war.]

7. Lewis, Adrian R. "The Failure of Allied Planning and Doctrine for Operation Overlord: The Case of Minefield and Obstacle Clearance," *The Journal of Military History*, vol. 62, no. 4 (October, 1998), pages 787-807. (Selected Readings)

8. ———. "The Navy Falls Short at Normandy," *Naval History*, vol. 12, no. 6 (December, 1998), pages 34-39. (Selected Readings)

[Adrian Lewis is the author of the most exhaustive history and critique of the Overlord planning process. These two articles summarize some of the principal findings and conclusions of his *Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory.*]

9. Ose, Dieter. "Rommel and Rundstedt: The 1944 Panzer Controversy," *Military Affairs*, vol. 50, no. 1 (January, 1986), pages 7-11. (Selected Readings)

[Ose explains the difference between Rommel's concept for the defense of Normandy and that of Runstedt.]

IV. WAGING TOTAL WAR: INTERDEPENDENCE OF SEA, AIR, AND GROUND OPERATIONS—THE UNITED STATES IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

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THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Anschluss In German, "the act of incorporation of one state of another." Commonly understood as the German annexation of Austria in March 1938.

appeasement Prior to the rise of Hitler, the common usage of the term "appeasement" meant "to make peaceful" and had a positive connotation. Appeasement today implies selling out your principles to satisfy the demands of an aggressor.

Blitzkrieg In German, "lightning war." Coordinated employment of tanks, infantry, and aircraft for a quick victory through the psychological disruption and destruction of the enemies' forces.

deterrence To prevent aggression, a clear commitment to retaliate if another party fails to behave in a desired manner, or the threat to meet attack with equal or greater power.

fascism Characteristics of fascism were extreme nationalism, disregard for democratic ideals and institutions, cult leadership, stiff internal discipline, and control of the economy. Gaining a foothold in Europe with Mussolini's rise in 1922 to dictator in Italy, fascism in some form was employed in Hitler's Germany and Franco's Spain.

Fifth Column Term originated during the Spanish Civil War meaning an organized and secret body working within an enemy state which aims to subvert, sabotage and disrupt the war effort.

Fuehrer In German, "leader."

Fuehrerprinzip In German, "principle of one leader."

irredentism Term used to characterize policies which seek to alter the status quo in a particular territory on the basis of nationalistic or ethnic criteria.

isolationism Isolationism is the term given to U.S. foreign policy between the two world wars, and implies that the United States would accept no obligation in military alliances.

Japanese internment The mass transfer in early 1942 of Japanese-Americans from California, Oregon and Washington to camps in the mountain states. The internment was deemed prudent because of the perception of divided loyalty among Japanese-Americans and the fear of sabotage of critical industry in the West Coast states.

Lebensraum German geopolitical term "living space." Hitler used it as part of his policy that it was Germany's destiny to control the East. Territorial expansion was deemed necessary because of Germany's overpopulation and need for foodstuffs. Ukraine was seen as a future German granary.

Locarno Treaty An agreement entered into on 16 November 1925 in which Belgium, France, Italy, Germany and Great Britain agreed to their existing borders and pledged to abstain from the use of force against each other. Germany also agreed to a demilitarized status for the Rhineland in perpetuity. It should be noted that the signatories specifically omitted similar recognition for Germany's eastern frontiers.

Maginot Line A system of frontier fortifications built by France after 1929 on the common border with Germany. The strategic thinking behind the Maginot Line was derived from French experiences from World War I. Proponents argued that heavy and determined resistance and concentrated firepower would check, then defeat, an enemy offensive. The Germans thought otherwise. The Maginot Line is an example of deterrence by denial. By making an enemy attack too expensive in terms of manpower and material losses, the enemy would be deterred from launching an offensive in the first place.

Mannerheim Line A system of fortifications about 65 miles long on the Karelian Isthmus peninsula of Finland designed to deter Soviet aggression.

Mulberry Artificial port built off the Normandy beachhead in 1944 with floating caissons and a line of old vessels sunk to form a breakwater.

multipolar An international system with at least three major states or power blocs predominate. The situation in the 1930's was most likely "multipolar" rather than balance of power, with Germany/Italy one bloc, France/Britain another, and then the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan as independent players who could tip the scales in the European power balance.

NKVD Soviet internal security agency established in 1934 for the purpose of combating all anti-party activities.

Nuremberg Laws A series of legislative acts passed in Nazi Germany in 1935 which, among other restrictions, deprived Jews of citizenship, the right to practice certain professions, and marriage between Jews and non-Jews.

panzer In German, "armor" or armored. Generally refers to German tanks.

plebiscite The act of presenting an important issue to the whole people of a state for making a decision by vote. It was the decision by the Austrian government to put unity with Germany to a vote that prompted Hitler to order the march into Austria.

Quisling One who is sympathetic to the policies of another state and who in case of war goes against his own state by joining the aggressor and collaborating with him. The term was coined from the name of Major Vidkun Quisling, once the head of the Fascist party of Norway, who, upon the invasion of that country by the Nazis, established a government which served the German cause.

Reichstag The lower house of the German Parliament under the Weimar Republic (1919-1933).

Sitzkrieg In the German language, "sitting war." Used to characterize the land war, which was nearly dormant, during the period between the conquest of Poland and the Nazi invasion of Norway.

Tripartite Pact Signed on 27 September 1940 by Germany, Italy and Japan. They agreed to assist one another with all political, economic and military means, and to enter the war against the U.S., if the U.S. became involved in Europe or Asia.

Ultra The official designation for all intelligence information gathered through the Enigma machine by deciphering German coded messages, which furnished the Allies with near real-time information on German intentions and operations.

Vichy The government organized in France, after the defeat in 1940, which collaborated with the German occupying forces. Named for its capital.

Weimar Republic The democratic government of Germany after World War I which lasted until 1933. The Weimar Constitution was considered the most democratic of its time, providing proportional representation, universal suffrage, and recall of elected officials. Hitler rose to power within the structure of the Weimar Republic.

World War II Chronology

German troops occupy the Rhineland.	Mar 7, 1936
Italian troops take Ethiopia.	May 9, 1936
Japanese attack Chinese at the Marco Polo Bridge.	Jul 7, 1936
Fall of Nanking to the Japanese.	Dec 14, 1936
Germany annexes Austria.	Mar 1938
Munich Conference, "Peace in our time."	Sep 30, 1938
Chiang-Kai-shek's Government withdraws to Chungking.	Oct 1938
German troops occupy the Sudetenland.	Oct 15, 1938
Fall of Canton to the Japanese.	Oct 21, 1938
Germany annexes Czechoslovakia.	Mar 15, 1939
Battle of Nomonhan between Japanese & Soviets.	May-Sep 1939
Germany and USSR sign nonaggression pact.	Aug 23, 1939
Germans invade Poland.	Sep 1, 1939
Great Britain, France, Australia, and New Zealand declare war on Germany.	Sep 3, 1939
Canada declares war on Germany.	Sep 10, 1939
Soviets invade Poland.	
Warsaw surrenders.	Sep 27, 1939
Soviets invade Finland.	Nov 30, 1939
"Graf Spee" scuttled.	Dec 17, 1939
Finland signs peace treaty with Soviet Union.	Mar 12, 1940
Germans invade Denmark and Norway.	Apr 9, 1940
British occupy Iceland.	May 1940
Germans invade Low Countries and France; Sir Winston Churchill named UK Prime Minister.	May 10, 1940
Dutch surrender to Germany.	May 15, 1940
Germans reach English Channel.	May 20, 1940
Dunkirk evacuation in France.	May 27, 1940
Belgium surrenders to Germany.	May 28, 1940
Italy declares war on Great Britain and France.	Jun 10, 1940
Germans enter Paris.	Jun 14, 1940
France signs armistice.	Jun 22, 1940
British attacks French fleet at Mers-el-Kebir.	Jul 3, 1940
French under Petain break off diplomatic relations with Britain.	Jul 5, 1940
The Battle of Britain begins.	Jul 10, 1940
Soviets annex Baltic states as Soviet republics.	Jul 1940
Closing of the Burma Road.	Jul-Oct 1940
Italians invade British and French Somaliland.	Aug 4, 1940
U.S. trades 50 destroyers to Britain in exchange for Atlantic bases.	Sep 2, 1940
Germans begin night bombing of London.	Sep 7, 1940
Italians invade Egypt.	Sep 14, 1940
U.S. Congress passes conscription bill. Roosevelt calls first of National Guard to active duty.	Sep 16, 1940
France allows Japan bases in Indochina.	Sep 22, 1940
U.S. limits scrap iron and steel exports to Western Hemisphere.	Sep 26, 1940
Italians invade Greece.	Oct 28, 1940
Roosevelt elected president.	Nov 5, 1940
British attack Italian fleet at Taranto.	Nov 11, 1940
Hungary joins the Axis.	Nov 20, 1940
Romania joins the Axis.	Nov 23, 1940
British offensive in North Africa captures Tobruk and Benghazi.	Dec 1940
Bulgaria joins the Axis.	Mar 1, 1941
Lend-Lease act signed.	Mar 11, 1941
Yugoslavia refuses to join Tripartite Pact.	Mar 27, 1941
U.S. seizes Axis ships in U.S. ports.	Mar 30, 1941
First German offensive in North Africa, takes Benghazi and invests Tobruk.	Mar 31, 1941
Germans invade Yugoslavia and Greece.	Apr 6, 1941
U.S. assumes control of Greenland.	Apr 9, 1941
Japan & USSR Non-aggression pact signed.	Apr 13, 1941
Yugoslavia surrenders.	Apr 17, 1941
Greece surrenders.	Apr 27, 1941
British invade Vichy-French occupied Iraq.	May 2, 1941
Germans take Crete.	May 20, 1941
"Bismarck" sunk. Roosevelt declares unlimited U.S. national emergency.	May 27, 1941
British defeat Vichy French and Italians in Syria and Lebanon.	Jun 8, 1941
U.S. freezes German and Italian assets in America.	Jun 14, 1941
Germans invade Russia.	Jun 22, 1941
Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance.	Jul 12, 1941
French transfer control of Indochina to Japan.	Jul 21, 1941
U.S. & Britain freeze Japanese assets.	Jul 25, 1941
U.S. bans gasoline exports to Japan.	Aug 1, 1941
Roosevelt-Churchill conference, Placentia Bay: Atlantic Charter.	Aug 14, 1941
Fall of Kiev.	Aug 17, 1941
Anglo-Russian occupation of Iran.	Aug 25, 1941
Roosevelt orders Navy to attack any vessel threatening U.S. shipping or ships under U.S. escort.	Sep 11, 1941
U.S. Navy announces capture of German radio station on Greenland.	Oct 11, 1941
Leningrad & Sevastopol fall-Nazi thrust to Moscow.	Oct 30, 1941
U-boats sink U.S.S. Reuben James.	Oct 31, 1941
Neutrality act amended to allow arming of U.S. merchant vessels.	Nov 17, 1941
Soviet counter-attack.	Dec 1, 1941
Japan attacks Pearl Harbor, Philippines, Hong Kong, and Malaya.	Dec 7, 1941
U.S. and Great Britain declare war on Japan.	Dec 8, 1941
China officially declares war on Japan and Germany.	Dec 9, 1941
Japanese sink the "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse" off Malaya; Japanese capture Guam.	Dec 10, 1941
Germany and Italy declare war on U.S.; Japanese attack Burma.	Dec 11, 1941
Fall of Wake Island.	Dec 23, 1941
Hong Kong falls.	Dec 25, 1941
Manila falls.	Jan 2, 1942
Japan attacks the Dutch East Indies.	Jan 11, 1942
Fall of Rangoon.	Feb 8, 1942
Fall of Singapore.	Feb 15, 1942
Japanese bomb Port Darwin in Australia.	Feb 19, 1942
Battle of Java Sea.	Feb 27, 1942
U.S. surrender at Bataan.	Apr 9, 1942

World War II Chronology (cont)

U.S. air raid on Tokyo.	Apr 18, 1942
Japan occupies Andaman Islands in Bay of Bengal.	Mar 23, 1942
Corregidor surrenders	May 6, 1942
Battle of the Coral Sea.	May 6, 1942
First thousand-bomber air raid on Germany.	May 30, 1942
Battle of Midway; Japanese attack on the Aleutian Islands.	Jun 4, 1942
Japanese submarine shells Seaside, Oregon.	Jun 21, 1942
Regular allied bombing raids begin on Ruhr and Hamburg.	Jul 1942
U.S. landings on the Solomon Islands.	Aug 7, 1942
Civil Disobedience campaign announced in India.	Aug 9, 1942
First U.S. air raid on Europe.	Aug 17, 1942
Allies attack Dieppe	Aug 19, 1942
Battle of Stalingrad begins.	Sep 13, 1942
Opening of U.S. offensive in New Guinea.	Sep 21, 1942
Battle of El Alamein.	Oct 23, 1942
Regular raids on Berlin begin.	Nov 1942
Allied landings in Morocco and Algeria.	Nov 8, 1942
Germans & Italians invade unoccupied portions of Vichy France.	Nov 11, 1942
U.S. begins nationwide gas rationing.	Dec 1, 1942
British Foreign Secretary Eden tells House of Commons of Nazi mass murder of Jews. U.S. declares those crimes will be avenged.	Dec 17, 1942
German retreat from Caucasus.	Jan 1943
Casablanca Conference.	Jan 14-24, 1943
First U.S. bombing raid on Germany.	Jan 27, 1943
German surrender at Stalingrad; Soviets recover Kursk and Rostov.	Feb 2, 1943
Wingate's expedition to Burma.	Feb 8, 1943
Battle of Kasserine Pass, first major battle between German & U.S. forces. U.S. loses.	Feb 14, 1943
Battle of the Bismarck Sea.	Mar 2, 1943
Death of Admiral Yamamoto, at Bougainville.	Apr 18, 1943
U.S. begins to liberate the Aleutian Islands.	May 11, 1943
German-Italian surrender in Tunisia.	May 12, 1943
Attack on Ruhr dams.	May 17, 1943
Doenitz suspends U-Boat operations in the North Atlantic.	May 22, 1943
U.S. landings in New Guinea.	Jun 29, 1943
German attack near Kursk	Jul 4, 1943
Invasion of Sicily.	Jul 10, 1943
Dismissal of Mussolini.	Jul 25, 1943
Invasion of Calabria and signing of Italian surrender.	Sep 3, 1943
Landing at Salerno.	Sep 9, 1943
Rescue of Mussolini by Germans.	Sep 12, 1943
Italy declares war on Germany.	Oct 13, 1943
Russians recover Kiev.	Nov 6, 1943
U.S. takes Tarawa & other Gilbert Islands.	Nov 24, 1943
Teheran Conference.	Nov 28, 1943
Landings at Anzio.	Jan 22, 1944
Leningrad relieved.	Jan 27, 1944
Japanese offensive on borders of India.	Feb-Mar 1944
Soviets enter Rumania.	Apr 2, 1944

Germans evacuate Monte Cassino. Merrill's Marauders take Myitkyina airfield, Burma (first major U.S. land operation in Asia).	May 17, 1944
Americans enter Rome.	Jun 4, 1944
D-Day, Allied invasion of France.	Jun 6, 1944
First V-1s hit London.	Jun 12, 1944
U.S. invades Saipan, First B-29 raid on Japan.	Jun 15, 1944
U.S. wins Battle of the Philippine Sea	Jun 19, 1944
Fall of Saipan.	Jul 9, 1944
Resignation of General Tojo.	Jul 18, 1944
Attempt to kill Adolf Hitler by his own Generals.	Jul 20, 1944
U.S. recovery of Tinian and Guam.	Aug 1, 1944
Allied landings in Southern France.	Aug 15, 1944
Final victories in Normandy.	Aug 17, 1944
Allies liberate Paris, Romania declares war on Germany.	Aug 25, 1944
Brussels liberated.	Sep 3, 1944
Bulgaria declares war on Germany.	Sep 5, 1944
First V2s hit London.	Sep 8, 1944
Finland signs armistice with Russia.	Sep 10, 1944
'Operation Market-Garden' fails.	Sep 30, 1944
U.S. landings in the Philippines.	Oct 20, 1944
Battle of Leyte Gulf.	Oct 25, 1944
Regular bombings of Japan begin.	Nov 1944
First allied ships unloaded at Antwerp.	Nov 26, 1944
German offensive in the Ardennes.	Dec 16, 1944
General Soviet offensive begins.	Jan 12, 1945
Soviets enter Warsaw.	Jan 17, 1945
Hungary declares war on Germany.	Jan 21, 1945
Yalta Conference.	Feb 4-12, 1945
Surrender of Budapest.	Feb 13, 1945
U.S. Marines land on Iwo Jima	Feb 17, 1945
Americans cross the Rhine at Remagen.	Mar 7, 1945
U.S. firebombs Tokyo killing 80,000	Mar 9, 1945
U.S. invades Okinawa	Apr 1, 1945
USSR cancels neutrality pact with Japan.	Apr 5, 1945
Death of President Roosevelt.	Apr 12, 1945
Soviets enter Vienna.	Apr 13, 1945
Last Soviet offensive begins.	Apr 16, 1945
Mussolini is hung by Italians.	Apr 28, 1945
Adolf Hitler commits suicide in his underground bunker in Berlin.	Apr 30, 1945
Berlin in Soviet hands.	May 2, 1945
Japanese surrender Rangoon.	May 3, 1945
Germans surrender at Rheims.	May 7, 1945
Soviets enter Prague.	May 9, 1945
Potsdam Conference.	Jul 17, 1945
Atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, kills 100,000	Aug 6, 1945
Soviet Union declares war on Japan.	Aug 8, 1945
Atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki, kills 70,000.	Aug 9, 1945
Japan surrenders on U.S.S. “Missouri: in Tokyo Bay.	Sep 2, 1945

V. VICTORY AT SEA: PREWAR PLANNING, MILITARY TRANSFORMATION, AND JOINT OPERATIONS IN A MODERN MARITIME WAR—THE PACIFIC WAR

A. General. The Pacific War was the most intense and most lethal maritime conflict ever fought. It featured the main types of naval platforms that the United States Navy still relies on in our own era: surface combatants, aircraft carriers, and submarines. Once Japan began to use kamikaze tactics with "human cruise missiles" at the end of the war, it foreshadowed naval warfare in the missile age. The Pacific War also illuminated the importance of information operations and information superiority, on which operational planners and strategic visionaries place much emphasis nowadays. Above all, it provided a lesson of enduring relevance in the importance of jointness. Notwithstanding conspicuous episodes of inter-service rivalry among American military leaders, the fact that the United States did better than Japan in integrating different forms of military power contributed greatly to its operational superiority and strategic success in this modern maritime war.

The Pacific War began with the only major attack on American territory between the War of 1812 and the Al Qaeda terrorist strike of 2001. It ended with the use of nuclear weapons by the United States against two Japanese cities. Since the Pacific War, there has not been another maritime war between great naval powers, and there has been no further use of nuclear weapons. Most analysts doubt that there will be a future naval war that resembles the Pacific War, and some doubt that there will be any future use of nuclear weapons. Yet many of the same factors that drove Japan to become a great naval power may well influence rising or resurgent Asian powers to become great naval powers prepared to contest command of the sea at some point in the twenty-first century. Likewise the possible use of nuclear weapons against American cities has dramatically raised the stakes of both the Global War on Terrorism and longstanding conflicts in East Asia.

A war in the Pacific was an eventuality for which the navies of the United States and Japan had long made operational plans. The evolution of the USN's Plan Orange for a trans-Pacific offensive and the development of IJN (Imperial Japanese Navy) plans to counter such an American offensive represent perhaps the most elaborate operational-planning exercises in the history of maritime conflict. Yet the plans were not executed at the beginning of the Pacific War. The decision of Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, commander-in-chief of Japan's Combined Fleet in 1941, to initiate the Pacific War with an attack on the forward base of the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor and U.S. Army airfields on Oahu marked a radical deviation from the thrust of traditional Japanese planning against the United States (however much it recalls to mind the beginning of Japan's war against Russia in 1904). Prominent among the many reasons for this change of plan was Yamamoto's belief that a technological revolution in carrier aviation pointed to a transformation in the character of naval warfare and perhaps to a quick decisive victory for Japan against the United States. At the operational level, Yamamoto proved to be prescient. At the strategic level, however, he badly miscalculated the effects on the United States of his surprise attack. The opening blow of the war had psychological and

political effects on the American people and their leaders that ensured the Pacific War would not be a replay of the Russo-Japanese War, as Japan's leaders had hoped. There would in this case be no negotiated settlement yielding the political fruits of Japanese operational successes in a relatively short war. Instead, American outrage over the attack on Pearl Harbor led to a determination to wage a total war for unlimited political objectives. Japan had much worse odds of prevailing in such a war than it did in a regional war of limited political objectives. The fact that the United States was caught by surprise reflected the difficulties of assessing an adversary from a very different culture. The fact that such surprise proved strategically counterproductive shows that Japan, too, had great cultural difficulties in understanding its adversary in this war.

Japan did achieve extraordinary operational successes early in the Pacific War. In a noteworthy aberration in the normal pattern of bitter inter-service rivalry between the Japanese army and the Japanese navy, Japan's military executed an exemplary series of joint operations in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific from December 1941 to the spring of 1942. Strategically, never had a country gained control over such a broad area of the world in such a short time. Operationally, the Japanese handling of the problems of synchronization and sequencing was brilliant. The United States and its allies could do little to counter Japan effectively in this period. On the first day of the war, by putting out of action the U.S. battleships at Pearl Harbor and by destroying the air assets under General Douglas MacArthur's command in the Philippines, the Japanese successfully attacked American strategy.

The United States had to engage in adaptive improvisation. It did so under new naval leadership, with Admiral Chester Nimitz replacing Admiral Husband Kimmel as commander of the Pacific Fleet and with Admiral Ernest King becoming Chief of Naval Operations and commander-in-chief of the United States Fleet. King and Nimitz were able to draw upon remarkable prewar developments in the technology and concepts of naval aviation, amphibious operations, and submarine warfare. Before Pearl Harbor proponents (such as Kimmel) of the primacy of the battleship had still dominated the U.S. Navy, but pioneers of carrier aviation had done much to develop the technology and concepts that USN carrier task forces would use to fight the Pacific War. When the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor put out of action the Pacific Fleet's battleships but not its aircraft carriers, naval aviation was ready to assume the primary role in the war against Japan. And when in the summer of 1942 the United States began what became a long series of forced-entry amphibious operations on Japanese-held islands in the Pacific, the Marines had already developed to a significant extent the tactics, techniques, and procedures necessary for executing such difficult landings. As for submarine warfare, the Pearl Harbor attack had the effect of removing prior American inhibitions against resorting to unrestricted submarine warfare against enemy shipping. Though technical problems with torpedoes (produced in Newport) severely hampered the submarine force for a while, the enhanced operational range and the tactical stealth of undersea platforms in World War II enabled the United States to interdict, with cumulating effectiveness, the access to overseas sources of oil and other raw materials vital to the Japanese war economy.

Students should give close attention to the ways in which Nimitz excelled as an operational leader. His role looms especially large in the battle of Midway in June 1942. That battle was the second of five major carrier engagements in the Pacific War. Operationally, given Japan's numerical superiority in carriers in June 1942, it had the most surprising outcome of the five engagements. Strategically, it was the most important one of all. Yamamoto hoped to destroy the American carrier force in the Pacific and use Midway Island as a stepping stone for a Japanese invasion of Oahu in early 1943. The stunning American success at Midway denied to Yamamoto what he regarded as the most likely way to achieve Japan's political objectives in the Pacific War. We see at Midway the most important strategic issue that a naval operational commander in any era may face: when to risk the fleet. Mahan's writings, which inspired Japanese naval doctrine at least as much as American naval doctrine, had highlighted the strategic importance of risking the fleet, but had not fully developed the operational issue of risk management. Students should seek to understand not only why in strategic terms both Yamamoto and Nimitz were for different reasons willing to risk their fleets at Midway, but also how in operational terms the two commanders managed that risk with different degrees of effectiveness.

The American victory at Midway made feasible a counteroffensive in the South Pacific that began later in the summer of 1942. The Japanese had opened that theater as part of a strategic effort to cut the sea lines of communication between the United States and Australia and deny an Australian staging area for an American counteroffensive against Japanese control of the western Pacific. Despite the United States' Europe-first strategic priority, President Roosevelt and Admiral King were eager to contest the Japanese in the new theater and were willing to divert scarce military assets away from use against Germany. The first step in the American counteroffensive was a Marine landing in August on the island of Guadalcanal, where the Japanese had been constructing an air field. The Marines had to overcome a number of significant difficulties to seize and maintain control of Guadalcanal: they had little time to plan their amphibious operation; once they got there, the naval task-force commander, Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, was unwilling to risk his fleet to support the Marines until they had secured their foothold on the island; and they then had to defend against a long series of Japanese attacks on their control of Henderson Field, the decisive point of the Guadalcanal/Solomons campaign. That campaign as it played out from August 1942 to February 1943 represents an instructive example of successful joint operations with significant strategic effects. Success on the ground, in the air, and at sea were interdependent and hard to achieve. Ships were sunk and aircraft were destroyed in great numbers. Japan could ill afford its disproportionate losses of key elements of its military power. In thinking about the operational character and strategic results of the Guadalcanal/Solomons campaign, students should bear in mind Corbett's writings about peripheral operations.

The attrition that the Japanese suffered in the Solomons, coming on top of their losses at Midway, left them at an increasing material disadvantage as American war production began to make its full weight felt in late 1943. Especially as U.S. submarine operations began to have increasing effects on the Japanese war economy, Japan had

great trouble in regenerating combat power. The United States, by contrast, now had the wherewithal to launch a two-pronged offensive in the Pacific. One prong, under the operational leadership of General MacArthur, with naval support from Admiral Thomas Kinkaid (and, at a greater distance, Admiral William Halsey) and air support from General George Kenney, jumped through the Southwest Pacific. The other prong, under the operational leadership of Admiral Nimitz, with new fast-carrier task forces, at-sea logistical replenishment, and Marine amphibious units, drove across the Central Pacific. The Joint Military Operations course examines in terms of operational art what happened when these two prongs converged in the Leyte Gulf campaign in late 1944. In the Strategy and War Course, students should consider the operational and strategic risks and rewards of dividing American forces into separate "prongs" from late 1943 to late 1944. They should bear in mind that the Pacific War was only a part of a larger global war in which the United States and its allies had agreed that Germany was the primary enemy. From this strategic perspective, it is important to consider whether or not the assets that flowed to one of the prongs in the Pacific in 1943 and 1944 might have brought a greater war-termination payoff in another theater.

The Pacific War provides the most compelling and controversial case study for the analysis of war termination in the history of modern warfare. As American forces developed bases in the Marianas in order to bomb the Japanese home islands and as the arrival of American forces in the Philippines further threatened Japan's sea lines of communications to indispensable raw materials in Southeast Asia, some Japanese leaders began to realize the scale of the strategic defeat that awaited Japan. When American forces took Okinawa in June 1945, the Japanese Emperor began to exert, behind the scenes, his influence in favor of a negotiated settlement of the war. But the Japanese military leaders remained determined to fight to the bitter end. They anticipated that by inflicting great casualties on American forces invading Kyushu, they could compel the United States to back down from its policy of unconditional surrender. Before the dropping of the atomic bombs in August 1945, the Emperor was unwilling to confront the military leaders on the issue of peace. In traditional practice, the Emperor reigned but did not rule. The Japanese military leadership had long been able to circumvent civilian authority. It not only had full control over military strategy, but also had veto power over foreign policy. It is in this political context that students should consider American options for war termination in 1945. There was only a muted debate within the American government over the use of nuclear weapons. There was greater debate, among leaders of the U.S. Navy and U.S. Army, about what operations would be necessary to end the war. Had not the atomic bombs ended the war in August 1945, there would have been further inter-service conflict over the planned invasion of Kyushu in the fall of 1945. Given the ethical issues raised by the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, historians and others have argued ever since over whether it was necessary for the United States to use nuclear weapons. Students should consider how different the political shape of postwar East Asia might have been, if the war against Japan had continued for much longer than it did.

Despite the bitterness of the fighting in the Pacific War and despite the nuclear devastation at its end, the postwar American occupation of Japan did not meet with

violent Japanese resistance. Japanese militarism was discredited in the eyes of the Japanese people. The American government had been wise enough to do ample planning during the war for the postwar occupation. At the end of the war, American leaders decided, also wisely, to allow the Emperor to remain on the throne. General MacArthur proved to be an effective Supreme Commander of occupied Japan. American occupation authorities found Japanese partners willing to participate in the establishment of a new democratic and demilitarized Japanese regime. The occupation gave way in the early 1950s, during the Korean War, to an alliance between the United States and Japan that survived throughout the Cold War and thrives even now into the twenty-first century.

From the perspective not only of military operations during the Pacific War but also of long-term political relations after the war, this case study has a strong claim to stand out as the greatest American strategic success ever. But from another perspective, the outcome of the Pacific War spelled trouble for the United States in the future. American war-termination strategy and policy, focused as it was on Japan itself, made virtually no provision for shaping the postwar fate of the different parts of the Japanese empire on the East Asian mainland. In East Asia as well as in Europe, the United States thought too little, too late, about the regional balance of power that would emerge from the Second World War. Europe immediately became the central theater of the Cold War, but East Asia emerged as the most violent region in the world from 1945 to 1975. Among other conflicts, there was a cataclysmic civil war in China, where the United States did not intervene militarily; there was a regional war in Korea, where the United States not only fought the Soviet client state of North Korea, but also the new Communist regime that had emerged victorious from the Chinese Civil War; and there were two major wars in Indochina. In the second Indochina War, the United States suffered its greatest strategic failure ever. American operations and strategy in Korea and Vietnam follow the Pacific War in this course, as they flowed from it in history.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. Analysts of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 point to a Japanese "proclivity" for surprise and an American proclivity to be surprised. How would you account for these proclivities?

2. What conclusions of operational and strategic significance would you derive from a net assessment of the United States and Japan on the eve of the Pacific War?

3. Who had done the better job of prewar preparation for the Pacific War—the United States or Japan?

4. Suppose that Japan had not attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941 but had undertaken its offensive operations in Southeast Asia, and suppose further that Admiral Kimmel had countered by executing the operational plan that Edward Miller describes in Required Reading 5. What would have been the most likely operational results and corresponding strategic effects of Kimmel's operation?

5. After successfully executing operations in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific by the spring of 1942, what should Japan have done next?

6. Which was most important in the American victory over Japan in the Pacific War—new military technologies, superior "jointness," or information superiority?

7. Mahan did not foresee the role that aviation and submarines would come to play in naval warfare. Are his theories nonetheless relevant to the Pacific War?

8. Which operations of the Pacific War are the most important for military planners to learn lessons from in the twenty-first century?

9. Both Yamamoto and Nimitz risked their fleets at Midway in June 1942. Compare and evaluate how each of these two naval commanders addressed the issue of operational and strategic risk.

10. Did it make operational and strategic sense for Japan to open, and for the United States to contest, a new theater in the Solomon Islands in the summer of 1942?

11. Use your knowledge of Corbett to assess the operational character and strategic significance of the Guadalcanal/Solomons campaign.

12. Almost all traditional military theorists and almost all contemporary doctrine-writers agree that "concentration" (or "mass") is the most important principle of war. Should the United States have divided its forces in the Southwest Pacific and Central Pacific offensives against Japan from late 1943 to late 1944?

13. Suppose the United States either had not developed atomic weapons by 1945 or had chosen not to use them against Japan. Assess the likely operational effectiveness, strategic effects, and moral implications of other American options for terminating the Pacific War.

14. Did Japan lose the Pacific War because it was excessively preoccupied with winning decisive naval battles?

15. Why were the Japanese so successful in their war against Russia in 1904-1905 and so unsuccessful in their war against the United States in 1941-1945?

C. Required Readings:

1. James, D. Clayton. "American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War," in Peter Paret, ed. *Makers of Modern Strategy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. Pages 703-732.

[James, an historian best known for his three-volume biography of General MacArthur, provides in this reading a policy-and-strategy overview of the Pacific War.]

2. Baer, George W. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 119-189, 206-272.

[In this award-winning book, Professor Baer, formerly Chairman of the Strategy Department at the Naval War College, provides an overview of the U.S. Navy's role in the development of American policy, strategy, and operations against Japan from 1940 to 1945.]

3. Evans, David C. and Mark R. Peattie. *Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Pages 447-517.

[Evans and Peattie, the two best-informed American historians of the Imperial Japanese Navy, provide much food for thought on its doctrinal and institutional deficiencies, as revealed in the Pacific War. Students should consider how the Japanese navy might have applied misconceived lessons from its war against Russia in 1904-5 to its war against the United States in 1941-45.]

4. Marston, Daniel, ed. *The Pacific War Companion*. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2005. Pages 31-45, 47-61, 63-77, 159-177, 195-209, 227-245.

[This collection of essays, ranging from the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 to the American atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, allows readers to focus on the key operations and operational leaders on both sides of the Pacific War. Students should take note that Professor Gatchel's essay on pages 159-177 provides excellent background for the JMO Department's case study on Leyte Gulf. Students should also note that the pivotal Midway naval engagement and Guadalcanal/Solomons joint operations of 1942 are covered in readings 6-9 below.]

5. Warner, Denis and Peggy. "The Doctrine of Surprise"; Miller, Edward S. "Kimmel's Hidden Agenda"; and Cohen, Eliot A. "The Might-Have-Beens of Pearl Harbor," in *Military History Quarterly* (Autumn 1991), pages 20-25, 36-43, 72-73. (Selected Readings)

[In this special issue of *MHQ* on Pearl Harbor, the Warners, authors of this course's main reading on the Russo-Japanese War, discuss the proclivity for surprise in Japanese strategic culture; Miller, the leading historian of the U.S. Navy's operational planning against Japan before the Pacific War, reveals what Admiral Kimmel intended to do with the Pacific Fleet under his command in December 1941, if that fleet had not been the victim of the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor; and Cohen, a former Strategy Department faculty member at the Naval War College and now a professor at the School of Advanced International Studies in the Johns Hopkins University, does a counterfactual

analysis of the different ways in which the United States might have avoided an operational disaster at Pearl Harbor.]

6. Parshall, Jonathan B. and Anthony B. Tully. *Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of Midway*. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005. Pages 19-59.

[Two non-academic historians provide in this book the latest word and best account in English of the Japanese side of the pivotal naval engagement at Midway in June 1942. The two chapters selected for this reading take a look at the Japanese strategic debate from which the decision to attack Midway emerged and provide a close analysis of Admiral Yamamoto's operational plan.]

7. Nimitz, Admiral C.W. "Operation Plan No. 29-42," 27 May 1942, and "Letter of Instruction," 28 May 1942. (Selected Readings)

[Students should contrast the simplicity of Adniral Nimitz's operation plan with the complexity of Yamamoto's—as discussed in reading 6—and should take Nimitz's "Letter of Instruction" as a point of departure for considering how the two naval commanders handled the issue of operational risk management.]

8. Prados, John. *Combined Fleet Decoded*. New York: Random House, 1995. Pages 312-343. (Selected Readings)

[This book, by a researcher in the National Security Archive at George Washington University, is the best detailed analysis of the role of signals intelligence and information superiority in American naval success against Japan. The assigned excerpt shows how the ability of American codebreakers to read Japanese operational messages helped Admiral Nimitz to formulate his plan to engage the Japanese carrier force at Midway.]

9. Larrabee, Eric. *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988. Pages 256-304, 354-411.

[In this superbly written book about American commanders in World War II, the first chapter selected for this case study provides an account of the important joint peripheral operations centered on Guadalcanal in 1942-43 and illuminates the vital contribution that the operational leadership of U.S. Marine General Alexander Vandegrift made to American success in the grueling Solomons campaign. The second chapter assigned examines the operational leadership of Admiral Nimitz as theater commander.]

10. Wylie, J.C. "Excerpt from 'Reflections on the War in the Pacific,'" Appendix A in *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989. Pages 117-121. (Selected Readings)

[This brief analysis of the Pacific War by an American admiral who served as a faculty member at the Naval War College after World War II distinguishes between "sequential"

and "cumulative" operations and shows how both were important to the outcome of the Pacific War. It serves as a reminder to students that they should not focus on carrier and amphibious operations to the exclusion of submarine operations against the Japanese economy.]

11. Krepinevich, Andrew. "Transforming to Victory: The U.S. Navy, Carrier Aviation, and Preparing for War in the Pacific," Olin Institute publication (2000). (Selected Readings)

[Krepinevich, a retired U.S. Army officer and former Naval War College student, emerged after the Gulf War of 1990-1991 as an articulate proponent of what is now called military "transformation." In this paper, he illuminates how advocates of carrier aviation in the U.S. Navy in the 1920s and 1930s developed new technology, organization, and concepts that paid off in remarkable operational and strategic success in the Pacific War.]

12. Millett, Alan R. "Assault from the Sea: The Development of Amphibious Warfare between the Wars: The American, British, and Japanese Experiences," in Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, eds. *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pages 50-59, 64-95.

[This study is part of a project sponsored by the Office of Net Assessment in the Pentagon to learn lessons from past "transformations" in military capability that generated "revolutions in military affairs." Millett highlights the conceptual and technical advances made in the 1920s and 1930s by the U.S. Marines in preparing to conduct amphibious operations against the Japanese. He also shows what the Japanese were doing in this domain of warfare.]

13. Rosen, Stephen Peter. *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991. Pages 130-147. (Selected Readings)

[Rosen, who wrote this book while on the Strategy Department faculty at the Naval War College and who is now a professor at Harvard, emphasizes the major adaptations that the U.S. submarine force had to make in order to be operationally effective in the Pacific War. He also notes how difficult it was at the time to measure the remarkable strategic effects that submarine operations against Japanese shipping had on Japan's war economy.]

14. Kawai Kazuo. *Japan's American Interlude*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960. Pages 1-33. (Selected Readings)

[Kawai, a Japanese newspaper editor during the postwar Occupation of Japan, offers explanations of why there was not violent Japanese resistance to U.S. military occupiers and evaluations of American efforts to demilitarize and democratize Japan. He is especially illuminating on Japanese cultural characteristics and MacArthur's leadership role.]

15. Spector, Ronald H. "After Hiroshima: Allied Military Occupations and the Fate of Japan's Empire, 1945-1947." *Journal of Military History* (October 2005), pages 1121-1136. (Selected Readings)

[Spector, a leading historian of the Pacific War, here carries the story of war termination into the postwar situation on the East Asian mainland. When Japan surrendered in 1945, there was indigenous turmoil in Korea, China, and Indochina that not only posed formidable problems for hastily improvised stability operations by occupation forces, but also pointed toward future wars in East Asia.]

V. VICTORY AT SEA: PREWAR PLANNING, MILITARY TRANSFORMATION, AND JOINT OPERATIONS IN A MODERN MARITIME WAR—THE PACIFIC WAR

Agawa, Hiroyuki. *The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy*. John Bester, trans. Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1979.

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Bartsch, William H. *December 8, 1941: MacArthur's Pearl Harbor*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2003.

Benedict, Ruth. *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1946.

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Borg, Dorothy, and Okamoto, Shumpei, eds. *Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1973.

Boyd, Carl. *The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995.

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Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. *Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005.

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World War II Chronology

German troops occupy the Rhineland.	Mar 7, 1936
Italian troops take Ethiopia.	May 9, 1936
Japanese attack Chinese at the Marco Polo Bridge.	Jul 7, 1936
Fall of Nanking to the Japanese.	Dec 14, 1936
Germany annexes Austria.	Mar 1938
Munich Conference, "Peace in our time."	Sep 30, 1938
Chiang-Kai-shek's Government withdraws to Chungking.	Oct 1938
German troops occupy the Sudetenland.	Oct 15, 1938
Fall of Canton to the Japanese.	Oct 21, 1938
Germany annexes Czechoslovakia.	Mar 15, 1939
Battle of Nomonhan between Japanese & Soviets.	May-Sep 1939
Germany and USSR sign nonaggression pact.	Aug 23, 1939
Germans invade Poland.	Sep 1, 1939
Great Britain, France, Australia, and New Zealand declare war on Germany.	Sep 3, 1939
Canada declares war on Germany.	Sep 10, 1939
Soviets invade Poland.	
Warsaw surrenders.	Sep 27, 1939
Soviets invade Finland.	Nov 30, 1939
"Graf Spee" scuttled.	Dec 17, 1939
Finland signs peace treaty with Soviet Union.	Mar 12, 1940
Germans invade Denmark and Norway.	Apr 9, 1940
British occupy Iceland.	May 1940
Germans invade Low Countries and France; Sir Winston Churchill named UK Prime Minister.	May 10, 1940
Dutch surrender to Germany.	May 15, 1940
Germans reach English Channel.	May 20, 1940
Dunkirk evacuation in France.	May 27, 1940
Belgium surrenders to Germany.	May 28, 1940
Italy declares war on Great Britain and France.	Jun 10, 1940
Germans enter Paris.	Jun 14, 1940
France signs armistice.	Jun 22, 1940
British attacks French fleet at Mers-el-Kebir.	Jul 3, 1940
French under Petain break off diplomatic relations with Britain.	Jul 5, 1940
The Battle of Britain begins.	Jul 10, 1940
Soviets annex Baltic states as Soviet republics.	Jul 1940
Closing of the Burma Road.	Jul-Oct 1940
Italians invade British and French Somaliland.	Aug 4, 1940
U.S. trades 50 destroyers to Britain in exchange for Atlantic bases.	Sep 2, 1940
Germans begin night bombing of London.	Sep 7, 1940
Italians invade Egypt.	Sep 14, 1940
U.S. Congress passes conscription bill. Roosevelt calls first of National Guard to active duty.	Sep 16, 1940
France allows Japan bases in Indochina.	Sep 22, 1940
U.S. limits scrap iron and steel exports to Western Hemisphere.	Sep 26, 1940
Italians invade Greece.	Oct 28, 1940
Roosevelt elected president.	Nov 5, 1940
British attack Italian fleet at Taranto.	Nov 11, 1940
Hungary joins the Axis.	Nov 20, 1940
Romania joins the Axis.	Nov 23, 1940
British offensive in North Africa captures Tobruk and Benghazi.	Dec 1940
Bulgaria joins the Axis.	Mar 1, 1941
Lend-Lease act signed.	Mar 11, 1941
Yugoslavia refuses to join Tripartite Pact.	Mar 27, 1941
U.S. seizes Axis ships in U.S. ports.	Mar 30, 1941
First German offensive in North Africa, takes Benghazi and invests Tobruk.	Mar 31, 1941
Germans invade Yugoslavia and Greece.	Apr 6, 1941
U.S. assumes control of Greenland.	Apr 9, 1941
Japan & USSR Non-aggression pact signed.	Apr 13, 1941
Yugoslavia surrenders.	Apr 17, 1941
Greece surrenders.	Apr 27, 1941
British invade Vichy-French occupied Iraq.	May 2, 1941
Germans take Crete.	May 20, 1941
"Bismarck" sunk. Roosevelt declares unlimited U.S. national emergency.	May 27, 1941
British defeat Vichy French and Italians in Syria and Lebanon.	Jun 8, 1941
U.S. freezes German and Italian assets in America.	Jun 14, 1941
Germans invade Russia.	Jun 22, 1941
Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance.	Jul 12, 1941
French transfer control of Indochina to Japan.	Jul 21, 1941
U.S. & Britain freeze Japanese assets.	Jul 25, 1941
U.S. bans gasoline exports to Japan.	Aug 1, 1941
Roosevelt-Churchill conference, Placentia Bay: Atlantic Charter.	Aug 14, 1941
Fall of Kiev.	Aug 17, 1941
Anglo-Russian occupation of Iran.	Aug 25, 1941
Roosevelt orders Navy to attack any vessel threatening U.S. shipping or ships under U.S. escort.	Sep 11, 1941
U.S. Navy announces capture of German radio station on Greenland.	Oct 11, 1941
Leningrad & Sevastopol fall-Nazi thrust to Moscow.	Oct 30, 1941
U-boats sink U.S.S. Reuben James.	Oct 31, 1941
Neutrality act amended to allow arming of U.S. merchant vessels.	Nov 17, 1941
Soviet counter-attack.	Dec 1, 1941
Japan attacks Pearl Harbor, Philippines, Hong Kong, and Malaya.	Dec 7, 1941
U.S. and Great Britain declare war on Japan.	Dec 8, 1941
China officially declares war on Japan and Germany.	Dec 9, 1941
Japanese sink the "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse" off Malaya; Japanese capture Guam.	Dec 10, 1941
Germany and Italy declare war on U.S.; Japanese attack Burma.	Dec 11, 1941
Fall of Wake Island.	Dec 23, 1941
Hong Kong falls.	Dec 25, 1941
Manila falls.	Jan 2, 1942
Japan attacks the Dutch East Indies.	Jan 11, 1942
Fall of Rangoon.	Feb 8, 1942
Fall of Singapore.	Feb 15, 1942
Japanese bomb Port Darwin in Australia.	Feb 19, 1942
Battle of Java Sea.	Feb 27, 1942
U.S. surrender at Bataan.	Apr 9, 1942

World War II Chronology (cont)

U.S. air raid on Tokyo.	Apr 18, 1942
Japan occupies Andaman Islands in Bay of Bengal.	Mar 23, 1942
Corregidor surrenders	May 6, 1942
Battle of the Coral Sea.	May 6, 1942
First thousand-bomber air raid on Germany.	May 30, 1942
Battle of Midway; Japanese attack on the Aleutian Islands.	Jun 4, 1942
Japanese submarine shells Seaside, Oregon.	Jun 21, 1942
Regular allied bombing raids begin on Ruhr and Hamburg.	Jul 1942
U.S. landings on the Solomon Islands.	Aug 7, 1942
Civil Disobedience campaign announced in India.	Aug 9, 1942
First U.S. air raid on Europe.	Aug 17, 1942
Allies attack Dieppe	Aug 19, 1942
Battle of Stalingrad begins.	Sep 13, 1942
Opening of U.S. offensive in New Guinea.	Sep 21, 1942
Battle of El Alamein.	Oct 23, 1942
Regular raids on Berlin begin.	Nov 1942
Allied landings in Morocco and Algeria.	Nov 8, 1942
Germans & Italians invade unoccupied portions of Vichy France.	Nov 11, 1942
U.S. begins nationwide gas rationing.	Dec 1, 1942
British Foreign Secretary Eden tells House of Commons of Nazi mass murder of Jews. U.S. declares those crimes will be avenged.	Dec 17, 1942
German retreat from Caucasus.	Jan 1943
Casablanca Conference.	Jan 14-24, 1943
First U.S. bombing raid on Germany.	Jan 27, 1943
German surrender at Stalingrad; Soviets recover Kursk and Rostov.	Feb 2, 1943
Wingate's expedition to Burma.	Feb 8, 1943
Battle of Kasserine Pass, first major battle between German & U.S. forces. U.S. loses.	Feb 14, 1943
Battle of the Bismarck Sea.	Mar 2, 1943
Death of Admiral Yamamoto, at Bougainville.	Apr 18, 1943
U.S. begins to liberate the Aleutian Islands.	May 11, 1943
German-Italian surrender in Tunisia.	May 12, 1943
Attack on Ruhr dams.	May 17, 1943
Doenitz suspends U-Boat operations in the North Atlantic.	May 22, 1943
U.S. landings in New Guinea.	Jun 29, 1943
German attack near Kursk	Jul 4, 1943
Invasion of Sicily.	Jul 10, 1943
Dismissal of Mussolini.	Jul 25, 1943
Invasion of Calabria and signing of Italian surrender.	Sep 3, 1943
Landing at Salerno.	Sep 9, 1943
Rescue of Mussolini by Germans.	Sep 12, 1943
Italy declares war on Germany.	Oct 13, 1943
Russians recover Kiev.	Nov 6, 1943
U.S. takes Tarawa & other Gilbert Islands.	Nov 24, 1943
Teheran Conference.	Nov 28, 1943
Landings at Anzio.	Jan 22, 1944
Leningrad relieved.	Jan 27, 1944
Japanese offensive on borders of India.	Feb-Mar 1944
Soviets enter Rumania.	Apr 2, 1944

Germans evacuate Monte Cassino. Merrill's Marauders take Myitkyina airfield, Burma (first major U.S. land operation in Asia).	May 17, 1944
Americans enter Rome.	Jun 4, 1944
D-Day, Allied invasion of France.	Jun 6, 1944
First V-1s hit London.	Jun 12, 1944
U.S. invades Saipan, First B-29 raid on Japan.	Jun 15, 1944
U.S. wins Battle of the Philippine Sea	Jun 19, 1944
Fall of Saipan.	Jul 9, 1944
Resignation of General Tojo.	Jul 18, 1944
Attempt to kill Adolf Hitler by his own Generals.	Jul 20, 1944
U.S. recovery of Tinian and Guam.	Aug 1, 1944
Allied landings in Southern France.	Aug 15, 1944
Final victories in Normandy.	Aug 17, 1944
Allies liberate Paris, Romania declares war on Germany.	Aug 25, 1944
Brussels liberated.	Sep 3, 1944
Bulgaria declares war on Germany.	Sep 5, 1944
First V2s hit London.	Sep 8, 1944
Finland signs armistice with Russia.	Sep 10, 1944
'Operation Market-Garden' fails.	Sep 30, 1944
U.S. landings in the Philippines.	Oct 20, 1944
Battle of Leyte Gulf.	Oct 25, 1944
Regular bombings of Japan begin.	Nov 1944
First allied ships unloaded at Antwerp.	Nov 26, 1944
German offensive in the Ardennes.	Dec 16, 1944
General Soviet offensive begins.	Jan 12, 1945
Soviets enter Warsaw.	Jan 17, 1945
Hungary declares war on Germany.	Jan 21, 1945
Yalta Conference.	Feb 4-12, 1945
Surrender of Budapest.	Feb 13, 1945
U.S. Marines land on Iwo Jima	Feb 17, 1945
Americans cross the Rhine at Remagen.	Mar 7, 1945
U.S. firebombs Tokyo killing 80,000	Mar 9, 1945
U.S. invades Okinawa	Apr 1, 1945
USSR cancels neutrality pact with Japan.	Apr 5, 1945
Death of President Roosevelt.	Apr 12, 1945
Soviets enter Vienna.	Apr 13, 1945
Last Soviet offensive begins.	Apr 16, 1945
Mussolini is hung by Italians.	Apr 28, 1945
Adolf Hitler commits suicide in his underground bunker in Berlin.	Apr 30, 1945
Berlin in Soviet hands.	May 2, 1945
Japanese surrender Rangoon.	May 3, 1945
Germans surrender at Rheims.	May 7, 1945
Soviets enter Prague.	May 9, 1945
Potsdam Conference.	Jul 17, 1945
Atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, kills 100,000	Aug 6, 1945
Soviet Union declares war on Japan.	Aug 8, 1945
Atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki, kills 70,000.	Aug 9, 1945
Japan surrenders on U.S.S. “Missouri: in Tokyo Bay.	Sep 2, 1945

VI. CLASH OF IDEOLOGIES: FIGHTING AND TERMINATING A MAJOR REGIONAL WAR—KOREA, 1950-1953

A. General: This case study examines the strategic and operational challenges that the United States faced in fighting a major regional war as a leader of a coalition against a determined ideological adversary. The time, place, and type of war that erupted on the Korean peninsula in 1950 caught the United States materially, strategically, and intellectually unprepared. Nonetheless, in response to North Korea's aggression, the United States decided almost immediately to intervene under the auspices of the U.N. in the fighting. After suffering initial military setbacks, U.N. counterattacks—notably the breakout from the Pusan perimeter and the landings at Inchon (Operation CHROMITE)—were masterpieces of surprise, deception, and joint warfighting. These remarkable operational successes, however, did not bring about a rapid end to the conflict. Instead, quite the reverse occurred: the war became even more difficult to end because, as U.N. forces sought to exploit their victories and keep the pressure on the enemy by advancing into North Korea, Chinese troops intervened in the fighting; the United States found itself embroiled in a major conflict with China. A calamitous intelligence failure about China's strategic intentions and operational capabilities contributed to one of the worst battlefield reverses ever suffered by American arms. While U.N. forces eventually halted and pushed back the Chinese offensive, an end of the fighting did not occur, with a costly, two-year stalemate taking hold on the battlefield. The stalemate proved immensely frustrating to Americans, who had come to expect that their wars would have decisive and unambiguous results. This war, unlike the recently concluded Second World War, was not fought until the complete defeat of the enemy. In addition, profound differences in ideology and strategic culture between the belligerents further complicated net assessment, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, operational planning, strategic choice, and negotiation tactics. The erratic course of the American intervention in Korea reflected the complexities of the first war fought for limited aims in the nuclear age. The Truman administration and American military leaders had great difficulty calibrating political objectives, keeping strategy in line with policy, and isolating their adversaries. In particular, Washington failed to reach agreement on key strategic issues with the theater commander, the famous and headstrong General Douglas MacArthur. An examination of this case study highlights the contrast between the so-called American way of war and the strategic preferences, operational art, and negotiating styles of hardened ideological enemies, who sought to break the will of the United States' people, government, and armed forces to fight in defense of coalition partners.

The origins of the Korean War can be found in the profound changes that occurred in the international strategic environment immediately after the Second World War. With the end of the Second World War, vast areas of the globe suffered in political, social, and economic chaos. In Asia, post-conflict stability operations were further complicated by the entry of the Soviet Union into the Pacific War in August 1945, as well as by indigenous Communist movements and the return of colonial powers in places like Vietnam and Malaya. Because of the rapidity with which peace came—at least a year before many had anticipated—the process of terminating the Second World War in Asia tended to be *ad hoc*. The former Japanese colony of Korea was partitioned between

U.S. and Soviet forces at the 38th Parallel, based on negotiations that took less than a week. As in Germany, attempts to form a single government that would unite a divided people broke down, and a short-term demarcation of zones of occupation became a defining line between Stalin's proxy, Kim Il-Sung, and the American-supported government of Syngman Rhee, both of whom retained the objective of uniting the country.

Despite the heightening of Cold War tensions in a series of crises ranging from the presence of Soviet forces in Iran in 1946 to the victory of the Chinese communists in 1949, the Truman administration originally did not expect a major military conflict, and it drastically downsized American forces from 1945 to 1950. Military planners, for their part, assumed that the next war would be similar to the Second World War (except that nuclear weapons would be used earlier), and ruled out Korea as a place to fight. The West focused its attention on Europe and its protection from numerically superior Soviet forces there. The problems associated with the postwar military reductions and the search for a peace dividend give a historic perspective to the downsizing of U.S. forces that occurred after the Cold War.

While the Korean War remained confined in geographic scope, it was fought between two global coalitions. This competition between two ideological blocs both complicated the matching of policy and strategy and raised the specter that the fighting in Korea might expand into a larger regional or even global conflagration involving the use of nuclear weapons. Hence, the leaders in both coalitions made their decisions at the operational and even tactical levels of war with an eye toward controlling escalation. The larger international strategic environment played a key role in shaping the strategic and operational courses of action available to those fighting in Korea.

An in-depth examination of the Korean War also highlights how the United States struggled to master the complexities of joint and multinational operations. While the geography of the region played to U.S. strengths as a naval and air power, the terrain of the peninsula negated many of these advantages, especially against the lighter and less road-bound Chinese forces. This case study thus permits an assessment of the strengths and limitations of specific instruments of war—sea, air, land, and nuclear—for achieving strategic objectives. The bounded nature of this conflict further provides an opportunity to focus, with a high degree of clarity, on interaction, adaptation, and reassessment in wartime. In particular, this case provides a classic example of the difficulties inherent in accurately determining both the culminating point of attack and the culminating point of victory.

This case study, too, is valuable for understanding the importance of intelligence, deception, surprise, and assessment in strategy and war. China's intervention in the Korean War provides one of the most dramatic episodes in American history, along with Pearl Harbor and September 11th, of a major intelligence failure. Whether the failure to understand China's intentions and actions was an example of the difficulties of assessing adversaries from a different culture, simple ignorance, willful disregard of clear warnings, or a triumph of operational secrecy on the part of the enemy remains an issue

hotly debated among historians. Further, by undertaking an in-depth study of this case, it is possible to explore the ways that commanders and planners might mitigate the risks facing them when intelligence is inadequate and the adversary is difficult to understand.

This case study highlights the special problems encountered in terminating a conflict in which the belligerents fight for limited aims. The process of war termination in Korea was obviously frustrating to American statesmen and commanders alike and left a legacy that directly affected U.S. conduct of the Vietnam War and the Gulf War of 1990-1. While the United States ultimately realized its aim of preserving an independent South Korea, China's intervention and the protracted negotiations with the communists greatly increased the costs of the war. Why this occurred and what it reveals about the problems of trying to fight while negotiating are yet more valuable lessons to be drawn from this case. The United States also found that, in trying to reach a settlement with adversaries, it faced vexing problems in managing coalition partners. Negotiating and fighting with the enemy formed but a part of the complex strategic problem in war termination that confronted American decision makers and military commanders.

Tense civil-military relations in the United States reflected these difficulties in war termination. The National Security Act of 1947 created the Department of Defense and the joint military establishment that endures to this day. The Korean War was the first conflict fought by the United States with this organizational framework. General MacArthur acted both as a multi-national (Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command) and a joint (Commander-in-Chief, Far East) commander in conducting this war, resulting in some tense issues in coalition dynamics, including Great Britain's concerns about the possible use of atomic weapons. This new arrangement, along with the unusual nature of the mission, also resulted in one of the most serious civil-military crises in American history: the Truman-MacArthur dispute. The conflict between President Truman and General MacArthur provides a fascinating look at civil-military relations in the American context and illuminates issues that continue to resonate in present-day operations, including the problem of friction and disagreement between the White House and the theater commander on objectives, strategy, and the proper employment of multi-national forces, notably ROK and ROC (Taiwan) troops, in the conflict. This case study analyzes a famous example of poor civil-military relations and highlights the adverse strategic consequences that can result from a breakdown in the relationship between the statesman and the military commander.

Following MacArthur's removal, Matthew Ridgway took command of the U. N. forces. The contrast between Ridgway and MacArthur as theater commanders is telling in that Ridgway concentrated on the operational problem at hand of evicting Chinese forces from South Korea. Coming from the Pentagon, Ridgway showed that he understood the administration's goals and undertook effective operations to achieve them. Chinese intervention, along with significant Soviet material aid, however, limited the strategic advantage that the United States could derive from air operations in Korea and enabled the stalemate that prevailed from mid-1951. Likewise, fears of horizontal escalation—that is, that the Soviet Union could launch operations in Europe—called into question the utility of nuclear weapons at the operational level of war. Having forced the

enemy back across the 38th Parallel, Ridgway opened truce talks, but could not secure a quick peace. Disagreement soon broke out among U.S. commanders over whether offensive operations had been halted prematurely. With U.N. forces bogged down and American casualties mounting, Stalin demanded that his coalition partners maintain their intransigent positions in negotiations and prolong the fighting. General Mark Clark, one of Ridgway's successors, considered escalating the war, including attacks on mainland China and the possible use of nuclear weapons to kick-start the stalled negotiations. With the death of Stalin, this kind of horizontal escalation turned out to be unnecessary.

More than fifty years after the armistice, U.S. troops remain in South Korea, committed to its defense against a renewed communist onslaught. What was supposed to be a limited intervention to repel communist aggression and restore order turned into more than a half century of tension with the communist rulers of North Korea, a regime with whom a peace treaty has yet to be signed and that, in an ominous and belligerent way, is developing nuclear weapons along with long-range delivery systems. While the presence of U.S. forces has contributed to the stability of the war's settlement, it has complicated relations with the Republic of Korea, especially with that country's transition to full democracy, and it has at the same time provided a target for North Korea's vitriol. The fate of the Korean people, then, seems far from settled, and the region remains fraught with danger. This case illustrates the unintended long-term consequences of intervention in regional conflicts and how international security might require a considerable and lengthy commitment of U.S. military power.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. What are the factors that can press commanders to seek permission to widen the objectives of a limited war?

2. Evaluate the operational risks and rewards of Operation CHROMITE.

3. How might the author of the *Sun Tzu* have evaluated China's use of surprise and deception at the operational and strategic levels of war from the fall of 1950 until June 1951?

4. Evaluate the applicability of Clausewitz's paired concepts of the Culminating Point of Attack and Culminating Point of Victory (*On War*, Book 7, Chapters 5 and 22) to the Korean War.

5. Did the communists commit a strategic blunder by pressing their offensive in late 1950?

6. Did the U. N. forces commit a strategic blunder by not continuing their advance in the spring of 1951?

7. Could the U.N. forces have achieved more strategic advantage out of their sea and air power advantages? If so, how? If not, why not?

8. This was the first major war fought after the advent of nuclear weapons. What role, if any, did they play in determining the choices that were made at the operational level of war?

9. Which was more harmful to the American conduct of the war in Korea—the failure of the military to comprehend the political objective or the failure of civilian leaders to comprehend what actually can and cannot be achieved by force?

10. Who had a better appreciation of the nature of the Korean War in a Clausewitzian sense—Douglas MacArthur, Matthew Ridgway, or Mark Clark?

11. What lessons might American policy makers and strategists have drawn from the Korean war-termination experience from 1951 to 1953?

12. How effectively did the United States integrate joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities during the Korean War?

13. Evaluate the alternative courses of action open to American planners in the aftermath of CHROMITE.

14. How effectively did the United States work with coalition partners during the Korean War?

15. How effectively did the United States use information as an instrument of national power during the Korean War?

16. The Korean War involved the United States fought in a major regional conflict with China. How well did American political decision makers and military leaders deal with the strategic problems that faced them in fighting and terminating a conflict with China?

C. Required Readings:

1. Nichols, Thomas M. *Winning the World: Lessons for America's Future from the Cold War*. Westport: Praeger, 2002. Pages 51-73.

[Employing sources made available by the fall of the Soviet Union, Nichols (a professor in the Strategy Department) dissects the dynamics of the Soviet alliance in East Asia and explains Stalin's decision to support Kim Il-Sung's invasion of South Korea.]

2. "The Truman Doctrine, 12 March 1947." (Selected Readings)

[Truman's speech before a joint session of Congress was a landmark in the articulation of American policy goals in the Cold War.]

3. Stueck, William. *Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. Pages 1-239.

[Stueck provides an overview of the origins of the war, foreign intervention, war termination, the effect of the Korean War on the Cold War alliances, and its enduring impact on U.S.-Korean relations.]

4. Osgood, Robert. *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957. Pages 163-193. (Selected Readings)

[Osgood's chapter on the Korean War analyzes the Truman administration's rationale for intervening in the conflict and addresses some of the problems that waging a limited war posed for the U.S. and its "Clausewitzian triangle."]

5. "North Korean Offensive, July 1-September 15," in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950*, volume VII: *Korea*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976. Pages 393-395; 449-461; 502-510; 600-603; 712-721; 781-782. (Selected Readings)

[These documents illuminate the nature and resolution of the debate within the American government, before the successful amphibious operation at Inchon, over whether the political objective of the U. S. in the Korean War should be limited or unlimited.]

6. Schnabel, James F. *Policy and Direction: The First Year*. Washington: Center of Military History, 1992. Pages 139-172, 182-183. (Selected Readings)

[The first selection details the planning and execution of Operation CHROMITE. The later brief excerpt reproduces instructions from the Joint Chiefs to General MacArthur for his advance into North Korea in the fall of 1950.]

7. Hunt, Michael H. "Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950-June 1951," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 107, no. 3 (Fall 1992), pages 453-478. (Selected Readings)

[Hunt provides an illuminating perspective on Chinese Communist policy and strategy. He includes an interesting contrast of how Mao and Truman handled their respective military commanders.]

8. Cohen, Eliot A. and John Gooch. *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War*. New York: The Free Press, 1990. Pages 165-195. (Selected Readings)

[Cohen and Gooch provide a detailed post-mortem of the multilayered intelligence and operational failures that culminated in one of the worst battlefield reverses in American

history. These authors also explain why U.N. air power was less operationally and strategically effective following the Chinese intervention.]

9. Brodie, Bernard. *War and Politics*. New York: Macmillan, 1973. Pages 57-112.

[Brodie analyzes the major American policy and strategy choices in the Korean War. He is especially provocative on what he sees as a missed opportunity for war termination in mid-1951.]

10. Clodfelter, Mark. *The Limits of Air Power*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006. Pages 12-26.

[As can be gleaned from the title, Clodfelter's analysis of air operations in Korea highlights the challenges that U.N. commanders faced in using air strikes to inflict sufficient operational and strategic costs on the Chinese to force them to accept peace terms.]

11. "Testimony of General Douglas MacArthur and of Secretary of Defense George Marshall," in Allen Guttman, ed., *Korea: Cold War and Limited War*. Lexington: D. C. Heath and Co., 1972. Pages 26-52. (Selected Readings)

[In this reading, we see the explanation General MacArthur offered for his actions in the conflict with Truman and the administration's rationale for his relief.]

12. Gaddis, John Lewis. *The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. Pages 104-129. (Selected Readings)

[Gaddis, a former member of the Strategy Department and now a professor at Yale University, explores the development of American nuclear strategy and the deliberate non-use of these weapons from the end of World War II to the end of the Korean War. This reading will help students think about how U.S. policy and strategy may be constrained if the other side has a small WMD capability at its disposal.]

13. Crane, Conrad C., "To Avert Impending Disaster: American Plans to Use Atomic Weapons during the Korean War," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 23, no. 2 (June 2000), pages 72–88. (Selected Readings)

[Crane, a retired Army officer and director of the U.S. Army Military History Institute, examines the views of senior American leaders about the operational utility of nuclear weapons during the Korean War.]

14. "Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, March 27, 1953," in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, vol. XV, part 1: *Korea*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1984. Pages 817-8. (Selected Readings)

[This is a brief summary of an interagency meeting called during the war to discuss operational and strategic courses of action involving the use of nuclear weapons.]

15. Baer, George W. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993. Chapter 13.

[This chapter examines the role of the U.S. Navy in the Korean War, as well as the overall maritime strategic environment in which the conflict occurred.]

16. Melia, Tamara Moser. *"Damn the Torpedoes": A Short History of U.S. Naval Mine Countermeasures, 1777-1991*. Washington: Naval Historical Center, 1991. Pages 67-83. (Selected Readings)

[Melia offers a detailed institutional and technological examination of the U.S. Navy's mine warfare efforts in the post-World War II era and of the Navy's humiliating problems in dealing with antiquated Russian mines in Wonsan Harbor.]

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Betts, Richard K. *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance*. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1987.

Cumings, Bruce, ed. *Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1953*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983.

Fehrenbach, T. R. *This Kind of War*. New York: Macmillan, 1963.

Field, James A., Jr. *History of United States Naval Operations: Korea*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962.

Foot, Rosemary. *The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985.

_____. *A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990.

Gaddis, John L. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar National Security*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.

_____. *We Now Know: Rethinking the Cold War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Goncharov, Sergei N.; Lewis, John W. and Xue, Litai. *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994.

Hermes, Walter G. *The U.S. Army in the Korean War: Truce Tent and Fighting Front*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966.

Heuser, Beatrice. "NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat: A New Perspective on Western Threat Perception and Policy Making." *Review of International Studies* (January 1991): 17-40.

James, D. Clayton, with Anne Sharp Wells. *Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis in Korea 1950-1953*. New York: The Free Press, 1993.

Jervis, Robert. "The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (December, 1980): 563-592.

Kauppi, Mark V. "Intelligence Assessments of Soviet Motivations: JIS 80 and Kennan's Long Telegram." *Intelligence and National Security* (October 1994): 603-632.

Kirtland, Michael A. "Planning Air Operations: Lessons from Operation Strangle in the Korean War." *Airpower Journal* (Summer 1992): 37-46.

Kissinger, Henry. *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994.

Leckie, Robert H. *Conflict: The History of the Korean War 1950-1953*. New York: Putnam, 1962.

Leffler, Melvyn P. *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992.

May, Ernest R. *American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68*. Boston: St. Martins Press, 1993.

Neilson, Keith, and, Ronald G. Haycock, eds. *The Cold War and Defense*. New York: Praeger, 1990.

Nichols, Thomas M. *Winning the World: Lessons for America's Future from the Cold War*. Westport: Praeger, 2002.

Pillar, Paul R. *Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.

Rees, David. Korea: *The Limited War*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964.

Rosenberg, David Alan. "American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision." *Journal of American History* (June 1979): 62-87.

Ross, Steven T. *American War Plans, 1945-1950*. New York: Garland, 1988.

Schnabel, James F. *The U.S. Army in the Korean War: Policy and Direction: The First Year*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972.

Spanier, John W. *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959.

Zhang, Shu Guang. *Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992.

_____. *Mao's Military Romanticism—China and the Korean War 1950-1953*. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1995.

FIGHTING AND TERMINATING A MAJOR REGIONAL WAR – KOREA, 1950-1953

rollback A foreign policy calling for positive United States action to bring important areas of the world taken over by the Communists since World War II out from under Communist control, presumably by force if necessary.

sanctuary A place of refuge and safety. By observing a self-imposed restraint on using force across certain borders, the U.S. in the Korean and Vietnam wars permitted the enemy to build base camps, supply depots, etc. out of reach of American attack.

Truman Doctrine On 12 March 1947 President Truman received congressional authorization to extend 400 million dollars in aid to Greece and Turkey in order to prevent communist forces from taking control. U.S. should support free people under attack from minorities supported by outside powers. Later that spring, Truman proclaimed that the United States would extend aid as a matter of policy to help those countries devastated by war to rebuild their economies. The Soviet Union denounced this plan as a plot by the United States to extend its domination.

unipolarity An international system with one state, or empire, identified as predominant.

FIGHTING AND TERMINATING A MAJOR REGIONAL WAR – KOREA, 1950-1953

Yalta Conference - Allies agree on four zones of occupation for Germany.	Feb 1945
VE Day - Victory in Europe	May 8, 1945
Lend Lease Ends	May 1945
Potsdam Conference	Jul 1945
First atomic bomb is dropped on Hiroshima, killing 100,000	Aug 6, 1945
Soviet Union declares war on Japan.	Aug 8, 1945
Atomic bomb is dropped on Nagasaki, killing 70,000.	Aug 9, 1945
Japan surrenders on U.S.S. "Missouri in Tokyo Bay.	Sep 2, 1945
Kennan's "Long telegram."	Feb 1946
Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech in Fulton, MO.	Mar 1946
Soviets withdraw from Iran	May 1946
Midterm elections give Republicans majority in the House 246-188 and in the Senate 51-45	Nov 1946
George C. Marshall becomes Secretary of State	Jan 1947
British announce pullout from Greece	Feb 1947
U.S. Aid under Truman Doctrine to Greece & Turkey to resist Communism.	Mar 1947
The Marshall Plan for Europe. Kennan's "X" Article in Foreign Affairs.	May 1947
National Security Act establishes DOD, NSC, and CIA.	Jul 1947
Rio Pact signed--regional security pact for Western Hemisphere	Sep 1947
Czechoslovakian and Hungarian governments taken over by Communists.	Feb 1948
Yugoslavia breaks with USSR.	Jun 1948
Social Democratic Party (CIA sponsored) "wins" Italian election, Allies denied land access to West Berlin across Soviet East Germany.	Apr 1948
West begins Berlin Airlift.	Jun 1948
West Germany established.	Sep 1948
Truman defeats Dewey 49.5%-45.1%	Nov 1948
Dean Acheson becomes Secretary of State	Jan 1949
NATO founded.	Apr 1949
Berlin blockade lifted.	May 1949
U.S. begins to withdraw troops from South Korea	Jun 1949
U.S.S.R. tests atom bomb.	Jul 1949
Chinese Communists establish People's Republic of China.	Oct 1949
Chiang Kai-shek evacuates to Formosa.	Dec 1949
Acheson's "perimeter" speech, Japan, Okinawa, Philippines, Aleutians inside the perimeter to be defended Formosa and South Korea outside	Jan 12, 1950
Joseph McCarthy speech announcing 57 communists in State Dept. (later 205, then 81)	Feb 9, 1950
Sino-Soviet Treaty signed	Feb 14, 1949
Truman approves NSC-68	Apr 12, 1950
North Korea invades South Korea.	Jun 24, 1950
"July Debate"—MacArthur, John Allison call for unification of Korea – Bradley, JCS, George Kennan call for restoring boundary at 38th parallel	Jul 1950
Inchon landing	Sep 15, 1950
UN forces cross 38th parallel, 12 hours before UN passes resolution for "unified, independent, democratic Korea"	Oct 8, 1950
MacArthur and Truman meet on Wake Island	Oct 15, 1950
1st CCF attack on UN forces	Oct 25, 1950
1st Soviet MIG 15 jets appear over Korea	Nov 1, 1950
UN forces start final offensive toward Yalu	Nov 24, 1950
CCF begin massive attacks on UN forces.	Nov 25, 1950
Greece and Turkey join NATO. U.S. explodes first thermonuclear bomb. British test atom bomb.	Nov 1950
Gen Walton Walker is killed in vehicle accident--Matthew Ridgway replaces him in command of the U.S. 8th Army	Dec 23, 1950
CCF halted at 38th parallel, MacArthur calls for all out war with China	Dec 25, 1950
CCF push UN forces back to the Han River	Jan 1951
Truman fires MacArthur, Ridgway replaces him as commander of UN forces	Apr 11, 1951
James Van Fleet assumes command of 8th Army	Apr 15, 1951

Ridgway's "Killer" offensive pushes CCF back to 38th parallel	Apr 21, 1951
Peace talks begin. Shift to Panmunjon in Nov 1951	Jul 10, 1951
Peace Treaty signed with Japan	Sep 8, 1951
Mark Clark replaces Ridgway in command of UN forces	May 1952
Eisenhower defeats Adlai Stevenson 55%-44%	Nov 1952
Van Fleet retires and charges he had been denied total victory in Korea by inadequate ammunition supply and by political decisions in Washington, D.C.	Feb 1953
Stalin dies.	Mar 5, 1953
Korean armistice signed	Jun 26, 1953
First Soviet thermonuclear bomb.	Aug 1953
Dien Bien Phu falls	May 7, 1954
Soviet troops withdraw from Austria. West Germany joins NATO. Warsaw Pact formed. First Quemoy-Matsu crisis.	May 1955
Khrushchev denounces Stalin and presents idea of peaceful coexistence with West.	Feb 1955
Soviet forces put down Hungarian Revolution.	Nov 1955
Suez crisis--Soviet Union threatens use of nuclear missiles against Britain and France.	Oct 1956
Sputnik proves Soviet capability for long ranged nuclear warheads.	Oct 1957
First U.S. satellite. Second Quemoy-Matsu crisis.	Feb 1958
Khrushchev visits U.S.	Sep 1958
Khrushchev and Eisenhower meet at Camp David.	Nov 1958
Sino-Soviet split made public	Apr 16, 1960
U-2 incident causes Khrushchev to abandon Paris Summit conference, ending brief relaxation of Cold War.	May 1960
Soviet embassy ordered from Congo.	Sep 1960
Bay of Pigs Invasion.	Apr 1961
Berlin Wall erected.	Aug 1961
Kennedy forces withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba.	Oct 1962

VII. TERRORISM: POLICY, STRATEGY, AND OPERATIONS

A. General: The attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon of September 11, 2001 have made it more important than ever to comprehend the military significance and political implications of terrorism. Foreshadowing America's current war on terror, which will receive attention later in the course, this module examines the phenomenon of terrorism in the twentieth century from the standpoint of terrorists themselves, and looks specifically at the relationship among terrorist policies, strategies, and operations. In addition, it emphasizes three other significant topics. First, it examines the ways in which culture and religion shape the environment within which terrorist campaigns take place. Second, it emphasizes how ineffectual and even counter-productive a largely military response to terrorism can be, by demonstrating that successful counter-terrorists strategies and operations must usually incorporate the other elements of national power, as well as armed force. And last, it highlights the importance of what today are called "information operations" to an understanding of the outcomes of terrorist and counter-terrorist campaigns alike.

In the twentieth century terrorism has been employed with many different political purposes in view. Some terrorists have aimed at forcing governments to renounce specific policies they found objectionable. Others have desired to topple governments and build alternative structures of political power. Still others have tried to put an end to colonialism or to expel foreign occupiers. Terrorism has sometimes been used as the sole strategy, and sometimes in conjunction with (or in subordination to) other means of struggle such as industrial strikes, rural arson, guerrilla warfare and even conventional military operations. Terrorist methods have included sabotage, hostage-taking, carefully targeted assassinations of officials and the wholesale murder of civilians. More often than not, terrorism has been instrumental, undertaken in the pursuit of discrete political objectives. In short, terrorism has been, in Martha Crenshaw's phrase, a "strategic choice."

The first group of assigned readings this week discusses the problem of defining terrorism. It also examines the historical evolution of terrorist strategies and terrorist theories of victory. The second group of readings deals with four cases of terrorism in practice: the Socialist-Revolutionary Party's campaign of terror in Imperial Russia (1902-1907); the IVA/IRA war to end British rule in Ireland (1916-1921); the FLN's struggle to drive the French from Algeria (1954-1962); and the Shining Path's battle to seize power in Peru (1980-1992). All four of these terrorist movements inflicted considerable damage on their chosen targets. Two of them—the IRA and the FLN—were successful, or at least partially successful, politically. The third group of readings focuses on important operations conducted by these latter two movements: the IRA's attempt, beginning in 1920, to use "flying columns" to defeat Great Britain's counter-terrorist effort; and the FLN's 1956-57 urban campaign against European civilians, which resulted in the "Battle of Algiers."

Founded in 1902, the Socialist-Revolutionary (or SR) Party dedicated itself to violent overthrow of the tsarist autocracy. Although influenced by Marxism, the SRs

sought to make a revolution in the name of and in the interest of the peasants who constituted the overwhelming majority of the Russian Empire's subjects. The SRs believed that the best means of igniting a revolutionary conflagration in Russia would be through a campaign of political murder directed against the highest officials in the government. These terrorist acts were supposed simultaneously to petrify the imperial bureaucracy, undermine the authority of the government, and touch off a general insurrection by the rural masses. In the first two and a half years of its existence, the SRs' "Combat Organization" was able to carry out a series of sensational assassinations that numbered among their victims two ministers of the interior, a governor-general, a minister of education and one of the tsar's uncles. There can be little doubt that SR terrorism helped create the environment that made the Russian revolution of 1905-07 possible. Although that revolution did transform Russia from an autocracy into a quasi-constitutional state, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party was in the end unable to destroy the tsarist system. It was crippled by both internal dissention and severe government repression. Then, too, the tsarist police managed to insinuate its spies and agents into the party's inner circles: Evno Azef, a prominent member of the party's "Combat Organization," and at one point in 1907 its head, was secretly a police employee. But the party was also defeated in part by the contradictions between the logic of mass politics and the logic of conspiracy. By 1905 the party had built up a network of local organizations scattered throughout Russia. During the revolution hundreds of provincial SRs (or people who identified themselves as SRs) undertook political murders, robberies and acts of arson on their own, often without the permission or knowledge of the party's central committee. It did not help matters much that the party's maximalist faction preached the doctrine of "economic terror," and called for indiscriminate attacks on the lives and property of factory owners and landlords. There were thousands of incidents of "revolutionary" violence in the years 1905-07, by no means all of them perpetrated by SRs. It has been estimated that these resulted in at least nine thousand casualties, of whom one half were private citizens. The scale of the bloodbath alienated moderate public opinion in Russia and assisted in discrediting terrorism as an instrument of political struggle.

By contrast, the Irish Republicans enjoyed much greater political success with the strategy of terrorism and guerrilla war they employed against the British. Michael Collins, who became the de facto leader of the paramilitary Irish Volunteers in the spring of 1918, devised much of that strategy. Unlike those of his colleagues in Sinn Féin who thought that they could negotiate a British withdrawal from Ireland, Collins was firmly convinced that only violence could secure Ireland's complete independence. Collins organized his Volunteers, who soon became known as the Irish Republican Army, into terrorist cells, and led them in a campaign of intimidation and, ultimately, murder directed against Irish "collaborators," the Irish police (RIC) and British officials. British efforts to track down and crush the IRA were frustrated by Collins' superb intelligence department, which frequently supplied him with exact advance information about British intentions and plans. The non-cooperation of a substantial proportion of the Irish public also stymied British counter-terrorism. Britain therefore decided to escalate the repression. In 1920 London recruited and dispatched to Ireland special paramilitary formations, of which the most notorious was the Black and Tans. Charged to "make

Ireland hell for the rebels," these units carried out a policy of "reprisals" that degenerated into looting, torture, and homicide. The various forces of the British Crown gunned down over two hundred unarmed civilians in 1920. Such atrocities validated IRA terrorism in the eyes of the Irish population and intensified support for the Republican cause, particularly in the south of the country.

London's increasing reliance on brute force in its struggle with the Irish rebels drove them to operational innovation. The intensification of police and military raids throughout the country compelled an increasing number of the most active IRA Volunteers to go on the run to avoid arrest. Small groups of fugitives began to congregate, thus giving birth to Active Service Units or Flying Columns. These typically consisted of fifteen to thirty-five combatants who specialized in waylaying vulnerable police, troop and supply convoys. Although the first Flying Columns arose spontaneously in the spring of 1920, by the late summer IRA GHQ in Dublin was ordering its Brigades in every quarter of Ireland to form them. Flying Columns enjoyed some spectacular successes in staging such ambushes as those at Rineen (September 1920), Kilmichael (November 1920), Headford Railway Junction (March 1921) and Modreeny (June 1921). Because the Flying Columns were large enough to inflict serious casualties, yet simultaneously too small to be readily detected, because they were capable of living off the country, and because they exploited a key vulnerability of the Crown Forces—their dependence on roads and vehicular transport—there were some Irish Republicans who came to believe that the columns represented the key to victory in the war. Others, who were less certain, pointed out that the Columns were chronically short of arms and ammunition, that the majority of ambush parties never even made contract with the enemy, and that the British had begun to adapt their own tactics and operational procedures in response.

In the opinion of Charles Townshend, while Britain did have the raw military power to suppress the rebellion in Ireland, the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, hesitated to apply it. One reason for this was his concern for Britain's international standing, particularly in the United States where millions of Irish-Americans openly sympathized with the Irish independence movement. Another was his appreciation of what the cost would likely be, for he was informed that the total pacification of Ireland would require the deployment of at least an additional hundred thousand troops and the expenditure of an extra hundred million pounds a year. In the summer of 1921 Lloyd George agreed to a truce and opened negotiations with Eamon de Valera, who as the Prime Minister of Ireland's shadow Dáil government was the political head of Sinn Féin. The ensuing talks resulted in the December 1921 treaty that created the Irish Free State. The Irish nationalists received some but not all of what they had wanted, for six counties in the north remained under British rule. The more extreme Irish republicans rejected the treaty outright and started a civil war.

Strategies that incorporated terrorism also achieved some success in the Algerian case. France had conquered Algeria in the 1830s and had proclaimed it to be an integral part of France in 1847. Yet the Muslim inhabitants of Algeria, who numbered eight and a half million by 1954, were treated as subjects rather than citizens by the French state.

Political and economic power in Algeria was concentrated in the hands of the European settlers (pieds noirs), a community of approximately one million people. In 1951 a small group of Algerian nationalists, including several French army veterans, established an organization to fight for Algeria's independence. The Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front or FLN) launched its anti-colonial offensive in November 1954. The FLN's initial acts of sabotage and terrorism did not, however, produce the elemental mass popular uprising on which it had been banking. Realizing that a rapid victory was beyond its grasp, and inspired by the example of the Viet Minh in Indo-China, the FLN then attempted to implement a strategy that borrowed many elements from Mao's teachings about people's war. But that strategy also deviated from Mao's in important respects, since it placed emphasis on urban guerrilla warfare and the premeditated murder of civilians, French and Algerian alike.

Perhaps the most dramatic event in the entire war was the Battle of Algiers. In September 1956 the FLN leadership decided to inaugurate a campaign of massive urban terrorism. Saadi Yacef, the head of the FLN operations in Algiers, took the leading role in planning and directing that campaign. Disposing of scores of safe houses in the Casbah, a clandestine explosives laboratory, and a network of 1,400 agents, Yacef ordered the first bombings targeted against European civilians that same month. The two virtually simultaneous explosions that blew apart two cafes on September 30 killed three people and mutilated over fifty more. In January 1957 the French civil authorities turned all responsibility for the restoration of order in Algiers over to General Jacques Massu, commander of the 10th Parachute Division. Yacef meanwhile continued his bombings, striking at bars, restaurants, sports stadiums, bus stops and nightclubs. It has been estimated that the FLN was responsible for an average of 800 shootings or bomb attacks per month between the early winter and spring of 1957. Determined to inflict an annihilating defeat on the FLN, Massu's paratroop regiments sealed off the Casbah, conducted hundreds of house-to-house searches, and made extensive use of torture to extract information about the capabilities and intentions of the enemy. With the capture of Yacef in September and the killing of his chief lieutenant, Ali la Pointe, in October, the battle of Algiers effectively came to an end. It had been a striking French victory at the tactical and operational level, and had utterly smashed the FLN's urban infrastructure.

France eventually succeeded in isolating the rural battlefield as well by erecting extensive fortified barriers that cut the Algerian insurgents off from their bases and sanctuaries in Morocco and Tunisia. After 1959 FLN fighters, as one historian writes, "did not appear in the countryside in units larger than company size." Martial law, draconian repression, forcible population transfers and the commitment of about half of the French regular army to the Algerian counter-insurgency had resulted in the unambiguous military defeat of the FLN. Yet military defeat did not preclude political victory for the FLN. De Gaulle, who owed his political comeback in 1958 to the Algerian crisis, had arrived at the conclusion that it was in France's best interest to grant Algeria her independence. De Gaulle won a national referendum on the question of Algerian self-determination, and negotiated France's withdrawal from Algeria in 1962, despite an abortive military coup against him and numerous attempts on his life by right-wing French terrorists.

Our final case of terrorism in practice is that of Peru's Sendero Luminoso or Shining Path guerrilla movement. Sendero was the creation of a group of fanatic Peruvian intellectuals who embraced an extreme form of Maoist ideology. Several of its members, including its leader, former philosophy professor Abimael Guzmán Reynoso, had studied or trained in China during the era of the Cultural Revolution. It was their objective to overthrow the Peruvian government, seize power and use that power to unleash a cultural revolution of their own that would not only banish capitalism, but even mechanized agriculture from Peru. Sendero's plan was to implement a classical Maoist three-phase strategy of guerrilla war, lavishly supplemented by terror. Terrorist activities were designed to publicize the revolutionary movement, demoralize the government, and wreck the Peruvian economy all at the same time. In addition to bombing power lines, rural medical clinics, government offices and bridges, Sendero guerrillas engaged in wholesale murder. From 1980, when the first armed bands became active in the mountains of Ayacucho, until 1992, when the Peruvian authorities apprehended Guzmán, Sendero Luminoso was responsible for killing more than twenty seven thousand people. Among the dead were government functionaries, foreign tourists, businessmen and aid workers, and Indian peasants who either resisted the revolution or evinced insufficient enthusiasm for it. Although Sendero initially established a limited social base among the rural poor, over the long term its vicious tactics, economic warfare and doctrinaire ideology alienated the majority of Peru's peasants. As Marks' account makes clear, the case of the Shining Path raises important questions about the capacity and limits of terrorist strategies to win popular support.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. In light of the conflicts we have examined this week, under what circumstances do strategies and operations that incorporate terrorism have the greatest chances of success?

2. In light of the conflicts we have examined this week, under what circumstances are strategies and operations that utilize terrorism most prone to failure?

3. How can a terrorist movement best induce and exploit a government's political or military reaction against it?

4. Given its strategy, operational style and material resources, what were the chances that the IRA could have continued to wage effective war until Irish independence was achieved if the truce had not occurred in July 1921 or if negotiations failed and hostilities had resumed between July and December 1921?

5. What "lessons," if any, does the history of the rise and fall of the PSR contain for the United States military in the current Global War on Terrorism?

6. What role, if any, did religion play in the outcomes of the conflicts in Ireland and Algeria?

7. "The victory of both the IRA and the FLN was more due to their superiority in 'information operations' than to any other factor." Do you agree or disagree?

8. The insurgents in Ireland and Algeria made numerous political, strategic and operational mistakes. Could either Great Britain or France have better turned them to advantage? If so, how?

9. What roles did ethnicity and social organization in rural Peru play in both Sendero Luminoso's original successes and eventual failure?

10. To what extent did the FLN's operations during the "Battle of Algiers" support its strategy? To what extent not?

11. How can terrorists best shape their campaigns to generate formal or informal support from abroad?

12. What are the strengths and weaknesses of terrorism as an instrument of mass political mobilization?

13. How useful is Clausewitzian "triangular" analysis for understanding the outcomes of the terrorist campaigns we have studied this week?

14. How useful is the *Sun Tzu's* theory of war for understanding the outcomes of the terrorist campaigns we have studied this week?

15. What strategies and operational practices are most effective in defeating terrorists?

16. What moral and ethical dilemmas do states confront in crafting strategies and undertaking operations against non-state terrorist organizations?

17. What factors inhibited conventional military forces from adapting to the problems posed by fighting an adversary that employs irregular warfare?

18. In *On War* (p. 91), Clausewitz wrote: "Many treaties have been concluded before one of the antagonists could be called powerless—even before the balance of power had been seriously altered." Instead, "improbability of victory" and "unacceptable cost" might lead one side in a conflict to make peace. How useful is this insight about war termination for understanding the outcome of the conflicts between state and non-state actors examined in this module of the course?

19. Why do states, with all the resources and capabilities at their disposal, nonetheless find it so difficult to gain a decisive superiority in the information domain against non-state adversaries?

20. In carrying out operations against terrorist organizations, why do states find it so difficult to strike with decisive strategic effect at the vulnerabilities of non-state armed groups and political movements?

C. Required Readings:

1. Crenshaw, Martha. "The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice," in Walter Reich, ed., *The Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998. Pages 7-24. (Selected Readings)

[Crenshaw offers a spirited defense of the proposition that terrorism can often be understood as politically and militarily rational.]

2. Thornton, Thomas Perry. "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation," in Harry Eckstein, ed., *Internal War*. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964. Pages. 71-99. (Selected Readings)

[Thornton is interested in the political objectives that terrorists pursue. Although he is writing about the use of terrorism in insurgencies, his insights may be applicable to other sorts of terrorist movements as well.]

3. Geifman, Anna. "The Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries and Terror," in Anna Geifman, ed., *Thou Shalt Kill. Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894-1917*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. Pages 45-83. (Selected Readings)

[The chapter from Geifman's book deals with the use of terror by the Russian Socialists-Revolutionaries in the early twentieth century. She shows how terror escaped from the control of the party leadership and took on a life of its own.]

4. Kee, Robert. *The Green Flag: The Turbulent History of the Irish National Movement*. New York: Delacorte Press, 1972. Pages 548-603; 628-731.

[Kee's highly readable narrative history of the Anglo-Irish War lays special stress on the political and tactical disagreements among the Irish nationalists themselves.]

5. Hopkinson, Michael. "The Irish Intelligence System and the Development of Guerrilla Warfare Up To the Truce," in *The Irish War of Independence*. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 2002. Pages 69-78. (Selected Readings)

[In addition to providing a succinct description of the IRA's use of tactical and operational intelligence, Hopkinson discusses the emergence of IRA Flying Columns in the spring and summer of 1920. Hopkinson is much less convinced than Kee (see reading 4 above) that the Flying Column represented an operational innovation to which the British were incapable of adapting.]

6. Townshend, Charles. "The Irish Republican Army and the Development of Guerrilla Warfare," *The English Historical Review*, vol. 94, no. 371 (April 1979), pages 318-345. (Selected Readings)

[This article offers an insightful assessment of the strategy and organization of the IRA during the Anglo-Irish War. Townshend highlights the weaknesses of the IRA as a fighting force and evaluates the strategic and political assumptions of its members. In addition, this article compares the actions of the IRA to other insurgencies that occurred during the twentieth century.]

7. "Irish Declaration of Independence," January 21, 1919; "Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland," December 6, 1921. (Selected Readings)

[These two important documents mark the beginning and the end of the Anglo-Irish War. The first document presents the grievances and aspirations of the Irish nationalists opposed to British rule in Ireland. Meanwhile, the "Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland" gives the terms of the settlement hammered out in intense negotiations between both sides' leaders. This compromise agreement pleased neither ardent Irish nationalists nor British imperialists.]

8. Clayton, Anthony. *The Wars of French Decolonization*. London and New York: Longman, 1994. Pages 108-187. (NWC Reprint)

[Clayton gives a concise account of the Algerian War of Independence.]

9. Crenshaw, Martha. "The Effectiveness of Terrorism in the Algerian War," in Martha Crenshaw, ed., *Terrorism in Context*. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995. Pages 473-513. (Selected Readings)

[Crenshaw examines the terrorism perpetrated by the FLN, the MNA, the pieds noirs, and the OAS during the Algerian war. While arguing that the Algerian experience shows that terrorism "is more likely to be effective than successful", she nonetheless suggests that terrorism may have made an enormous contribution to the French decision to abandon Algeria. She also describes the way in which the FLN exploited terror to marginalize, silence, or eliminate its political rivals within the Arab population.]

10. Horne, Alastair. *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962*. New York: The Viking Press, 1977. Pages 183-250. (Selected Readings)

[In this widely read and important study of the war in Algeria, Horne provides a thorough account of the Battle of Algiers, as well as its consequences for French domestic opinion and international public opinion.]

11. Marks, Thomas A. "Making Revolution: *Sendero Luminoso* in Peru as Maoist Conclusion," in Thomas A. Marks, ed. *Maoist Insurgency since Vietnam*. London: Frank Cass, 1996. Pages 253-284. (Selected Readings)

[Marks shows how the Sendero Luminoso grew from a small cabal of radical intellectuals into a force cable of paralyzing the government and economy of Peru. He also explains how and why the Sendero Luminoso ultimately failed.]

12. Bolivar, Alberto. "Peru," in Yonah Alexander, ed. *Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2002. Pages 84-115. (Selected Readings)

[Bolivar gives an insightful overview of Peru's successful counter-terrorism strategy against Sendero Luminoso.]

13. Nelson Manrique, "The War for the Central Sierra," in Steve J. Stern, ed. *Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995*. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1998. Pages 193-223. (Selected Readings)

[This article analyzes the interaction of Sendero Luminoso and Peru's rural population.]

14. Galula, David. *Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. New York: Praeger, 1964. Chapters 4-5, 7.

[David Galula was a French military officer and veteran of the Algerian War; his 1964 study *Counter-Insurgency Warfare* is increasingly regarded today as a classic of military theory. In these three chapters Galula discusses the characteristics of successful counter-insurgency operations and lays out an eight-phase plan to guide strategy and operations during a counter-insurgency campaign. Note particularly his emphasis on propaganda and information operations.]

VII. TERRORISM: POLICY, STRATEGY, AND OPERATIONS

General Works on Terrorism and the History of Terrorism

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VIII. BITTER DEFEAT: INSURGENCY, COUNTERINSURGENCY, AND INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS IN A FAILING STATE— THE VIETNAM WAR

A. General: Military doctrine must often be adapted to achieve success in war, especially when a nation faces a kind of war it has not planned to fight. Since every war is inherently unpredictable, victory often goes to the side that adapts more successfully. Just as today American forces are adapting to the war on terror, American ground and air services in the 1960s had to change to fight a complex conflict in Southeast Asia. While American leaders made some important changes, they either came too late or failed to attack underlying political problems that plagued American attempts to achieve its objective in South Vietnam.

The United States intervention in Vietnam from 1965 through 1973 aimed at preserving an independent, non-Communist South Vietnam, by forcing or convincing North Vietnam to withdraw its forces from and end its support for the Viet Cong (VC) insurgency in South Vietnam, and defeating that insurgency through pacification campaigns. The United States military relied upon doctrine dating from the Second World War, within political constraints designed to keep the war limited and local imposed by the Johnson and Nixon Administrations. The war eventually involved the application of enormous firepower on the ground, from the air, and from the sea, but without achieving the desired result. American ground troops increased from about 20,000 in advisory and support roles in early 1965 to about 550,000 by late 1968, began to decrease in the summer of 1969, and were gradually withdrawn over the next few years. The employment of American air power against North Vietnam began slowly in March 1965, increased steadily for three years, was partially limited in April 1968, temporarily halted in November of that year, but resumed with a vengeance under President Nixon in 1972 with new targets and new technology.

Our case study focuses on three major air operations and a prolonged series of ground operations. In the air, Operation ROLLING THUNDER (1965-68) raised critical issues of the influence of the civilian leadership upon operations, command relationships in theater, the effectiveness of joint and service doctrine in an unfamiliar environment, and the limits of what air power could contribute to victory in this particular war. Throughout ROLLING THUNDER, President Johnson and his senior advisers wanted to make sure the campaign did not alienate domestic or international opinion or lead to expansion and escalation of the war. He and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, therefore, insisted upon limiting the targets that could be struck, a practice which some officers felt severely limited the campaign's effectiveness. Meanwhile, a lack of clear lines of authority among the various participants in ROLLING THUNDER made the campaign much more difficult to run. Perhaps most importantly of all, Mark Clodfelter argues in retrospect that North Vietnam did not include enough targets to make a World War II-type strategic bombing campaign effective. This week we must ask which of these factors contributed the most to the strategic failure of the air operations to translate battlefield effects into achievement of national political objectives.

Operations LINEBACKER I, from May through October 1972, and LINEBACKER II, which lasted about one week during December 1972, present a different range of issues. In April 1972, the North Vietnamese made a major conventional attack upon South Vietnam, and LINEBACKER I, executed with few, if any, political restraints, undoubtedly helped halt that attack, both because of improved technology (the first "smart" bombs) and the changed nature of the enemy threat. LINEBACKER II, an all-out air operation featuring hundreds of B-52 sorties over Hanoi and Haiphong, was designed to force changes in a peace agreement to which the two sides had agreed in October 1972. While the communists did sign the Paris Peace Accords, found in the readings, LINEBACKER II's contribution to the termination of this war remains controversial. In 1969, the Nixon administration considered an alternative strategic course of action that resembled the LINEBACKER air operations. This case study, using newly declassified documents, permits an in-depth examination of this alternative strategy. These documents raise the intriguing questions of whether the Nixon administration, by using this alternative strategy of air and mining operations, could have achieved an earlier agreement and, if so, would that settlement have proved more durable.

On the ground, the case begins with substantial readings from Andrew Krepinevich, who argues that the U.S. Army consistently preferred a conventional approach to the war, but includes very important material on the interagency dimension of the conflict, including the CORDS Pacification campaign and the Phoenix Program. The remainder of the reading focuses on the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, which United States ground forces undertook in 1969 following a year of very heavy conventional fighting that had created opportunities in the countryside for the Viet Cong. The campaign was a multinational and interagency effort, involving the Army and Marines, the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN), Navy SEALs, and CIA personnel who contributed to the attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure known as the Phoenix Program. Our reading looks very closely at pacification in two critical areas: Hau Nghia province on the Cambodian border, a VC stronghold, and the Mekong Delta, long a center of Viet Cong activity, in which the U.S. Army's 9th Division made a major effort in 1969 for the first time. As we shall see, Army doctrine and operations had to be modified substantially to contribute to the goals of this new campaign—the securing of the people and the countryside for the South Vietnamese government. Eric Bergerud describes how this occurred in Hau Nghia, and three officers of the 9th Division—Generals Julian Ewell and Ira Hunt and then-Lieutenant Colonel David Hackworth—give different perspectives about the division's operations. Both Bergerud and Krepinevich discuss the contribution of the Phoenix program and the role of intelligence in pacification. Robert Komer's study, written before the war was over, focuses on the bureaucratic obstacles to pacification and describes how they were briefly overcome.

Pacification made very impressive gains from 1969 through 1971, but both the attitudes of South Vietnamese observed at the time and the subsequent North Vietnamese offensive in 1972 and the loss of the war in 1975 raise perhaps the biggest strategic issue of the Vietnam War: exactly how much even the most effective American military operations could contribute to the defeat of the Communist enemy. Bergerud, in

particular, addresses underlying political problems that the Americans and South Vietnamese never managed to solve—making this case, even now, critical to an understanding of the proper role and potentially limited effectiveness of the military in attempts to reshape a foreign culture. The 1972 monograph by Robert Komer, who headed the overall pacification effort in South Vietnam for several years, discusses interagency problems that remain highly relevant today. Douglas Pike's extraordinary chapters on *dau tranh*, the theory of Vietnamese Communist strategy, help explain why a predominately military approach was almost certain to fail against this particular enemy.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. How did existing Army doctrine have to be modified in an attempt to improve pacification efforts in South Vietnam? Were the modifications sufficient to make such operations effective?

2. How and why did the senior civilian leadership attempt to control the ROLLING THUNDER, and did they contribute to the realization of their political objectives?

3. How did joint planning, command relationships, and overlapping command authority affect the use of air power during the Vietnam War?

4. What was most responsible for the failure of ROLLING THUNDER to have a decisive effect in the Vietnam War?

5. How did pacification in the Mekong Delta differ from pacification in Hau Nghia province, and which, in your opinion, was more strategically effective?

6. How effectively did the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong combine conventional and guerilla operations?

7. Were the most important security problems within South Vietnam susceptible to the application of US military power?

8. How and why do Lieutenant Colonel Hackworth's and Generals Hunt and Ewell's views of the operations waged by the 9th Division in 1969 differ, and what strategic and operational lessons do their differences suggest to you?

9. In light of the Paris Peace accords and the story of how they were reached in 1972-3, what effect did LINEBACKER I and LINEBACKER II have on the outcome of the war?

10. Assess the contributions of the interagency process to the effectiveness of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign.

11. What would an effective counter to the enemy's *dau tranh* strategy have required?

12. How well did American leaders assess the effectiveness of their military strategy and adapt it to interaction with the enemy?

13. Was the communist victory in Vietnam due more to the inherent weaknesses of the Saigon regime or strategic mistakes made by the United States?

14. Did the United States armed forces discover elements of a strategy that, if combined, might have secured American objectives at an acceptable cost?

15. To what extent did the doctrinal outlook of the American armed services about how to fight wars inhibit the strategic effectiveness of the United States during the Vietnam conflict?

16. The United States fought a successful limited regional war in Korea. Why, when faced with an ostensibly similar strategic situation, did the United States fail to achieve its objectives in Vietnam, despite a greater effort in both magnitude and duration?

17. Assess the likely strategic effects of the operational plans developed by the United States during 1969 to carry out an intense air and naval offensive against North Vietnam. (See Reading 9.)

C. Required Readings

1. Clodfelter, Mark. *The Limits of Air Power*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006. Pages 73-210.

[Clodfelter, a former U.S. Air Force officer, discusses doctrine, broader civilian concerns, operational problems and strategic effects of Rolling Thunder, Linebacker I, and Linebacker II.]

2. Krepinevich, Andrew F. *The Army and Vietnam*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. Pages 131-275.

[In this widely read study, Krepinevich, a former U.S. Army officer and now a prominent strategic analyst, shows how the Army began by attempting to apply conventional doctrine in Vietnam.]

3. Bergerud, Eric. *The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province*. Boulder: The Westview Press, 1991. Pages 223-321.

[Focusing on one key province, Bergerud discusses U.S. and communist strategies during the period of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign and their overall effects.]

4. Ewell, Lieutenant General Julian J., and Major General Ira A. Hunt. *Sharpening the Combat Edge. The Use of Analysis to Reinforce Military Judgment.* Washington: Department of the Army, 1974. Pages 3-13, 150-183. (Selected Readings) (http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/Vietnam/Sharpen/index.htm)

[In this monograph, the commander of the 9th Division and his deputy discuss their approach to pacification in the Mekong Delta.]

5. Hackworth, Lieutenant Colonel David A., with Julie Sherman. *About Face: The Odyssey of an American Warrior*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989. Pages 646-706. (Selected Readings)

[Hackworth, a highly decorated but controversial officer who later became a well-known commentator on military affairs, discusses the 9th Division's work from his perspective as a battalion commander and offers his views on leadership during an unpopular war.]

6. Komer, Robert. *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam*. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1972. Pages 1-11, 37-44, 64-9, 106-117, and 151-62. Available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2005/R967.pdf. (Selected Readings)

[Komer, who headed the CORDS program in Vietnam, examines the bureaucratic obstacles that inhibited effective interagency participation.]

7. Pike, Douglas. *PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam*. Novato: Presidio Press, 1986. Pages 213-52. (Selected Readings)

[This critical chapter focuses on *dau tranh*, or struggle, the essence of Viet Cong political and military strategy, and argues that no effective counterstrategy to it was yet known to exist.]

8. Baer, George W. One *Hundred Years of Sea Power*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 384-93.

[Baer, a distinguished professor at the Naval War College, discusses the Navy's role during the war, including its riverine campaign.]

9. Vietnam Contingency Planning, October 1969, National Security Council Files, Box 89, Folder 2, and Box 122, Folder 6, Nixon Presidential Materials, National Archives. Declassified documents found at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB195/index.htm. (Selected Readings)

[In recently declassified documents, American plans developed during 1969 to attack critical infrastructure, logistical networks, and air defense capabilities in North Vietnam, as well as to mine North Vietnamese waters to reduce the flow of supplies, provided an alternative strategic course of action from what the United States actually followed during the Vietnam War. This intense air and naval offensive, planners estimated, might even produce a psychological shock effect that would set the stage for war termination negotiations. While the Nixon administration decided against carrying out this offensive during 1969-70, the United States did eventually undertake some of the operations envisioned in these plans in response to the major North Vietnamese offensives during 1972. American air power and mining operations proved critical in assisting the armed forces of South Vietnam to defeat these communist offensives and in paving the way for the signing of the Paris Peace Accords. The availability of these documents about American planning efforts permit a critical analysis of the alternative courses of action open to the United States and the strategic dilemmas facing the incoming Nixon administration during 1969.]

10. Final Paris Peace Accord, 1973. (Selected Readings)

VIII. BITTER DEFEAT: INSURGENCY, COUNTERINSURGENCY, AND INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS IN A FAILING STATE—THE VIETNAM WAR

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LIMITED WAR IN A REVOLUTIONARY SETTING: VIETNAM

counterinsurgency A type of warfare which seeks to neutralize insurgencies by employing some of the same tactics in reverse. In particular, counterinsurgency seeks to separate the guerrilla from the local population through both political and military means. Counterinsurgency doctrine recognizes that political, economic, and social reforms are the foundation of an effective military strategy.

crossover point The condition where casualties inflicted on the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese regulars exceeded their ability to provide replacement for losses. Reaching and exceeding the crossover point became a central focus of U.S. military strategy under General William C. Westmoreland.

domino theory An analogy to the way a row of dominoes falls sequentially until none remain standing. At a press conference on 7 April 1954, President Eisenhower used the analogy to describe the situation in Southeast Asia. Eisenhower feared that China and North Korea could be just the beginning; more dominoes, such as Indochina, Burma, Thailand, Malaya and Indonesia were at risk to fall to communism if preventive measures were not taken.

foco theory A concept developed by the Cuban revolutionary leaders Castro and Guevara. The basis of the idea is that it is not necessary to wait until the objective conditions are right before commencing an insurgency. Foco theory argues that a small group of armed insurgents can act as the focal point for discontents and thereby create the conditions for opposition. Guevara's subsequent campaign in Bolivia failed to substantiate the theory and its successful application remains unique to the Cuban revolution.

general strike A refusal to work by all the workers in an area or nation, intended to display unity, and sometimes used to oppose or destroy state power.

Great Society A policy statement issued by President Johnson on 22 May 1964 to the effect that he would use all the wealth and all the human and material resources of the nation for the purpose of improving the living standard of every American.

insurgency An armed insurrection or rebellion against the established system of government in a state.

Nixon Doctrine President Nixon stated in July 1969 that the U.S. would continue to maintain all existing treaty commitments, provide a nuclear shield for allies whose survival were important to U.S. interests, but in non-nuclear situations, the U.S. would “look to the nations directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.” The U.S. would provide economic and hardware assistance, air and sea support, but refrain for committing U.S. ground troops to action.

revolutionary war A war unleashed by a revolutionary group to overthrow the existing social or political order. Revolutionaries often begin their struggle by using unconventional methods of warfare.

surtax An additional or extra tax on something already taxed. In the summer of 1967, President Johnson asked for a 10% surtax to meet the fiscal demands of Great Society programs and the cost of the war in Vietnam.

Viet-Minh Shorthand for "the league of independence," a group founded by Ho Chi Minh in 1941 for the purpose of combating the Japanese invaders, and later, the French forces in Indochina.

wars of national liberation The anti-Western, anti-colonial and anti-imperial elements of this doctrine were first elaborated by Khrushchev in 1961 and contributed to the perception of U.S. policy makers that Moscow played an important role in encouraging and supporting Communist insurgencies in the Third World.

Vietnam War Chronology

Vietnamese in Paris (including Ho Chi Minh) unsuccessfully attempt to present a homeland independence document to Versailles Peace Conference	1919
Ho founds Marxist Revolutionary Youth League of Vietnam, VNQDD (Vietnamese Nationalist Party) forms in opposition	1925
Ho Chi Minh founds Communist Party of Vietnam in Hong Kong, French crush VNQDD during a revolt near Hanoi	1930
Bao Dai returns from France to reign as emperor of Vietnam under the French.	1932
Vichy French troops defeated by invading Japanese forces--allow Japanese troops to occupy Indochina	Sep 1940
Ho Chi Minh founds Viet Minh, a united front to resist Japanese and French	May 1941
Ho travels to China seeking aid—is imprisoned for 13 months	1942
Japanese install Bao Dai as head of 'independent" Vietnam	Mar 1945
OSS Team parachutes into Northern Vietnam to save ill Ho Chi Minh	1945
Japan surrenders, Bao Dai abdicates after a general uprising led by the Viet Minh.	Aug 1945
Ho Chi Minh establishes Democratic Republic of Vietnam	Sep 2, 1945
200,000 Chinese Nationalists occupy North, British land in Saigon--British, French and Japanese troops resist Viet Minh	Sep 12, 1945
Ho Chi Minh's attempt to negotiate end to French rule fails, French shell Haiphong	Nov 1946
Chinese withdraw, French land troops in North Vietnam	Mar 1946
Viet Minh conduct first major attack against French	Dec 1946
Communist China begins support of Viet Minh	Jan 1950
U.S. recognizes Bao Dai government	Feb 1950
U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group arrives--U.S. assumes half of cost of French war in Indochina	Aug 1950
JCS/NSC propose massive U.S. airstrikes, mining Haiphong and a parachute assault at Dien Bien Phu	Mar 20, 1954
After learning of British Prime Minister Churchill's opposition, President Eisenhower denies the U.S. planned air strikes	Apr 29, 1954
French defeated at Dien Bien Phu--U.S. now pays 80% of cost of the conflict	May 1954
Bao Dai names Ngo Dinh Diem as prime minister (sister-in-law is Madame Nhu)	Jun 1954
Geneva Conference partitions Vietnam declares 17th parallel a DMZ allows free travel between north & south for 300 days—900,000 flee NVN for the south	Jul 1954
Manila Treaty establishes SEATO	Sep 1954
Viet Minh establish control of Hanoi and NVN	Oct 1954
U.S. backed Diem government establish Republic of Vietnam with Diem as president	1955
NLF founded	1960
President Kennedy signs executive order authorizing draft deferments for fathers and married men	1963
Buddhist opposition intensifies, first Buddhist monk self-immolates himself in Saigon, six more monks and nuns follow—Madame Nhu refers to the incidents as barbecues and offers to supply the matches	Jun 16, 1963
Diem & his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu assassinated-- Madame Nhu remains in U.S.	Nov 1, 1963
President Kennedy is assassinated	Nov 22, 1963
William Westmoreland assumes command of MACV	Jun 20, 1964
Maxwell Taylor becomes U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam	Jul 7, 1964
Tonkin Gulf Incident—USS Maddox attacked by NVN torpedo boats	Aug 2-4, 1964
Congress passes Tonkin Gulf Resolution allows president to take necessary measures to repel further attacks and to provide military assistance to any SEATO member. President Johnson orders bombing of NVN	Aug 7, 1964
President Johnson issues executive order ending draft exemptions for men married after August 26, 1965	Aug 1965
Rolling Thunder begins	Mar 2, 1965
First U.S ground troops (Marines) arrive in SVN	Mar 8, 1965
Generals Ky & Thieu overthrow government of SVN	Jun 1965
Cultural Revolution begins	Oct 1966
Military Selective Service Act of 1967 limits graduate school deferments	Jun 1967
Thieu wins presidential election	Sep 1967
First mass anti-war demonstration in Washington (50,000)	Oct 1967
Battle of Khe Sanh begins	Jan 21, 1968
USS Pueblo is seized by North Korea	Jan 23, 1968
Johnson mobilizes 14,801 reservists in 28 units (Navy Reserve & Air National Guard/Reserve)--4 units deploy to Vietnam	Jan 25, 1968
Tet Offensive begins	Jan 31, 1968
DOD presents Johnson an "A to Z" reassessment of U.S. strategy in Vietnam asking for a call up of 260,000 reservists	Mar 4, 1968
My Lai massacre	Mar 16, 1968
Johnson announces he will not seek reelection—halts bombing of NVN north of 20th parallel--approves 24K reserve call-up	Mar 31, 1968
22,786 U.S. reservists are mobilized--about half deploy to Vietnam in units or as individuals	May 13, 1968

Vietnam War Chronology (cont.)

Creighton Abrams assumes command of MACV	Jun 10, 1968
Rolling Thunder(bombing of NVN) ends	Oct 31, 1968
Battle of Hamburger Hill	May 1969
Paris Peace Talks begin	May 20, 1969
Nixon announces first troop withdrawals	Jul 8, 1969
Ho Chi Minh dies	Sep 3, 1969
Draft law amended to phase out student deferments and initiate a lottery	Nov 26, 1969
250,000 attend anti-war demonstrations in Washington	Nov 1969
First draft lottery	Dec 1969
U.S. & SVN troops invade Cambodia	Apr 30 ,1970
Kent State protests ("Four Dead in Ohio")	May 4, 1970
SVN troops invade Laos	Feb 1971
Largest civil protest in U.S. history in Washington with 750,000 marching	Apr 24, 1971
Linebacker I	May 10-Oct 23 1972
Nixon announces that no more draftees will be sent to Vietnam	Jun 28, 1972
Linebacker II	Dec 19-30 1972
Draft ends	Jan 27, 1973
U.S., SVN, & NVN sign Paris Peace Accords	Jan 27, 1973
591 U.S. POWs repatriated	Feb 12 -Apr 1, 1973
Last U.S. combat troops leave SVN	Mar 29, 1973
Saigon falls to NVN, SVN surrenders	Apr 30, 1975
Zhou Enlai dies--Gang of Four prevents gathering in Tiananmin Square	Apr 1976
Mao dies--Gang of Four suppressed--ending Cultural Revolution	Sep 9, 1976
Vietnam invades Cambodia--topple Pol Pot regime	Dec 1978
Chinese attack Vietnam over border disputes and Cambodian invasion--seize several provincial cities	Jan 1979
Chinese withdraw, over 10,000 dead on each side—10-year border war begins (mostly artillery duel)	Mar 1979
Vietnam attacks northern Thailand over Thai support to Khmer Rouge, withdraws after inflicting nearly 500 casualties	June 1980
China invades Spratly Islands, Vietnamese Naval resistance is defeated—Vietnam acquiesces to Chinese occupation	Jan-Mar 1988
Vietnam begins cooperating with U.S. over MIA accounting	1988
Last Vietnamese forces leave Cambodia, Chinese and Vietnam end border war	Dec 1989
U.S. establishes MIA office in Hanoi	Apr 1991
U.S. lifts trade embargo with Vietnam	Feb 1994
U.S. normalizes relations with Vietnam, Vietnam joins Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)	Jul 1995

US Combat Deaths	Number Serving	Combat Deaths	%	Draftees	Draftee Combat Deaths	%
Vietnam (Aug 1964- Feb 1973)	8,744,000	58,202	0.67	1,766,910	17,725	1.00
Serving in Theater	3,403,100	58,202	1.71	648,500	17,725	2.73

STRENGTH BY YEAR

Year	RVNAF	RVN Other (National Police, civil affairs)	People's Self Defense Forces (village militia)	Total RVN Forces	RVN Forces Deaths	%	U.S. Forces	U.S Deaths	%	3d Nation Forces	3d Nation Deaths	%	Total Allied Forces	Total Deaths	%	NVA/VC in SVN Force Estimates	Estimated Deaths
1965	571,000	52,000	0	623,000	11,243	1.8	184,000	1,369	0.7	23,000	31	0.1	830,000	12,643	1.5	226,000	35,000
1966	623,000	91,000	0	714,000	11,953	1.7	385,000	5,008	1.3	53,000	566	1.1	1,152,000	17,527	1.5	262,000	56,000
1967	643,000	118,000	0	761,000	12,716	1.7	486,000	9,378	1.9	59,000	1,105	1.9	1,306,000	23,199	1.8	340,000	88,000
1968	819,000	132,000	1,481,000	2,432,000	27,915	1.1	543,000	14,952	2.8	66,000	979	1.5	3,041,000	43,846	1.4	290,000	181,000
1969	969,000	136,000	3,219,000	4,324,000	21,833	0.5	475,000	9,414	2.0	70,000	866	1.2	4,869,000	32,113	0.7		157,000
1970	1,047,000	132,000	3,489,000	4,668,000	23,346	0.5	335,000	4,221	1.3	68,000	704	1.0	5,071,000	28,271	0.6	270,000	104,000
1971	1,046,000	147,000	4,429,000	5,622,000	22,738	0.4	158,000	1,380	0.9	54,000	526	1.0	5,834,000	24,644	0.4		98,000
1972	1,090,000	144,000	3,829,000	5,063,000	39,587	0.8	24,000	300	1.3	36,000	443	1.2	5,123,000	40,330	0.8	308,000	132,000

IX. TOWARD A NEW WORLD ORDER? JOINT AND COALITION OPERATIONS IN A MAJOR REGIONAL WAR— IRAQ, 1990-1994

A. General: Planning, waging and ending wars fought by coalitions for limited objectives represent a continuing challenge in the post-Cold War international environment. Although the principles for success in limited regional war remain constant—isolating the adversary, seizing the initiative, and imposing sufficient costs to convince the enemy to relinquish the political objectives at stake—achieving a durable peace may be more complicated when coalition partners have competing objectives and large variations in military capacity. War planning must consider the possibility of escalation in an environment of proliferating weapons of mass destruction. What to demand at the end of hostilities, and whether to accept a partial outcome or reinitiate military action, remains a challenging set of strategic issues for both individual democratic societies and for larger multinational coalitions.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 came at an unusually advantageous time for U.S. planners. The recent end of the Cold War meant that relatively abundant U.S. forces were available for regional military operations. The heightened level of the U.S.-Soviet military competition in the 1980s led to the development of both organizational and technological innovations in the U.S. military that some analysts began referring to as a "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA). Congressional legislation (the Goldwater-Nichols Act) and new Department of Defense initiatives (the Weinberger Doctrine) emphasized the importance of joint operations and the employment of overwhelming force in future wars. Most importantly, the end of the Cold War meant that the Soviet Union was unlikely to intervene militarily on behalf of its former Iraqi ally.

Both regional and U.S. policymakers were taken by surprise by Iraq's invasion. President George H. W. Bush moved rapidly to create an international coalition to oppose Saddam, and moved U.S. military forces to help defend Saudi Arabia from further Iraqi aggression. The United Nations authorized a series of measures against Iraq, including sanctions, containment, and eventually the use of military force and coercive inspections to guarantee the destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. The political objectives of the United States and the Coalition, formally articulated for the U.S. in National Security Directive 54, appear explicitly limited—there was no demand for unconditional surrender or the replacement of Saddam's Ba'athist regime. As President Bush's diaries suggest, however, U.S. political objectives continued to evolve throughout the crisis and the war itself, and the removal of Saddam remained a consideration. Uncertainty about the conditions necessary to achieve long-term security in the Gulf region led to confusion during the termination of the conflict, and criticism of the Bush administration after the war's end.

The war was fought by military forces from a coalition of more than thirty states representing every continent except Antarctica. The U.S. provided roughly two-thirds of

the troop strength, and an even greater proportion of the combat power. A large multinational naval force imposed a blockade on Iraq, and enforced a comprehensive set of sanctions in the months before the Coalition began the liberation of Kuwait. The membership of the coalition demonstrated the changes in the international environment—U.S. ships served alongside the Soviet Navy in enforcing sanctions against Iraq, while the Coalition ground force eventually included a Syrian armored division. Despite Iraqi efforts to gain support from key Coalition partners (particularly France and the Soviet Union), by January 1991 Saddam faced war with a large, capable multinational force.

Initial planning efforts centered on the defense of Saudi Arabia from a follow-on Iraqi advance (DESERT SHIELD). In the absence of massive ground forces, planners developed a concept for air operations (INSTANT THUNDER) intended to take advantage of new air strike capabilities. Coalition naval forces instituted such an effective blockade of Iraq that some analysts believed sanctions alone could coerce Saddam into withdrawing his forces from Kuwait. Predictions about possible Coalition losses in a war—in most cases these estimates proved to be greatly exaggerated—prompted opponents of military operations in the U.S. to launch public protests and led, eventually, to a Senate vote narrowly authorizing the President to initiate hostilities.

As more U.S. and Coalition ground forces poured into the region, Coalition planners began preparing for offensive action to liberate Kuwait (DESERT STORM). Although the Goldwater-Nichols Act emphasized the importance of joint planning and operations, Trainor and Gordon argue that inter-service rivalries remained an obstacle to a truly unified effort. Coalition efforts were also inhibited by the necessity of a dual command structure reflecting the political requirements of key regional partners. Nevertheless, the military campaign successfully exploited Coalition strengths, including major air operations and the threat of an amphibious landing on the Kuwaiti coast. Iraq's forces in the Kuwaiti theater of operations and in southern Iraq were significantly weakened in the weeks leading up to the ground offensive, which liberated Kuwait in just four days.

Military operations against Iraq were complicated by the presence of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Effect (WMD/E). Iraq possessed the second-largest stockpile of chemical weapons in the world—trailing only the Soviet Union—and was researching and producing sophisticated nerve agents and biological weapons. Iraq's covert nuclear weapons program was far more advanced than Western analysts suspected, as U.N. inspections dramatically demonstrated after the war's end. The availability of such weapons creates new requirements for protection of forces operating in a potential WMD/E environment. Iraq's use of ballistic missiles to attack Israel—which was not a member of the Coalition—threatened to escalate the conflict and also to shatter the Coalition, creating a political crisis for the United States and imposing a new priority target set for Coalition air strikes during DESERT STORM.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act designated the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—General Colin Powell in 1990-91—as the primary military advisor to the President. Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM were the first major test

of this new relationship, and also the first major test of Central Command's ability to plan and execute major military operations. President Bush made a deliberate effort to minimize civilian interference in military planning and the conduct of operations, reflecting critiques of the Johnson administration during the Vietnam War. Nevertheless, civilians in the administration practiced "the primacy of politics" on a number of occasions, dismissing the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, insisting on revisions to the initial plans for the ground campaign, pressing for a diversion of air assets to SCUD hunts, and eventually restricting the bombing of downtown Baghdad.

Civil-military relations also played an important role in the termination of the conflict. President Bush's decision to end the war after 100 hours, possibly prompted by concerns about media coverage of Iraq's retreat under heavy air attack, was also influenced by miscommunication regarding the actual military situation on the ground and the remaining strength of Iraq's Republican Guard forces. General Schwarzkopf's negotiation of a cease-fire and emphasis on a hasty withdrawal from Iraqi territory denied the Coalition leverage to assure Iraq's compliance with the cease-fire terms. Major uprisings against Saddam were crushed by the Republican Guard forces that survived DESERT STORM, with the assistance of helicopter flights that were permitted by the Coalition under the cease-fire agreement. As a result, Saddam remained in power, albeit under continued international sanctions and an unprecedented and very intrusive U.N. inspection regime.

From 1991 until 1994, Saddam continued to consolidate power, to harass and intimidate U.N. inspectors, and to carry out a massive denial and deception campaign regarding Iraqi WMD/E capabilities. Iraq's military, although only half the size of 1990, remained one of the most powerful conventional forces in the region. Coalition air forces established "no-fly" zones over much of Iraq, requiring continued presence in the region at air bases in Turkey and Saudi Arabia. In February 1993, Iraqi intelligence was involved in a plot to assassinate former President Bush on a visit to Kuwait. In October 1994, Iraqi forces mobilized on the Kuwait border, again threatening invasion—a strong indication that stability in the region had not been entirely assured by the results of DESERT STORM. Over the next nine years, U.S. policy—but not necessarily the policy of Coalition partners—moved towards a commitment to overthrow Saddam's regime, either through covert or later conventional means.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. How effectively did American political and military leaders work together from August 1990 to March 1991 to formulate a strategy that not only matched the stated political objectives but was also sensitive to other political considerations that weighed on the minds of policymakers?

2. Did American political (President, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, National Security Advisor) and military (CJCS, JCS, combatant commanders, and service

commanders) leaders successfully carry out their respective roles and functions? If so, how? If not, why not?

3. How well did the U.S. military and political leadership manage the problems of coordinating interservice, interagency, and coalition concerns in the planning and execution of DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM?

4. What is your assessment of the strategic effectiveness of the initial and revised American plans for waging an air offensive in 1990-1991? Please include an evaluation of the process by which the plans were revised.

5. What is your assessment of the strategic effectiveness of the initial and revised American plans for waging a ground offensive? Please include an evaluation of the process by which the plans were revised.

6. In the war-termination phase of a conflict, three key strategic problems need to be addressed: a) how far to go militarily before making peace; b) what to demand in the armistice or peace talks; and c) who will enforce the peace and how. How well did the United States handle these questions at the end of DESERT STORM?

7. On the whole, were coalition partners an asset to or a constraint on U.S. strategic effectiveness in 1990-1991?

8. Did U.S. planners make the most effective use of coalition partners in the planning and execution of DESERT SHIELD/STORM? If so, how? If not, why not?

9. Clausewitz raises two important considerations when carrying out military operations—the principle of continuity and the culminating point of victory. How did these considerations affect U.S. planning and execution from August 1990-March 1991?

10. Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor maintain that "the air campaign had all but won the war." (*The Generals' War*, p. 331) Do you agree with their assessment of the strategic effects of air power in this case?

11. Examining this and other examples of limited regional wars in the Strategy and War Course (Russo-Japanese War, Korea, Vietnam), what are the conditions in which a quick decisive victory can be achieved? Did the Coalition achieve a quick decisive victory in DESERT STORM?

12. Did Coalition success in DESERT STORM produce as durable a peace as could reasonably be expected? If so, how? If not, why not?

13. What should the U.S. Navy have learned from its operations in the Persian Gulf during 1990-1994?

14. Was the U.S. Navy well prepared for joint operations in the Persian Gulf in 1990-1991?

15. The author of the *Sun Tzu* emphasizes the importance of intelligence, surprise, and deception. Evaluate the performance of the United States and Iraq during the period between 1990 and 1994. Which state was more effective in its use of intelligence, surprise, and deception? Why?

16. A prominent foreign policy and strategic analyst maintains that Saddam Hussein's "stupidity [was] perhaps matched only by his ruthlessness." Do you agree with the assessment that United States found in Saddam Hussein a "cooperative" adversary, who managed to compensate for his serious errors in strategic judgment by demonstrating a brutal effectiveness in keeping internal order within Iraq?

C. Required Readings:

1. Gordon, Michael R., and General Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (ret). *The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995. Pages vii-xv, 31-101, 102-202, 227-248, 267-288, 309-331, 413-432, 443-461, 476-477.

[This reading provides an opportunity to assess civil-military relations and the national command structure, interservice cooperation and rivalry in war planning and execution, the various strategic alternatives open to decision makers, the strengths and limitations of the high-tech RMA pioneered by the American armed forces, the limits of intelligence in piercing the fog of war, the formation of joint doctrine and planning after the Goldwater Nichols Act, and war termination.]

2. Bush, George, and Brent Scowcroft. *A World Transformed.* New York: Knopf, 1998. Pages 380-382, 388-402, 416-492.

[President George Bush and his national security advisor Brent Scowcroft wrote an illuminating account of foreign policy decision-making during their time in office. Portions of their account rely on a revealing diary kept by President Bush. The sections of this book dealing with the Gulf War provide insights into high-level decision-making during wartime and are especially good for understanding American policy aims in the war, the politics of coalition building, the press of domestic political considerations on the making of strategy, the crafting of a coordinated information campaign, the importance of society, culture, and religion in formulating strategy and policy, and the president's role as commander-in-chief.]

3. Baram, Amatzia. "The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Decision-making in Baghdad," in Amatzia Baram and Barry Rubin, eds. *Iraq's Road to War*. New York: St. Martin's, 1993. Pages 5-28. (Selected Readings)

[This reading examines Saddam Hussein's rationale for attacking Kuwait, and the Iraqi perspective on events leading up to Operation DESERT SHIELD through Saddam's early options for DESERT STORM. It is particularly valuable for its examination of his domestic motives and its counter-factual analysis of Saddam's "other options."]

4. Pollack, Kenneth M. *The Threatening Storm*. New York: Random House, 2002. Pages 6-70.

[Pollack, an official in the first Bush and Clinton administrations, provides essential background information about the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, U.S. policy toward the Middle East, and the views of coalition partners in the region. He also examines the war's immediate aftermath.]

5. Murray, Williamson. "Air War in the Gulf: The Limits of Air Power." *Strategic Review* (Winter 1998), pages 28-38. (Selected Readings)

[While it may not have been the ideal application of air power that some analysts claim, Gulf War air operations did achieve extraordinary results in spite of considerable problems in planning and execution cited by critics. Murray provides an analysis of what worked and what did not in this strategic application of air power, drawing on the Gulf War Air Power Survey and other sources.]

6. Rosen, Stephen Peter, "Nuclear Proliferation and Alliance Relations," and Barry R. Posen, "U.S. Security Policy in a Nuclear-Armed World, or What If Iraq Had Nuclear Weapons?" in Victor A. Utgoff, ed. *The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World Order*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000. Pages 131-151, 157-190. (Selected Readings)

[What if Saddam had possessed nuclear weapons in 1990-91? Stephen Rosen, a professor at Harvard and a former S&P faculty member, and Barry Posen, a professor at MIT, explore this frightening counterfactual question as a way of thinking about the nature of a conflict involving the United States and an enemy armed with nuclear weapons. While the United States has never fought in open combat against a foe possessing nuclear weapons, in a future war that might not be the case. Rosen and Posen explore, and reach different conclusions on, key operational and strategic issues that such a contingency would raise. Students should consider these issues from the perspective not only of a policy maker but also of a theater commander.]

7. *NSD 54*, January 15, 1991. (Selected Readings)

[Declassified version of U.S. war aims in January 1991.]

8. Al Jabbar, Faleh Abd. "Why the Uprisings Failed," *Middle East Report,* No. 176: *Iraq in the Aftermath*. May-June 1992, pages 2-14. (Selected Readings)

[This article analyzes the failure of the Iraqi *intifada* immediately after DESERT STORM. Although both Iraqi opposition leaders and Coalition leaders called for a popular uprising, the author notes that "when the moment did arrive, the opposition was totally unprepared."]

9. McCarthy, Timothy V. and Jonathan B. Tucker. "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal: Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars," in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds. *Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000. Pages 47-78. (Selected Readings)

[McCarthy and Tucker offer insight into how weapons of mass destruction or effect (WMD/E) alter operational and strategic interactions at the theater level. Blending a cultural and institutional approach, the authors argue that Iraq's capabilities and strategies were heavily influenced by Saddam's personal ambitions and fears, as well as the organizational problems that dictators face in maintaining internal security and preventing coups. This reading is particularly useful in that it extends WMD/E considerations beyond nuclear weapons, addresses the utility of these weapons against a regional adversary in the Iran-Iraq war, and explores from an Iraqi perspective how their possession may have shaped U.S. options in 1991.]

10. Deptula, Brigadier General David A. *Effects-Based Operations: Change in the Nature of Warfare*. Arlington, VA: Aerospace Education Foundation, 2001. Pages 1-16. (Selected Readings)

[A major planner in the air war describes the impact of precision guidance and stealth technology on the Gulf War and future campaign planning.]

11. Pokrant, Marvin. *DESERT STORM at Sea: What the Navy Really Did*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999. Pages 205-207, 219-228, 231-234, 265-270, 281-292. (Selected Readings)

[Pokrant, a researcher for the Center for Naval Analyses, provides a synopsis of U.S. Navy's "lessons learned" from DESERT SHIELD/STORM, including an examination of jointness and an evaluation of relative strengths and weaknesses in command and control during operations in the Persian Gulf.]

IX. TOWARD A NEW WORLD ORDER? JOINT AND COALITION OPERATIONS IN A MAJOR REGIONAL WAR—IRAQ, 1990-1994

Al-Jabbar, Faleh Abd. "Why the Uprisings Failed." *Middle East Report* 176, Iraq in the Aftermath (May – June 1992): 2-14.

Arkin, William M., "Baghdad: The Urban Sanctuary in Desert Storm?" *Air Power Journal* (Winter 1997).

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THE GULF WAR AND FUTURE WAR

Ba'th Party The ruling party in Iraq since a coup in 1968. It is oriented toward Pan-Arabism (with Iraq as the leader of a united Arab world) and secularism, rather than toward Islamic radicalism.

Black Hole The Special Planning Group in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, that did CENTCOM's in-theater planning for the air campaign. Headed by Brigadier General Buster Glosson, USAF, it built upon Checkmate's plan.

Checkmate A warfighting-concepts office in the Air Staff, headed in 1990 by Col. John A. Warden, III, that developed the Instant Thunder strategic air campaign plan.

coercion A social-science concept denoting the use or threat of force to change the behavior of an opposing state by manipulating its cost-benefit calculations.

decapitation A strategy involving direct attacks against the enemy's political leadership and its means of command, control, and communications, with the object of killing, changing, or paralyzing that leadership.

denial A social-science concept denoting the use of force to prevent the enemy from successfully using military power to obtain its political objectives.

existential deterrence The notion that the mere possession of nuclear weapons by one state will serve to deter an attack by another state, regardless of the relative balance of nuclear capabilities.

extended deterrence The strategy, adopted by the United States in the Cold War, to threaten the use of nuclear weapons to prevent an attack on a major ally.

"high diddle diddle up-the-middle" plan The name given by Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney to CENTCOM's original plan of October 1990 for a ground offensive against Iraqi forces in Kuwait.

hyperwar The use of high-technology weaponry (in the words of Colonel John A. Warden, III, USAF) to bring all of an enemy's key operational and strategic nodes under near-simultaneous attack.

inside-out warfare If one follows Colonel Warden in conceiving of enemy centers of gravity as arrayed in concentric rings radiating outward from the enemy's national command authority, one puts highest priority on attacking leadership targets, next highest priority on targeting essential production, third priority on the transportation network, and so on out to the enemy's fielded forces, which rate the lowest priority.

Instant Thunder The plan originally developed by Checkmate in August 1990 for using air power to launch as many strikes as possible in six days to bomb the nerve centers of Saddam Hussein's regime and paralyze its control over the Iraqi army and people. The name was chosen to contrast this plan with the Rolling Thunder air campaign against North Vietnam in 1965-1968.

intrawar deterrence In a conventional war, using the threat of nuclear retaliation to prevent enemy use of weapons of mass destruction.

Jedi Knights The nickname given to the graduates of the Army's School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) who were assigned to CENTCOM's Special Plans Group and tasked to develop an offensive ground plan against the Iraqi army.

Military-Technical Revolution (MTR) A term developed by the Soviets that was a precursor to the current American concept of revolution in military affairs (RMA). MTR puts a narrower emphasis on technology than RMA, which stresses the importance of innovation in organizational forms and operational concepts to exploit new technology.

Republican Guard Established as an elite and politically reliable armored unit by Saddam Hussein to protect himself against a coup, it first saw action in 1983 in Iraq's war against Iran. After 1985, Saddam greatly expanded it in size. In 1988, its offensive broke Iran's will to continue the war. By August 1990, the Republican Guard had some 150,000 men under arms, operated outside the normal military chain of command, and was much better equipped and paid than the rest of the Iraqi army. It spearheaded the invasion of Kuwait and then served as the strategic reserve in the Kuwait Theater of operations.

Special Plans Group A CENTCOM planning cell made up primarily of graduates of the Army's School of Advanced Military Studies who were tasked to develop an offensive ground plan. The group's initial product was the “high diddle diddle up-the-middle” plan of October 1990.

UN Security Council Resolution 660 The first UN resolution passed in August 1990 condemning Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and demanding unconditional Iraqi withdrawal.

UN Security Council Resolution 678 The UN resolution of 29 November 1990 authorizing member states to use all necessary means to force Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, unless by 15 January 1991 Iraq fully complied with Resolution 660 and other, subsequent resolutions.

Western Excursion A plan for an offensive to occupy the western desert of Iraq in order to create a surprise threat to Baghdad. It was originally suggested by Henry Rowen, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and was promoted by Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney as an alternative to CENTCOM's “high diddle diddle up-the-middle” plan of October 1990.

Gulf War Chronology

Iraq accuses Kuwait of oil overproduction of and stealing oil from Iraqi oil fields on the Kuwait-Iraq border.	Jul 17, 1990
U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie informs Iraq that the dispute is an Arab matter not one affecting the U.S.	Jul 25, 1990
Iraq invades Kuwait.	Aug 2, 1990
UN imposes economic sanctions on Iraq.	Aug 7, 1990
First U.S. fighter aircraft arrive in Saudi Arabia.	Aug 8, 1990
Lead elements of U.S. 82d Airborne Division arrive in Saudi Arabia.	Aug 9, 1990
First U.S. Fast Sealift Ship departs CONUS with equipment of the U.S. 24th Inf Div (M).	Aug 13, 1990
First Marine MPS ships arrive in theater.	Aug 15, 1990
U.S. mobilizes reserves.	Aug 22, 1990
First 'heavy' force, the U.S. 24th Inf Div, arrives in theater.	Sep 12, 1990
US CENTCOM presents single corps offensive option to US National Command Authority.	Oct 10, 1990
US NCA orders additional U.S. corps to deploy to theater.	Nov 8, 1990
UN Security Council authorizes use of force if Iraq does not withdraw from Kuwait by 15 Jan.	Nov 29, 1990
Congress votes to allow U.S. forces to participate in offensive operations.	Jan 12, 1991
Coalition aircraft attack targets in Kuwait and Iraq.	Jan 16, 1991
Iraq launches first SCUD attacks.	Jan 17, 1991
Iraq launches first SCUD attack on Israel.	Jan 18, 1991
First U.S. air attacks launched from Turkey.	Jan 18, 1991
U.S. deploys Patriot batteries to Israel.	Jan 19, 1991
Iraq sets 732 oil fires in Kuwait.	Jan 24, 1991
Iraqi aircraft begin escaping to Iran.	Jan 28, 1991
Iraq attacks into Saudi Arabia at Khafji.	Jan 29, 1991
U.S. forces in Gulf exceed 500,000.	Jan 30, 1991
Second U.S. corps competes deployment.	Feb 6, 1991
U.S. aircraft attack Al Firdos bunker in Baghdad killing nearly 300 civilians.	Feb 13, 1991
Moscow abandons attempt to negotiate end to conflict.	Feb 22, 1991
Coalition forces launch ground attack on Kuwait and Iraq.	Feb 23, 1991
Kuwaiti resistance leaders reclaim control of Kuwait City	Feb 26, 1991
President Bush orders cease fire.	Feb 27, 1991
Shiites in Southern Iraq and Kurds in north launch revolts.	Mar 2, 1991
Iraqi leaders accept cease fire.	Mar 3, 1991
45 Coalition POWs are repatriated.	Mar 4-5, 1991
First U.S. forces begin redeployment to home stations.	Mar 8, 1991
Joint Task Force Provide Comfort formed in Turkey to conduct humanitarian operations in northern Iraq.	Apr 6, 1991
Washington Victory Parade.	Jun 8, 1991
Last oil fires extinguished	Oct 1991
Provide Comfort I ends. Provide Comfort II begins with mission to deter Iraq from attacks on Iraqi Kurds.	Jul 24, 1991
“No-fly” zone established over Southern (below 32d parallel) and Northern Iraq (above 36th parallel)	Aug 27, 1992
Plot foiled to assassinate former President Bush during visit to the Middle East	Apr 13, 1993
U.S. warships attack Iraq with Tomahawk missiles in retaliation for assassination plot.	Jun 27, 1993
Iraq moves troops to Kuwait border, U.S. deploys carrier battle group, additional aircraft, and 54,000 troops in response.	Oct 7, 1994
U.S. expands Southern no-fly zone to 33d parallel	Sep 1996
U.S. launches heavy air and missile attacks against Iraq (DESERT STRIKE)	Sep 2, 1996
Provide Comfort II ends	Dec 31, 1996
U.S. launches heavy air and missile attacks against Iraq (DESERT FOX)	Dec 16, 1998
Iraq announces they will no longer observe no-fly zones	Jan 1999

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Strategy & Policy Department
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X. ON THE OFFENSIVE AGAINST TERRORISTS AND TYRANTS: MULTI-THEATER STRATEGY AND INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS IN THE LONG WAR— AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ, AND AL QAEDA

A. General: This course seeks to foster strategic versatility and operational adaptability. A key to strategic versatility is intellectual preparation for three major types of war well-represented in our syllabus: big wars fought for high stakes over a long time, between coalitions and in multiple theaters; regional wars fought within a single theater, typically for a shorter time, often for limited political objectives, and sometimes without a coalition on one side or the other; and insurgencies fought within a political system, against a failing, emerging, or well-established state, by a non-state movement that seeks to form a new political system. In Strategy and War we study several cases of wars within each of these three "boxes." Within a given box, all the cases have much in common, but each new case varies in some ways from previous cases. A few modules present an overlapping of wars—wars within wars—as in the Vietnam module, where there was an insurgency in South Vietnam, overlaid by a regional war between the United States and North Vietnam, all within the context of a global Cold War. The need for operational adaptability arises against this strategic background. Operational commanders, their staffs, and interagency partners have to be prepared, in terms of intellect, temperament, and doctrine, to undertake different types of operations, fight different types of enemies, and make transitions between different phases of a war and its aftermath. As this module will show, such adaptability has been no easy matter for American operational leaders to master so far in the twenty-first century.

The strategic context of this module—what the United States government initially called "the Global War on Terrorism" (GWOT) and then renamed the "Long War"—puts an especially high premium on strategic versatility. As the adjectives "global" and "long" suggest, the war against violent jihadists falls within the "big war" box. It is indeed likely to be quite long, it certainly involves high political stakes, it already extends over multiple theaters, and it has coalitions on both sides. It differs, however, in important respects from any previous big war that we have studied, above all because the main adversary of the United States and its allies now is not other states engaged in major conventional operations, but rather a transnational network of non-state actors engaged in terrorist, guerrilla, and information operations. Within the Long War, the United States has already fought two regional wars, the first in Afghanistan and the second in Iraq. But whereas the previous regional wars that we have studied featured, for the most part, limited political objectives, the American political objectives in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) involved "regime change"—the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. In both cases, when the phase of conventional operations for unlimited political objectives came to an end, there was a transition from one type of war to another. As the United States and its allies formed new regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq, they sooner (in Iraq) or later (in Afghanistan) found themselves in the "insurgency box." Too many American commanders tried to deal with Iraqi and Afghan insurgents without a good grasp of key determinants of counterinsurgent success that they might have learned from previous cases of insurgency. Especially in Iraq, moreover, there was variation from

earlier cases in the insurgency box that complicated counterinsurgency efforts. As non-state actors without significant conventional capabilities, both jihadist and nationalist/Baathist insurgents in Iraq embraced the Al Qaeda operational model of relying on terrorism, especially suicide bombings, to generate incidents of mass slaughter on a scale beyond that of earlier terrorist groups. In addition, they showed more sophistication and agility than previous groups in exploiting the Internet and other new means of communication for a variety of operational tasks and strategic purposes.

The highlighted operations of this module capture the good news and the bad news of the American effort in both Afghanistan and Iraq. In the case of OEF we shall look closely at the planning and execution of the operations that took down the Taliban government. Those operations achieved the political objective of regime change in a remarkably short time in the fall of 2001. There was then a somewhat ragged transition to an effort to take out the Al Qaeda leadership--an effort that was not so successful. Though American operations did eliminate Al Qaeda training camps and expel Al Qaeda forces from Afghanistan, they did not succeed in killing or capturing Usama bin Laden and other strategic leaders of the terrorist organization that had been responsible for the 9/11 attack on the United States. In this regard, we shall focus on the American/Afghan operation at Tora Bora, to which bin Laden had retreated in November 2001 and from which he escaped into Pakistan in December 2001. In the case of OIF, we will do a similar bi-focal analysis of the good news and the bad news. We shall first look closely at the planning and execution of the joint and combined operations in March-April 2003 that overthrew Saddam Hussein's regime, again with remarkable quickness. We shall then analyze the sluggish "phase transition" from conventional operations to stability operations in the spring and summer of 2003. That unsuccessful transition to "Phase IV" set the conditions for the insurgency that has prevented the United States from winning the peace in Iraq.

In order that students not lose sight of the strategic context and strategic effects of these highlighted operations and phase transitions, the chronological sweep of this module will take us back well before the fall of 2001, cover the gap between the highlighted operations of 2001 and 2003, and take us forward to the present. Assigned reading will enable us to trace the emergence of the Al Qaeda threat to the United States in the 1990s and the shortcomings of the American response to that threat before the 9/11 attacks. It will illuminate how in the immediate aftermath of those terrorist attacks, American policymakers already envisioned operations in theaters beyond Afghanistan, a "series of blows" against the jihadists and their actual or potential rogue-state supporters. Even while the hunt for the escaped Al Qaeda leader Bin Laden and the Taliban leader Mullah Omar was proceeding in 2002, strategic decision-makers shifted assets and attention from Afghanistan to the upcoming campaign against Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. Anticipating that American campaign, Al Qaeda and Associated Movements (principally Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's group) also began to focus on the new Iraqi theater. Both the Bush administration and jihadist strategists sought to develop and enunciate theories of victory to connect operations in Iraq to their respective strategies in the larger global war. We shall see from our reading that, in the spring of 2003, after the toppling of Saddam's regime, American policymakers abruptly expanded the scope of

liberation/occupation policy in Iraq even as there was a drawdown of American forces on the ground. The resulting policy/strategy mismatch may have stimulated the Iraqi insurgency to an intensity that it might not otherwise have attained. While AQAM operatives, denied their previous sanctuary in Afghanistan, had dispersed to multiple theaters around the world, Iraq became the main theater in the global conflict. We shall wrap up this module with an analysis of the effects of OIF on the Long War.

Because this module is the only one in the course that deals with ongoing operations, and because the Long War may in the future involve major American operations in new theaters, the incentive for learning lessons makes itself felt with special urgency in the agenda for study this week. Each of the following paragraphs addresses a type of lesson that could serve as an agenda item for seminar preparation.

The first lesson has to do with the need for military officers and their interagency counterparts to be ready to deal with unexpected consequences of strategic surprise. Almost every war that we have studied in this course since the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 began with strategic surprise, and in many cases one side or the other ended up fighting in new theaters that they had not planned to open or contest. The current war saw the biggest surprise of all with the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and the dynamics of interaction with the jihadists over the coming years are even harder to predict than in more conventional warfare. American forces could find themselves, on short notice, in new theaters that the United States would not have chosen to open but that unexpected developments have compelled it to contest. In addition, third parties not directly involved in the Long War might take aggressive actions that would lead to new wars, of a different type, in which the United States could become involved. This lesson underlines the importance of strategic versatility and operational adaptability.

The second lesson, arising from the first one and also building on earlier modules in the course, points to the special problems of intelligence and assessment that the United States faces when engaged with adversaries from a different culture, especially when those adversaries have (from an American perspective) bizarre and opaque political systems (as did both the Taliban regime and Saddam Hussein's regime) or have non-state forms of political organization (as do jihadist terrorist networks and Iraqi and Afghan insurgents). The hi-tech sources of intelligence on which American strategic leaders and operational commanders have long relied are of less utility against such adversaries than against more familiar and conventional enemies. In the environment that this module features, there is no good substitute for human intelligence—the sort that the author of the *Sun Tzu* valued so highly. Operational commanders will by no means get all the information that they need from the intelligence community. They will have to develop human intelligence, make culturally informed assessments, and be mindful of "theory of victory" assumptions as an integral part of their own operations.

The third lesson addresses the differences between operational planning processes in the real world and operational planning processes on paper. Much of the guidance from the Joint Staff to war colleges for professional military education seeks to ensure that officers will be well-versed in the standard procedures and concepts of American

operational planning detailed in manuals. Yet at the higher levels of planning in OEF and OIF, as in the Gulf War of 1990-1991, what actually happened deviated substantially from the doctrinal template and staff-officer expectations about procedures and concepts. In 1990-1991, key concepts emerged from outside CENTCOM planning staffs. In September 2001, the CIA seized the planning initiative in the face of insufficient CENTCOM agility. In 2002-2003, the Secretary of Defense involved himself in CENTCOM's planning process to an extraordinary degree. Three straight instances make for a telling trend. If officers expect that trend to go away in the future, they may be deluding themselves.

The fourth lesson takes our attention from planning to execution. OEF and OIF show, as do previous cases such as Korea and Vietnam, the difficulty of balancing operational considerations and political considerations in a dynamic wartime environment. Especially in wars against terrorists and guerrilla insurgents, operational opportunities may be fleeting. But impulsive or excessive use of force against targets of opportunity may have counterproductive political effects. Political restraints and restrictive rules of engagement frustrated air commanders in OEF and some ground commanders in OIF and led to friction between military leaders and political leaders or between operational commanders and theater strategists. Here we have another trend that officers should expect to persist in the future. One purpose of a strategy course is to educate officers to understand political considerations and political restraints as part of the context in which they have to execute operations.

The fifth lesson goes even more directly to the purpose of a strategy course. As other parts of this course indicate, many American commanders, past and present, have had a narrow view of war and of victory in war. A lesson unlearned from Vietnam is that conventional operations against conventional military forces do not necessarily define war. OEF and OIF confirm that successful battles and successful campaigns do not necessarily determine victory in war. Unconventional operations against non-state actors have long been part of war and are likely to remain a big part of the future for military officers. From a strategic perspective, winning a war means winning the peace, and that in turn means that military commanders must embrace stability operations and governance operations after, or sometimes in the absence of, conventional operations.

The sixth lesson is that the American military ought not to have to go it alone in war. To succeed fully, operations in the Long War require multinational partners, some indigenous to a given theater and others coming in from outside the theater. Shifting American fortunes in Afghanistan and Iraq in the last several years have often turned on the vicissitudes of American efforts to identify and work with local partners. Especially in countering an insurgency, it is difficult but essential to find local partners who are both willing to align with American political purposes and able to attract mass support in their own society. Bringing along allies from elsewhere in the world has proven to be problematic as well. After 9/11, American policymakers preferred to form ad hoc "coalitions of the willing" rather than accommodate traditional allies unwilling to conform to American strategic and operational ideas of how to deal with Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and Saddam Hussein. More recently American political and military leaders

have shown greater willingness to listen more carefully to, and work more closely with, old friends. Continuing along those lines in the future makes strategic sense.

The seventh lesson is that the American military needs help from partners within the American government, too. Winning the peace requires diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments, not just military instruments. One major problem in OEF and especially in OIF has been mobilizing and coordinating interagency partners who wield the non-military instruments. Since the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the American military has increasingly been able to integrate different forms of military power more effectively by virtue of cultivating jointness among the services. Some lapses notwithstanding, OEF and OIF highlight the achievement of jointness. Readings for this module shed light on how and why interagency collaboration lags so far behind interservice collaboration. By considering the experiment with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and the troubled relationship between the Coalition Provisional Authority (now defunct) and Combined Joint Task Force 7 in Iraq, military officers and government officials in this course should be able to develop some insight into possible solutions for interagency problems.

The eighth lesson is, conversely, that military commanders engaged in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism should not try fully to offload "non-military" burdens onto interagency partners. Even the "non-kinetic" use of the information instrument should be a significant part of a commander's operational repertoire. It is striking, but should not be surprising, that information operations now loom so large in Iraq and in the Long War more broadly. After all, the current adversaries of the United States have a limited range of kinetic capabilities, mainly involving terrorist attacks, which they need to amplify or "spin" with information operations. More surprising, perhaps, is the facility with which the jihadists, for all their backward-looking political orientation, have exploited the most up-to-date communications technologies. American operational commanders and their superiors in the chain of command need to be more agile in outmaneuvering the jihadists in the information domain. The outcome of the struggle over the political alignment of Muslim populations may depend on words and images as well as on deeds.

The ninth lesson has to do with new technology more generally. Operational successes in the Gulf War in 1991 gave rise in the American defense community to talk of a technologically-driven "revolution in military affairs" and then to an agenda of "transformation" that Donald Rumsfeld pursued upon becoming Secretary of Defense in 2001. In his view, OEF and OIF vindicated that agenda. But the rising tide of insurgency in Iraq, and Afghanistan, too, has demonstrated the limits of the new way of war. The lesson here is that a particular way of war cannot be equally effective in all types of war against all types of adversaries. The United States in the twenty-first century requires different ways of war, and military officers should be familiar and comfortable with all of them.

The tenth lesson is tantamount to a tenth commandment: avoid self-defeating actions. Strategy and War modules reveal that in some wars one side defeats the other

because it develops a good strategy and executes it well. But this course also reveals that the outcome of other wars stems from self-defeating action by the side that ends up losing. The Long War seems likely to fall into the latter group. The key to ultimate success against jihadists may be to avoid courses of action, at all levels of the war, that carry a high risk of creating more new enemies than killing or capturing existing ones.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. How does AQAM differ from other terrorist groups that you have studied in this course, and what implications do those differences have for devising a successful strategy to win the Long War?

2. What strategic effects have U.S. operations in Iraq since March 2003 had on Al Qaeda in the larger GWOT?

3. Did OIF, as conceived and executed by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and General Tommy Franks, match well the political purposes discussed by President George Bush in his speech of February 26, 2003 (Required Reading 8)?

4. Henry Crumpton, who led the CIA effort in OEF from September 2001 until June 2002, has stressed the importance for American operations of understanding the "cultural terrain" in Afghanistan. What features of that cultural terrain were most important to achieving the degree of success that OEF had?

5. What were the operational and strategic advantages and disadvantages for the U.S. of working with the Afghan indigenous forces that CIA and SOF operatives chose as partners in OEF in the fall of 2001 and the winter of 2001-2002?

6. What were the most important features of the "cultural terrain" of Iraq that American strategic and operational leaders understood least well upon embarking on OIF in March 2003?

7. Were the rules of engagement and other political restraints on the use of the air instrument in Afghanistan in the autumn of 2001 too stringent?

8. Afghanistan is a landlocked country. Yet the sea services had an important role to play—and arguably could have played an even larger role than they did—in OEF. How and why?

9. Would the strategic effects in the Long War of killing or capturing Usama Bin Laden have been worth the costs and risks of committing as many U.S. ground forces as logistically possible to the Tora Bora operation in December 2001?

10. How important was deception in making possible a rapid "march to Baghdad" in March-April 2003?

11. In OEF and OIF in 2001-2003, as in the Gulf War in 1990-1991, U.S. planning for war deviated in significant ways from the doctrinal "template" and staff-officer expectations of the proper planning process. Were the advantages of such deviations greater than the disadvantages in OEF and OIF?

12. How did the presumed possession of weapons of mass destruction by Saddam Hussein's regime affect American planning for and execution of OIF?

13. How did civil-military relations affect both the planning for and execution of "Phase IV" operations in OIF?

14. How have changes in technology influenced the best ways of integrating different forms of military power in early twenty-first century U.S. operations?

15. What does the American experience in Afghanistan and Iraq suggest about the importance and the difficulty of interagency operations for achieving the strategic goals of the United States in the Long War?

16. How is the Iraqi insurgency similar to and different from other insurgencies that we have studied in this course, and what are the implications of these similarities and differences for devising a successful counterinsurgency in Iraq?

17. Are information operations and strategic communication more important in wars against insurgents and terrorists than in the other kinds of war that you have studied in this course? If so, why? If not, why not?

18. Echoing *Sun Tzu*, a leading expert on counterinsurgency has recently advised American commanders to "fight the enemy's strategy, not his forces." How might that advice be applied to dealing with the insurgency in Iraq?

19. Why has the U.S. had difficulty in "winning the peace" in Afghanistan and Iraq in a way that fully serves the overall political purposes of the Long War?

20. Jihadist pronouncements on the Internet have made clear that AQAM regards Iraq as the central theater at this juncture in the Long War. In what ways has Iraq been a favorable theater, and in what ways an unfavorable theater, for the transnational jihadist cause?

C. Required Readings:

1. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*. New York: Norton, 2004. Pages 47-70, 187-214, 330-338. (Selected Readings)

[With a readability that is unusual for official reports, this well-known 9/11 report provides informative background on the emergence of Al Qaeda as a threat to the United States, on the ineffectual American response to that threat before September 2001, and on the early planning by the Bush Administration for a global war on terrorism after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.]

2. Crumpton, Henry A. "Intelligence and War: Afghanistan, 2001-2002," in Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber, eds. *Transforming U.S. Intelligence*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2005. Pages 162-179. (Selected Readings)

[Crumpton, who led the CIA's effort in OEF from September 2001 until June 2002 and later became Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the State Department, describes the planning and execution of the operations in Afghanistan in which he was centrally involved. He is especially illuminating on the importance of understanding the Afghan cultural terrain and building a "complex partnership of power" that brought together different agencies of the U.S. government and different indigenous factions in Afghanistan.]

3. Lambeth, Benjamin S. *Air Power Against Terror: America's Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005. Pages xiii-xxiv, 49-62, 293-331. (Selected Readings)

[Lambeth, a retired Air Force officer and the author of many works on air power, here provides an overview of OEF from an air-power perspective. The most valuable part of the reading for this course is Lambeth's examination of rules of engagement and other restraints on the use of the air instrument in Afghanistan. Students should consider whether U.S. political and military leaders struck the proper balance between operational opportunities and political considerations.]

4. Smucker, Philip. *Al Qaeda's Great Escape: The Military and the Media on Terror's Trail*. Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2004. Pages 31-38, 42-61, 72-90, 97-100, 108-112, 198-206. (Selected Readings)

[The United States in OEF had much greater difficulty in taking out the Al Qaeda leadership than in taking down the Taliban regime. Smucker, a journalist, was in the Tora Bora area when Usama Bin Laden was there in November-December 2001. He provides the local context for the unsuccessful effort to kill or capture the Al Qaeda leader. His account is especially useful for its description of the Afghan partners, especially Hazret Ali and Zaman Haji, with whom U.S. Special Forces tried to work in the Tora Bora operation.]

5. Weaver, Mary Ann. "Lost at Tora Bora," *The New York Times Magazine*, September 11, 2005. (Selected Readings)

[Weaver, an expert on Pakistan and Afghanistan who wrote this article while she was a Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, adds to the information presented by Smucker in Reading 4 by drawing on interviews with U.S. intelligence officials and military officers. Both Weaver and Smucker highlight the issue of whether U.S. conventional forces could have prevented the escape of Bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders from Tora Bora in December 2001. Whereas Smucker envisions forces from the Tenth Mountain Division playing such a role, Weaver points to the Marine Task Force 58. A lecture in this module will address the logistical feasibility of moving any American conventional force to Tora Bora in time.]

6. McNerney, Michael J. "Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?" *Parameters* (Winter 2005-06), pages 33-46. (Selected Readings)

[McNerney, drawing on his experience and observations as an official in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, describes and evaluates the use of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan from 2003 as an interagency and multinational effort to help stabilize selected areas in the countryside, reconstruct a nation devastated by war, and extend the political authority and governing capacity of the new Afghan central government. McNerney notes how far short the PRT program in Afghanistan has fallen of the scale of effort reached with the CORDS program in Vietnam in the late 1960s. U.S. naval officers should note that their cohorts have recently been deployed to Afghanistan in increasing numbers to play leadership roles in these teams.]

7. Gordon, Michael R. and General Bernard Trainor. *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*. New York: Pantheon Books, 2006. Pages 3-163, 457-507.

[Gordon and Trainor seek to do for OIF in 2003 what their previous book *The Generals' War* did so well for the Gulf War of 1990-1991: provide an instant history based on access to inside information. Careful readers will note that the authors treat more gently those policymakers and military officers who agreed to interviews than those who did not. The two excerpts assigned here cover prewar planning and the sluggish transition to "Phase IV" after the end of conventional operations in April 2003. The middle 300 pages are too detailed and too tactical in focus to include in the reading. That gap in coverage of the "march to Baghdad" is filled by Reading 9 below.]

8. Bush, President George W. *Speech to the American Enterprise Institute*. 26 February 2003. (Selected Readings)

[This speech was the last major presentation by President Bush of the case for war against Iraq before the launching of OIF three weeks later. It also represented his most wide-ranging public explanation of the various political purposes that the war was supposed to serve for the United States. Students in this course should read it with two questions in mind: 1) How could military commanders align operations and strategy with the political objectives that they can glean from the speech? 2) What effects did the

President and his advisers calculate that this exercise in strategic communication would have on which audiences?]

9. Knights, Michael. *Cradle of Conflict: Iraq and the Birth of the Modern U.S. Military*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005. Pages 263-327. (Selected Readings)

[Knights, a British scholar and consultant, is interested in the emergence of a "transformed" American way of war featuring precision strike, rapid operational maneuver, deception, and network-centric C4ISR. The excerpt assigned here provides a succinct overview of the conventional-operations phase of OIF in March-April 2003 primarily from that perspective. It also enables students to make judgments about adaptive deviations from prewar plans and the progress of jointness since the Gulf War of 1990-1991. Given Knights' penchant for acronyms and gadgetry, students may need to make liberal use of the on-line glossary.]

10. Woods, Kevin M., with Michael R. Pease, Mark E. Stout, Williamson Murray, and James G. Lacey. *Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam's Senior Leadership*. Norfolk: U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2006. Pages 123-150. (Selected Readings)

[U.S. Joint Forces Command sponsored, and the Institute for Defense Analysis carried out, a major study of the Iraqi side of the road to war in 2003 and its defense against the American invasion in March and April of that year. The study drew upon an extensive series of interviews with captured Iraqi leaders and translations of captured documents. The excerpt assigned here sheds light on why Saddam Hussein and his military were unable to respond effectively to the American "march on Baghdad." Gordon and Trainor present other revelations from the study in pages 55-66, 118-123, and 504-505 of Required Reading 7.]

11. Schnaubelt, Christopher M. "After the Fight: Interagency Operations," *Parameters* (Winter 2005-06), pages 47-61. (Selected Readings)

[Schnaubelt, a colonel in the U.S. Army Reserves with a Ph.D. in political science, served in the C-5 shop of Combined Joint Task Force 7 in Baghdad in 2004. He makes the case that "the lack of effective interagency collaboration at the operational level" has been a critical factor in the difficulty that the U.S. has had in winning the peace in OIF. Whereas Gordon and Trainor in Reading 7 play up shortcomings in planning, Schnaubelt highlights deficiencies in execution, with special emphasis on problems in the relationship between the Coalition Provisional Authority and CJTF-7.]

12. Baker, Colonel Ralph O. "The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team Commander's Perspective on Information Operations," *Military Review* (May-June 2006), pages 13-32. (Selected Readings)

[Baker, a U.S. Army officer and a former Naval War College student, commanded the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, during a deployment to Iraq in 2003-

2004. His brigade's area of operations was two districts of Baghdad. Baker describes how he came to appreciate the importance of information operations, how he had to outmaneuver both American military bureaucracy and Iraqi adversaries, and how he learned to communicate with different audiences in ways calculated to win their trust and respect.]

13. International Crisis Group, "In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency," Middle East Report No. 50 (15 February 2006), pages 1-26. (Selected Readings)

[This report, by a prominent non-governmental organization headquartered in Brussels, gives a picture of the insurgency in Iraq as it developed over its first two-and-one-half years or so. As the published study that focuses most closely on what insurgent groups have said, it has some difficulty in distinguishing between propaganda and reality and probably overstates the cohesiveness of the insurgency, but it provides a valuable analysis of information operations, especially on the Internet, and it highlights the importance of religious as well as nationalist themes in insurgent efforts to mobilize support in Iraq.]

14. Project on the Means of Intervention, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, and U.S. Army War College, "Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Implications of Irregular Warfare for the U.S. Government," Workshop (7-8 November 2005), pages 2-20. (Selected Readings)

[This workshop, held two-and-one-half years after the first signs of insurgency in Iraq, brought together military officers, government officials, and civilian academics to assess progress made in counterinsurgency efforts. Three issues stand out in the discussion: 1) arguments and counter-arguments over the value of learning from past cases of insurgency; 2) the uneven adaptation of American military units to the nature of the insurgency and the requirements of counterinsurgency in Iraq; and 3) the unsatisfactory state of interagency coordination.]

15. Hegghamer, Thomas. "Global Jihadism After the Iraq War," *The Middle East Journal* (Winter 2006), pages 11-32. (Selected Readings)

[Hegghamer, a researcher associated with the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, has for several years been closely tracking Arabic-language primary sources, with special attention to the pronouncements of radical jihadists on Internet sites. In this article, after providing useful background on "global jihadism" and on the importance that its proponents attach to the Iraqi theater, he offers a clear and sophisticated analysis of various important effects that the war in Iraq has had on strategic thinking and debate in AQAM.]

D. Official Documents: The following list represents the most important documents published by the U.S. Government and Department of Defense that are of relevance to

this module. All three academic departments at the Naval War College make reference to these documents. Students should, at some time during their tour of duty at Newport, familiarize themselves with each of them. They can find links to the documents at: http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/.

President of the United States. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. March 2006.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*. February 2006.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*. February 2006.

National Security Council. *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq*. November 2005.

Department of Defense. *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*. March 2005.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America*. 2004.

President of the United States. *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. February 2003.

President of the United States. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. September 2002. This document, though superseded by the first document in this list, remains important for understanding the strategic context of OIF.

X. ON THE OFFENSIVE AGAINST TERRORISTS AND TYRANTS: MULTI-THEATER STRATEGY AND INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS IN THE LONG WAR—AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ, AND AL QAEDA

Anonymous [Michael Scheuer]. *Through Our Enemies Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America*. Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2002.

Arquilla, John, and David Ronfeldt, eds. *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001.

Barnett, Thomas P.M. *The Pentagon's New Map*. New York: Putnam, 2004.

Benjamin, Daniel, and Steven Simon. *The Age of Sacred Terror*. New York: Random House, 2002.

Bergen, Peter. *The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of Al Qaeda's Leader*. New York: Free Press, 2006.

Berntsen, Gary, with Ralph Pezzulo. *Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al Qaeda: A Personal Account by the CIA's Key Field Commander*. New York: Crown, 2005.

Biddle, Stephen. *Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002.

Bremer, L. Paul. *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006.

Byman, Daniel. *Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Clarke, Richard. *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror*. New York: Free Press, 2004.

Coll, Steve. *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*. New York: Penguin, 2004.

Cordesman, Anthony H. *Terrorism, Asymmetric Warfare, and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Defending the U.S. Homeland*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002.

_____. *The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003.

_____. *The War after the War: Strategic Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan*. Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2004.

Cronin, Audrey Kurth, and James M Ludes, eds. *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2004.

DeLong, General Michael, with Noah Lukeman. *Inside CentCom: The Unvarnished Truth About the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq*. Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2004.

Diamond, Larry. *Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq*. New York: Henry Holt, 2005.

Fontenot, Col. Gregory, Lt. Col. E.J. Degen, and Lt. Col. David Tohn. *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005.

Franks, Tommy General, with Malcolm McConnell. *American Soldier*. New York: Regan Books, 2004.

Fukuyama, Francis, ed. *Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2006.

Gaddis, John Lewis. *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004.

Galbraith, Peter W. *The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without End*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006.

Gerges, Fawaz, A. *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*. Cambridge, UK, and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Goodson, Larry P. *Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001.

Gordon, Philip, and Jeremy Shapiro. *Allies at War: America, Europe, and the Split over Iraq*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004.

Gray, Colin. *Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?* Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006.

Gunaratna, Rohan. *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, updated 3d ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003.

Gurr, Nadine, and Benjamin Cole. *The New Face of Terrorism: Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction*. London and New York: I.B.Tauris, 2001.

Habeck, Mary R. *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.

Hammes, Thomas X. *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century*. St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004.

Hashim, Ahmed. *Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006.

Hoffman, Bruce. *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006.

Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.

Kagan, Frederick W. "Did We Fail in Afghanistan?" *Commentary* (March 2003): 39-45.

_____. "War and Aftermath." *Policy Review* (August & September 2003): 3-28.

Karsh, Efraim. *Islamic Imperialism: A History*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.

Keegan, John. *The Iraq War*. New York: Knopf, 2004.

Kepel, Giles. *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*. Translated by Anthony F. Roberts. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002.

_____. *The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West*. Translated by Pascale Ghazaleh. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004.

Lawrence, Bruce, ed. *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden*. London and New York: Verso, 2005.

Lewis, Bernard. *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*. New York: Random House, 2003.

_____. *What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Lynch, Marc. *Voices of the New Arab Public: Iraq, Al-Jazeera, and Middle East Politics Today*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005.

Maloney, Sean. *Enduring the Freedom: A Rogue Historian in Afghanistan*. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005.

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XI. RETHINKING MARITIME STRATEGY: SEA POWER IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY—EMERGING MISSIONS, DOCTRINE, TECHNOLOGY

A. General: This module, the capstone of the course, examines the ends, ways, and means of employing the U.S. sea services in the early decades of the twenty-first century. It does so by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to examine the challenges the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, and the nation will face in coming years. Students will:

- Assess the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces—particularly of naval forces—against the spectrum of adversaries the United States may face in the early decades of the twenty-first century.

- Explore considerations that influence the employment of joint and combined forces at the operational and strategic levels of war.

- Illuminate trends and concepts that influence the development of joint doctrine.

- Examine the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war as well as the application of strategic theory to the operational level of war.

Navies have historically served a range of missions. The very existence of a strong navy shapes relationships with friends, neutrals, and adversaries: it serves as the means to forge international coalitions, an enforcer of international norms, and a deterrent to potential adversaries. In time of war, navies exert sea control, permitting friendly forces to gain strategic advantage by using the sea while denying its use to adversaries. Naval forces protect or disrupt sea lines of communications. Control of the sea can provide strategic depth and offer protection to the homeland. Navies also support operations ashore. Last but not least, navies serve as the platform for launching operations against the land, including the landing of expeditionary forces.

The United States will possess the world's most powerful navy for the foreseeable future. The United States—and indeed the world—is the beneficiary of the U.S. Navy's command of the sea. The U.S. Navy underpins the free flow of goods and services that serves as the bedrock of globalization. American naval forces also play an important role in shaping the foreign policy and strategic choices of other states, friend and foe alike.

Although the United States is unlikely to face a blue-water naval competitor in the near future, it will face adversaries who have invested in anti-access and area-denial capabilities. It also faces terrorist groups who use the sea to transport people and arms, as well as use it as an avenue to attack the United States or its allies. In addition, the United States and its allies must deal with states and non-state actors who use the seas for illicit activities.

Three strategic challenges seem likely to dominate U.S. national security planning. Together, these challenges will determine the size and shape of the U.S. armed forces over coming decades.

The first is the so-called Long War, a protracted global counterinsurgency campaign against jihadist terrorist groups and their supporters.

A second, related challenge is the need to defend the U.S. homeland in depth and to prevent terrorist groups from acquiring and using nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

The third challenge is the need to shape the choices of other major powers, particularly those of China. China's rise does not necessarily mean competition, let alone conflict. It does, however, offer the most plausible contingency in which the U.S. Navy would confront stressing operational and strategic challenges, such as the need to operate in an anti-access or area-denial environment. In addition, Iran and North Korea, regional powers with substantial military capabilities, present serious strategic challenges to the United States. American naval forces would be in the thick of the fight in any future conflict involving Iran or North Korea.

This case focuses on the strategic purposes and operational forms of future wars at sea and in the littorals. It analyzes trends in naval doctrine and explores how technology is influencing the evolution of maritime strategy and operations. It also examines the role of naval forces in shaping the maritime environment.

B. Topics for Discussion:

1. How can U.S. maritime forces contribute to the national security of the United States over the next two to three decades?

2. To what extent will technology alter the character of war at sea over the next two to three decades?

3. How is technological innovation and diffusion producing operational capabilities that undermine the United States' command of the maritime commons?

4. To what extent, and under what conditions, does the concept of sea control retain its relevance?

5. To what extent and in what ways can maritime operations contribute to strategic success in the Long War?

6. How does command of the maritime commons contribute to homeland defense?

7. What can an understanding of Clausewitz contribute to the development of strategy and operational concepts for fighting the Long War?

8. What lessons do the major regional wars examined in the Strategy and War Course hold for the maritime dimension of a conflict with China?

9. What lessons do the major regional wars examined in the Strategy and War Course hold for the maritime dimension of a conflict with North Korea?

10. What lessons do the major regional wars examined in the Strategy and War Course hold for the maritime dimension of a conflict with Iran?

11. To what extent and in what ways might maritime operations contribute to strategic success in a conflict with China?

12. What strategic challenges would the United States face in a war with China?

13. What strategic and operational considerations should planners keep in mind in contemplating a conflict with China across the Taiwan Straits?

14. What difference would it make if the U.S. Navy could not support national policy and objectives? What would be the strategic consequences for the nation of such a failure?

15. Assess the value of foundational maritime strategists, as represented by Mahan and Corbett, for understanding the strategic and operational challenges facing the U.S. Navy in the twenty-first century.

16. Will submarines, mines, and missiles, in the hands of a major regional power, deny the U.S. Navy maritime access to critical regions of the globe?

17. Assess the principal risks that confront large surface combatants operating in the littoral waters of a major regional power. What strategic considerations might justify the running of such high-risk operations?

18. Assess the value of the strategic prescriptions attributed to Sun Tzu for understanding a conflict with China across the Taiwan Straits.

19. Assess the value of Mao's strategic writings for examining the asymmetric strategies of irregular warfare employed by the United States' adversaries in the Long War.

20. The example of Pearl Harbor, studied earlier in the course, suggests that naval forces may be at risk of preemptive surprise attack. How vulnerable would forward-deployed American naval forces be to a preemptive surprise strike by a major regional power in the twenty-first century?

21. A respected analyst of the role played by information in war writes: "in the new and strange kind of war [on terror] currently being fought, with the extraordinary premium that is placed on timely and accurate information to ward off attacks and to track down the enemy, intelligence may play an even greater role in national security than ever before. But even then, it will never be decisive on its own. Strength is." Do you agree with this assessment that the strategic effect of information will ultimately prove secondary in determining the outcome of the Long War?

22. James Fallows, a well-known policy commentator, posed the following provocative questions: "[W]hat if al-Qaeda's leaders could see their faults and weaknesses as clearly as those of others? What if they had a Clausewitz or Sun Tzu to speak frankly to them?" How might Clausewitz and the author of the *Sun Tzu* assess the strategies and future strategic prospects of the jihadists?

C. Required Readings:

1. Morgan, Vice Admiral John G., USN, and Rear Admiral Charles W. Martoglio, USN, "The 1,000-Ship Navy Global Maritime Network," *Proceedings* (November 2005), pages 14-17; Lieutenant General James N. Mattis, USMC, and Lieutenant Colonel Frank Hoffman, USMCR (Ret.), "Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars," *Proceedings* (November 2005), pages 18-19. (Selected Readings)

[These articles by Navy and Marine Corps leaders provide complementary views of future naval and maritime warfare.]

2. Till, Geoffrey. *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century*. London: Frank Cass, 2004. Chapters 4, 9-10. Pages 113-147, 271-378.

[The chapters from this book by one of the world's leading naval strategists explore the role of technology in naval warfare, as well as navies in diplomacy and enforcing standards of international conduct.]

3. Uhlig, Frank. "The Constants of Naval Warfare," *Naval War College Review*, vol. 50, no. 2 (Spring 1997), pages 92-105. (Selected Readings)

[This article by Frank Uhlig, the Editor Emeritus of the *Naval War College Review*, argues that despite changes in naval technology, at the operational level naval missions have remained constant from the late eighteenth century to the present day.]

4. Posen, Barry R. "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony," *International Security* vol. 28, no. 4 (Spring 2004), pages 125-160. (Selected Readings)

[In this article Barry Posen, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, argues that superiority at sea, in the air, and in space form the military foundation of American dominance of the international strategic environment. He discusses the nature of that superiority as well as challenges to it. (Those who have taken the National Security and Decision Making Course will only need to review this article before seminar, because they have already read it during the previous term.)]

5. Department of Defense. *Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2006. (Selected Readings)

[This reading represents the official Defense Department assessment of China's policy, strategy, and operational capabilities.]

6. Betts, Richard K. and Thomas J. Christensen. "China: Getting the Questions Right," *The National Interest*, no. 62 (Winter 2000/2001), pages 17-29. (Selected Readings)

[This article by Betts, a professor at Columbia University and one of the nation's foremost thinkers on strategic studies, and Christensen, a Princeton University professor currently serving in government and an expert on Chinese foreign policy and strategy, provides a framework for thinking about the future of the U.S.-China relationship. The authors argue that China can cause problems for the United States even if it does not become a peer competitor, does not intend aggression, integrates into the world economy, and liberalizes politically.]

7. Rahman, Chris. "Ballistic Missiles in China's Anti-Taiwan Blockade Strategy," in Bruce A. Elleman and S.C.M. Paine, eds., *Naval Blockades and Seapower: Strategies and Counter-Strategies, 1805-2005*. London: Routledge, 2005. Pages 215-224. (Selected Readings)

[This short analysis examines the strategic effects of China's missile tests during the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis, arguing that they amounted to a partial and temporary blockade of the island.]

8. O'Hanlon, Michael. "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan," *International Security*, vol. 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000), pages 51-86. (Selected Readings)

[This article, by a well-known defense expert at the Brookings Institution, explores future conflict scenarios between China and Taiwan. O'Hanlon argues that China cannot invade Taiwan even if the United States does not intervene. He also argues that a ballistic missile attack or naval blockade are more likely but also quite difficult.]

9. Goldstein, Lyle and William Murray. "Undersea Dragons: China's Maturing Submarine Force," *International Security*, vol. 28, no. 4 (Spring 2004), pages 161-196. (Selected Readings)

[This article, by two professors in the Naval War College's Center for Naval Warfare Studies, provides a more pessimistic assessment of the China-Taiwan military balance. The authors assess the modernization of China's submarine force and also critique O'Hanlon's article, above.]

10. Kilcullen, David J. "Countering Global Insurgency," *Journal of Strategic Studies* vol. 28, no. 4 (August 2005), pages 597-617. (Selected Readings)

[This article, by a retired Australian army officer serving now as the Chief Strategist in the office of the State Department's Coordinator for Counterterrorism, argues that the Global War on Terrorism should be conceived of as a global insurgency. The author suggests a strategy of "disaggregation" to break the bonds between terrorist networks.]

11. Luft, Gal, and Anne Korin. "Terrorism Goes to Sea," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 83, no. 6 (November/December 2004), pages 61-71. (Selected Readings)

[This article, by two experts on international energy, explores the rise of piracy and terrorist use of the seas.]

12. Baer, George W. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 418-444.

[This reading, by a professor and former chairman of the Strategy and Policy Department, discusses the development of the Maritime Strategy as a way of competing with the Soviet Union during the late Cold War.]

13. Gray, Colin S. *Recognizing and Understanding Revolutionary Change in Warfare: The Sovereignty of Context*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006. Available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB640.pdf. (Selected Readings)

[This reading, by a leading contemporary strategic thinker, provides a critical review of the concept of revolutionary military change. The author clarifies and critiques the concept of a "Revolution in Military Affairs," exploring both the changing and unchanging dimensions of warfare.]

14. Strachan, Hew, "The Lost Meaning of Strategy," *Survival*, vol. 47, no. 3 (Autumn 2005), pages 33-54. (Selected Readings)

[This article, by a noted professor of war studies at Oxford University, offers a critique of American and British policy and strategy, arguing that the term "strategy" is often misused in contemporary national security discussions.]

15. Department of Defense. "Operationalizing the Strategy," in *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, February 2006. Pages 19-40. (Selected Readings)

[This chapter from the *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report* describes the challenges that the United States will face in coming years, the United States' aims in dealing with those challenges, and the strategy to address them. It serves as an analytical framework for thinking about the strategic challenges the U.S. Navy must address.]

16. *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*. Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, February 2006. (Selected Readings)

[*The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism* is the Defense Department's strategy for waging the Long War.]

17. *National Strategy for Maritime Security*. Washington, D.C.: White House, 2005. (Selected Readings)

[This reading describes the joint and interagency strategy of the United States for achieving maritime security. It describes threats to maritime security, outlines strategic objectives, and discusses strategic actions to achieve those objectives.]

18. *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.* Washington, D.C.: White House, September 2006. Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/index.html. (Selected Readings)

[This reading is the updated strategy put forward by the administration for fighting the war on terror. In this important reading, the war on terror is described as "both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas."]

XI. ILC: SEA POWER AND MARITIME STRATEGY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Bracken, Paul. *Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age*. New York: Harper Collins, 1999.

Cordesman, Anthony H. and Abraham R. Wagner. *The Lessons of Modern War, Volume 3, the Afghan and Falklands Conflicts*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990.

"Damn the Torpedoes: Debating Possible U.S. Navy Losses in a Taiwan Scenario," in *International Security* 28, no. 1 (Summer 2003), pages 5-46.

Freedman, Lawrence. *The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, 2 volumes*. London: Routledge, 2005.

Friedman, Norman. *Seapower as Strategy: Navies and National Interests*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001.

Glosny, Michael A. "Strangulation from the Sea? A PRC Submarine Blockade of Taiwan," in *International Security* 28, no. 4 (Spring 2004), pages 125-160.

Goldstein, Avery. *Rising to the Challenge: China's Grand Strategy and International Security*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005.

Goldstein, Lyle J., John B. Hattendorf, and Yuri M. Zhukov, eds. "The Cold War at Sea: An International Appraisal," special issue of *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, no. 2 (April 2005).

Hattendorf, John B. *The Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy, 1977-1986, Newport Paper 19*. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004.

Nincic, Donna J., "The Challenge of Maritime Terrorism: Threat Identification, WMD and Regime Response," in *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, no. 4 (August 2005), pages 619-644.

Russell, Richard L. "What If…China Attacks Taiwan," in *Parameters* 31, no. 3 (Fall 2001).

Smith, General Sir Rupert. *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*. London: Allen Lane, 2005.

Terrill, Ross, "What Does China Want?" *The Wilson Quarterly* 29, no. 4 (Autumn 2005), pages 50-61.

Woodward, Sandy. *One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992.

Work, Robert. *The Challenge of Maritime Transformation: Is Bigger Better?* Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2002.

ANNEX D- PLANNING CALENDAR

Intermediate Level Course **OCTOBER 2006**

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY
2	3	4	5	6
9	10	11	12	13
16	17	18	19	20
23	24	25	26 CNCS concludes NSDM S&P Introductory Presentation-Spruance 1300-1400 Introductory Seminars: Seminar Rooms: "A" Seminars 2:15-3:15 "B" Seminars 3:30-4:30	27 0830-1600: Student Preparation/Tutorials/ Physical Fitness Time
30 0830-1600: Student Preparation/Tutorials/ Physical Fitness Time	31 WEEK I: Masters of War 0830-0945: Presentation-Spruance 1015-1130: Presentation-Spruance			

ILC

NOVEMBER 2006

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY
		1 0830-0945: Presentation-Spruance 1015-1130: Presentation-Spruance	2 0830-1130: "A" Seminars-Seminar Rooms (Masters of War)	3 0830-1130: "B" Seminars-Seminar Rooms (Masters of War)
6 WEEK II: Sea Power, Combined Ops, and Irregular Warfare 0830-0945: Presentation-Spruance 1015-1130: Presentation-Spruance	7 0830-0945: Presentation-Spruance 1015-1130: Presentation-Spruance	8 0830-1130: "A" Seminars-Seminar Rooms (Sea Power, Combined Ops, and Irregular Warfare)	9 0830-1130: "B" Seminars-Seminar Rooms (Sea Power, Combined Ops, and Irregular Warfare)	10 VETERANS DAY NSC IPV
13 0830-1600: Student Preparation/Tutorials/ Physical Fitness Time NSC IPV	14 INTERSESSIONAL CONFERENCE NSC IPV	15 WEEK III: Maritime Strategy and Joint Ops in Regional War 1300-1415: Presentation-Spruance 1445-1600: Presentation-Spruance Graduation-(AM) NSC IPV	16 0830-0945: Presentation-Spruance 1015-1130: Presentation-Spruance Electives Begin NSC IPV	17 0830-1600: Student Preparation/Tutorials/ Physical Fitness Time Electives NSC IPV
20 0830-1130: "A" Seminars-Seminar Rooms (Maritime Strategy and Joint Ops in Regional War) Electives	21 0830-1130: "B" Seminars-Seminar Rooms (Maritime Strategy and Joint Ops in Regional War) Electives	22 Student Admin Day	23 THANKSGIVING RECESS	24 THANKSGIVING RECESS
27 WEEK IV: Waging Total War: Interdependence of Joint Ops 0830-0945: Presentation-Spruance 1015-1130: Presentation-Spruance	28 0830-0945: Presentation-Spruance 1015-1130: Presentation-Spruance	29 0830-1130: "A" Seminars-Seminar Rooms (Joint Ops in Total War) Electives	30 0830-1130: "B" Seminars-Seminar Rooms (Joint Ops in Total War) Electives	

ILC

DECEMBER 2006

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY
				1 **WEEK V: Victory at Sea: Transforming Naval Warfare** 0830-0945: Presentation-Spruance 1015-1130: Presentation-Spruance
4 0830-0945: Presentation-Spruance 1015-1130: Presentation-Spruance	5 0830-1130: "A" Seminars-Seminar Rooms (Transforming Naval Warfare)	6 0830-1130: "B" Seminars-Seminar Rooms (Transforming Naval Warfare) Electives	7 **WEEK VI: Fighting and Terminating a Regional War** 0830-0945: Presentation-Spruance 1015-1130: Presentation-Spruance Electives	8 0830-1600: Student Preparation/Tutorials/ Physical Fitness Time President's Cup
11 0830-0945: Presentation-Spruance 1015-1130: Presentation-Spruance NSC IPV	12 0830-1130: "A" Seminars-Seminar Rooms (Fighting and Terminating a Regional War) NSC IPV	13 0830-1130: "B" Seminars-Seminar Rooms (Fighting and Terminating a Regional War) Electives NSC IPV	14 **WEEK VII: Terrorism: Strategy and Operations** 0830-0945: Presentation-Spruance 1015-1130: Presentation-Spruance Electives NSC IPV	15 0830-0945: Presentation-Spruance 1015-1130: Presentation-Spruance NSC IPV
18 0830-1130: "A" Seminars-Seminar Rooms (Terrorism: Strategy and Operations)	19 0830-1130: "B" Seminars-Seminar Rooms (Terrorism: Strategy and Operations)	20 **WEEK VIII: Counter-insurgency Ops, Failing States** 0830-0945: Presentation-Spruance 1015-1130: Presentation-Spruance Electives	21 0830-0945: Presentation-Spruance 1015-1130: Presentation-Spruance Electives	22 0830-1600 Student Preparation/Tutorials/ Physical Fitness Time
25 HOLIDAY RECESS	26 HOLIDAY RECESS	27 HOLIDAY RECESS	28 HOLIDAY RECESS	29 HOLIDAY RECESS

ILC

JANUARY 2007

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY
1 NEW YEARS DAY HOLIDAY RECESS	2 HOLIDAY RECESS	3 0830-1130: "A" Seminars-Seminar Rooms (Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Operations) Electives	4 0830-1130: "B" Seminars-Seminar Rooms (Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Operations) Electives	5 WEEK IX: New World Order: Joint Ops in a Major Regional War 0830-0945: Presentation-Spruance 1015-1130: Presentation-Spruance
8 0830-0945: Presentation-Spruance 1015-1130: Presentation-Spruance	9 0830-1130: "A" Seminars-Seminar Rooms (Joint Planning and Ops in Regional War)	10 0830-1130: "B" Seminars-Seminar Rooms (Joint Planning and Ops in Regional War) Electives	11 WEEK X: Multi-theater and Interagency Ops in the Long War 0830-0945: Presentation-Spruance 1015-1130: Presentation-Spruance Electives	12 0830-1600: Student Preparation/Tutorials/Physical Fitness Time
15 DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING HOLIDAY	16 0830-0945: Presentation-Spruance 1015-1130: Presentation-Spruance	17 0830-1130: "A" Seminars-Seminar Rooms (Multi-theater and Interagency Ops in the Long War) Electives	18 0830-1130: "B" Seminars-Seminar Rooms (Multi-theater and Interagency Ops in the Long War) Electives	19 WEEK XI: Sea Power and Maritime Strategy in the 21ST Century 0830-0945: Presentation-Spruance 1015-1130: Presentation-Spruance
22 0830-0945: Presentation-Spruance 1015-1130: Presentation-Spruance	23 0830-1130: "A" Seminars-Seminar Rooms (Sea Power and Maritime Strategy in the 21st Century) Electives	24 0830-1130: "B" Seminars-Seminar Rooms (Sea Power and Maritime Strategy in the 21st Century) Electives	25 0830: FINAL EXAM DISTRIBUTED	26 0830: FINAL EXAM RETURNED TRIMESTER ENDS
29 CNCS ADMIN DAY	30 CNCS FINAL GRADES DUE	31 CNCS GRADUATION 10:00		